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Abstract 
 
Although institutional shareholders are still in their infancy in China, Chinese 
institutional shareholder activism in corporate governance is drawing public attention 
in state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform. Since the United Kingdom (UK) and United 
States (US) are at the forefront in this regard, a comparative study was conducted to 
explore whether Chinese institutional investors activism could influence corporate 
governance as their UK and US counterparts and whether the possibility of more 
institutional shareholder activism in China exists as the country rides on the current 
wave of economic reform. 
 
A contractual perspective of the firm and principal–agent relationship between 
members provide a useful tool to get a better understanding of the internal structure of 
organizations. Therefore, the thesis begins with the agency theory and the analysis of 
agency problems existed in each jurisdiction serve as a foundation for further research. 
Apart from the legal research, historical and political perspective of research were 
adopted. On the one hand, the factors that promote the development of institutional 
shareholders are analysed with the evolution of the ownership structure. This 
retrospective assists with an understanding of the wider context in which institutional 
shareholder activism emerged. On the other hand, the socialist ideology and political 
legitimacy management by the Chinese Communist Party deeply influence every aspect 
of Chinese economy. The political influence is discussed and Chinese institutional 
shareholder activism analysed under the influence of political factors.  
 
Given the fact that institutional shareholder activism operates within a complex 
framework, a breakdown of shareholder activism by typologies of institutional 
investors and forms of activism is presented. The extent of institutional shareholder 
activism in the UK, US and China was explored from an empirical perspective. 
Academic research, reports from institutional investors and industry associations, 
related news, and cases were collected to assist with the study. Although it appears that 
there is institutional shareholder activism with similar features in the UK, US and China, 
the role that institutional shareholder activism plays in corporate governance is different. 
Nine factors that contribute to the difference in institutional shareholder activism are 
presented. Based on these findings, the research suggests that although institutional 
  
shareholder activism is rational and beneficial to corporate performance under certain 
circumstances, and more institutional shareholder activism can be expected as it fits 
within a broad tapestry of economic reform, it is not easy for Chinese institutional 
shareholders to overcome their passivity and engage in corporate governance actively. 
The possible way forward was analysed at the end of the thesis. 
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State Owned Enterprise reform 
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1 
 
Introduction 
 
With the development of modern enterprises, and the separation between ownership 
and control, founders who provide ‘start-up’ capital for companies no longer 
completely control these companies. The result is that professionally trained managers 
are hired with the expectation that their specialised human capital could maximise 
profits. Given the fact that contracts between shareholders and managers cannot specify 
every possible aspect, some degree of control rights needs to be allocated to managers 
to allow them to make decisions when contingencies that were not foreseen in contracts 
occur at some point in the future. According to Jensen and Meckling, when one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) entrust other persons (the agent(s)) to act on their behalf with 
certain decision-making power passed on to the agent, an agency relationship is 
generated.1 Therefore, a principal–agent relationship is formed between shareholders 
and managers. However, it has to be acknowledged that everyone has a self-interested 
utility-maximising motivation and managers are no exception in this regard. With 
considerable control rights and the advantage of information at their disposal, managers 
are likely to benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders’ profits. Therefore, 
agency problems are generated in this process. 
 
Apart from the agency problems between shareholders and managers, the agency 
relationship between majority shareholders and minority shareholders could generate 
problems as well. To alleviate the agency problems, on the one hand, the distribution 
of powers among different participants in the business entities is sophisticatedly 
designed; on the other hand, those who are outsiders of the business entities, such as 
regulators, governments, trade unions, financial institutions and the market itself, 
exercise an external monitoring function. This system of checks and balances is 
corporate governance.2 Although an attempt has been made to build a sophisticated 
mechanism to ensure that corporates operate efficiently with minimum agency costs, 
growing corporate scandals, the collapse of world-renowned companies and the recent 
worldwide financial crisis serve as evidence of some kind of failure in corporate 
governance mechanisms.  
                                                          
1 Michael C Jensen and William H Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305.  
2 For a definition of corporate governance, see section 1.1.  
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‘Like poets and revolutionaries, corporate law scholars and policymakers dream. If only 
we could find the silver bullet, the wonder drug, we could solve the manager–
shareholder agency cost problem that is the focus of much of corporate law.’ 3 
Institutional shareholders, with their large portion of equity holdings and ability to 
influence their investee companies, are regarded as the ‘wonder drug’ of corporate 
governance problems or, at least, a drug worth trying. However, the question of the role 
that institutional shareholders should play in corporate governance is a complex one 
and the call for increased institutional shareholder activism is not the subject of 
consensus.4 The excessive risk taking and short-term actions bolstered the criticism 
against institutional shareholder activism. While there is no consistent consensus in the 
scholarly literature on the extent to which institutional shareholders should engage with 
their investee companies, most scholars agree that a certain degree of institutional 
shareholder activism is needed to improve corporate governance. During the past 
decades institutional investors have increasingly engaged in corporate governance 
activities in the United Kingdom5 and United States of America6. In China, although 
institutional shareholders are still in their infancy, news about Chinese institutional 
shareholder activism is drawing public attention. Institutional shareholder activism 
appears to have come of age. 
 
China is standing at the crossroads of state-owned enterprise7 reform. In August 2015, 
Guidance Opinions on the Deepening of Reform of State-owned Enterprises8 were 
issued by the Central Committee and the State Council. The Guidance Opinions provide 
30 specific guidelines for mixed ownership reform of China’s SOEs. In the period 
2015–2017, various guidelines and opinions were issued to map out SOE mixed 
ownership reform. The mixed ownership reform is aimed at diversifying the ownership 
structure of SOEs in order to boost the efficiency in SOEs.9 Given the fact that SOEs 
                                                          
3 Edward B Rock, ‘Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance’ in Oxford Handbook on Corporate 
Law and Governance (2015) University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper 
No. 14–37.  
4 See Chapter 3. 
5 Hereinafter ‘UK’. 
6 Hereinafter ‘US’. 
7 Hereinafter ‘SOE’. 
8 Hereinafter ‘the Guidance Opinion’. ‘Guidance Opinions on the Deepening of Reform of State-owned 
Enterprises’ [ 中 共 中 央 、 国 务 院 关 于 深 化 国 有 企 业 改 革 的 指 导 意 见 ] 2015 
<http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-09/13/content_2930440.htm> accessed 8 November 2016. 
9 See section 3.4.2.1.3 of this thesis.  
3 
 
are large in size, small companies and individuals are too weak to participate in this 
reform process. Hence, institutional shareholders and some powerful companies are 
expected to play a major role in the reform. A senior officer responsible for SOE reform 
remarked that institutional investors – like national social security funds and insurance 
funds – are top priorities when looking for private investors in the mixed ownership 
reform.10 Institutional shareholders are given the expectation that they could engage in 
corporate governance actively as their UK and US counterparts so as to alleviate severe 
agency problems within SOEs. This boils down to a foundational question: do Chinese 
institutional investors have the capacity to perform the role now expected of them? 
 
In order to answer this core question, this thesis adopts a comparative scholarship 
between the UK, US and China. Given the fact that institutional shareholder activism 
operates within a complex framework, the comparative study focuses on (1) the 
different agency problems that institutional shareholders encounter; (2) reasons for the 
development of institutional investors; (3) the influence from the wider context, such 
as political, ideological and legal factors; (4) typologies of institutional investors and 
different forms of activism; (5) and the differences in the effects of institutional 
shareholder activism and reasons behind such differences. There are two reasons for 
choosing the UK and US as objectives when doing the comparison. First, the UK and 
US enjoy the reputation of being leaders in corporate governance,11 and they keep their 
advantages in the area of research on institutional shareholder activism. An in-depth 
comparison is beneficial in that it provides either experiences or lessons to inspire their 
Chinese counterparts. Second, although there are huge differences between the UK, US 
and China in terms of ideology, state power, economic structure and share ownership 
structure, the development of company law and corporate governance in China is itself 
a continual borrowing process from the UK and US, and there are many resemblances 
between these three countries. There is, therefore, comparability between these 
countries and legal transplantation is possible. 
 
                                                          
10 Yitian Zhu, ‘Pension funds and Chinese investors are top priorities in SOE reform’ [国企混改优先考
虑 社 保 和 中 国 投 资 者 ] (Wall Street News, 29 December 2014) 
<https://wallstreetcn.com/articles/212537> accessed 8 November 2016. 
11 The UK and US scored the top among 49 countries in a survey conducted by the World Bank. World 
Economic Forum 2003, cited in Qiao Liu, ‘Corporate Governance in China: Current Practices, Economic 
Effects and Institutional Determinants’ (2006) 52 CESifo Economic Studies 432.  
4 
 
Considering that the contractual perspective of the firm and principal-agent relationship 
between members not only provide a useful tool to get a better understanding of the 
internal structure of organizations, but also permeate and drive the whole corporate 
governance discourse, the thesis begins with the contractual theory of the firm and uses 
agency theory as the analytical basis for this research. This is followed by corporate 
governance mechanisms that are aimed at relieving agency problems. Chapter 2 probes 
the reasons for the development and growth of institutional investors, and data are 
presented to characterize the size of the different institutional investors in the UK, US 
and China. The third chapter provides a detailed theoretical analysis of institutional 
shareholder activism. In essence, three question are answered in this chapter: (1) is 
shareholder activism rational? (2) what are the reasons for institutional shareholder 
passivity? and (3) why is there currently a growth in institutional shareholder activism. 
Chapter 4 deals with institutional shareholder activism in the UK and US in an 
empirical way. It first reviews the factors that influence institutional shareholder 
activism, then the typologies of activism, followed by how different institutional 
shareholders deploy these types of activism. This chapter ends with an analysis of how 
the factors mentioned at the beginning influence the engagement activities of UK and 
US institutional shareholders. Chapter 5 looks at institutional shareholder activism in 
China in an empirical way. The research was conducted under a similar structure to that 
used in Chapter 4. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. It contains a summary of the findings 
in Chapters 4 and 5 on the different influences of institutional shareholder activism in 
corporate governance in these three countries, and then cites the reasons that led to these 
differences. Finally, the chapter explores the possibility of developing Chinese 
institutional shareholder activism and the possible way forward. 
 
This thesis offers three original approaches: first, it adopts a historical perspective in 
the first two chapters, and takes stock of the evolution of share ownership structure and 
the development of institutional shareholders. This retrospective assists with an 
understanding of the wider context in which, and push factors that resulted in, the 
emergence and development of institutional shareholder activism. Second, the political 
control of SOEs by the State is a force that cannot be ignored and this thesis brings this 
political influence into discussion. The theme of political legitimacy management by 
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the Chinese Communist Party12 runs throughout the thesis and this is the first time that 
institutional shareholder activism under the influence of the state has been analysed. In 
Chinese context, the political reform and governmental influence play an vital role in 
influencing every aspects of corporate governance. Only by embedding institutional 
shareholders into this broader political territory, can we get a clear picture about its 
nature and function. Third, this thesis situates institutional shareholder activism within 
a more complete framework and treats this form of activism as a kind of behaviour 
adopted by various types of subjects that are different in aims, objectives, motives and 
preferences. The contribution of this thesis lies in exploring that whether Chinese 
institutional investor activism could influence corporate governance as in the same way 
its UK and US counterparts and whether the possibility of more institutional 
shareholder activism in China exists as the country rides on the current wave of 
economic reform by taking both legal and political elements into account.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Hereinafter ‘CPC’. 
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Chapter 1: Agency Problems and Corporate Governance Mechanism 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the background information 
that is necessary for the later discussion on institutional shareholder activism in this 
research. Corporate law and governance can only fulfil their role appropriately if the 
problems that need to be addressed are known. A contractual perspective of the firm 
and principal–agent relationship between members provide a useful tool to get a better 
understanding of the internal structure of organizations. Therefore, this chapter starts 
with an examination of the contractual theory and agency problems. Sections 1.2 and 
1.3 deal with the UK, US and China respectively. Each section begins with a description 
of the evolution of share ownership structure, followed by the kind of agency problems 
that are generated in certain share ownership structures. These sections then examine 
the corporate governance frameworks that have been designed to relieve agency 
problems. Section 1.4 concludes with a brief summary.   
 
1.1 Contractual perspective of the firm and principal–agent relationship 
 
Before Coase published The Nature of the Firm in 1937,1 the conventional theory of 
the firm, which is often referred to as the ‘neoclassical theory of the firm’, was the 
dominant theory in economics.2 Put briefly, the reasons for the existence of the firm, in 
the eyes of economists, were that the firm ‘was a means of realizing economies of scale 
in the production of goods and services’.3 Firms could collect different inputs, combine 
their effectively by means of their specialization and output it as final products.4 As a 
response to the radical change in the economic and political landscapes5 in the late 
1970s, neoliberalism came onto the stage and Coase’s theory became part of the 
standard microeconomic literature as it focused on the perspective that was ignored by 
                                                          
1 Ronald H Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4 Economica 386. 
2 Thomas S Ulen, ‘The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics’ (1992) 18 Journal of Corporate Law 301. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Brian R Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure, and Operation (Clarendon Press 1997) 4. 
5 Such as the stagflation in this period and competition with new-born economies such as Japan and West 
Germany. See details in David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2005 Oxford University Press). 
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neoclassical theory, that is, what precisely it is that went on in this ‘black box’.6 Coase’s 
central thesis is that the emergence of a firm to supersede a market is because the 
difference in costs, that is, the costs of operating institutions are lower than the 
operation of a market.7 Transactions will be undertaken within the firm when the cost 
of an internal transaction is lower than the external market as firms and markets are 
alternative forms of contracting, with the minimization of transaction costs determining 
the choice of the two. However, the utilization of ‘some authority to direct the 
resource’8 is not free of charge.9 The boundaries of the firm would be settled when the 
costs of using the organizational structure are equal to the expenses of organizing such 
a deal in the market.10  
 
Coase’s work paved the way for the further development of contractual theory, 
including transaction cost economics and principal–agent theory, which are two main 
strands of scholarship, with the former focusing on the relationship between the firm 
and the market and the latter focusing on the internal organizational structure of the 
firm.11 Alchian and Demsetz developed the theory that the emergence of the firm was 
a response to the benefits of team production.12 Williamson made a deep and far-
reaching analysis of transaction cost economics by pointing out that post-contractual 
opportunism could result in the problem of shirking and that bringing a transaction from 
the market into the firm could mitigate this opportunistic behaviour.13 Principal–agency 
theory recognizes conflicts of interest between different economic actors. As a result, 
careful monitoring within a production team is necessary.14 Jensen and Meckling first 
formulated the conception that the corporation was ‘a nexus of contracts’ and further 
                                                          
6  Ronald H Coase, ‘The Institutional Structure of Production’ (1992) 82 The American Economic 
Review 713. 
7 Steven NS Cheung, ‘The Contractual Nature of the Firm’ (1983) 26 The Journal of Law and Economics 
12. 
8 Coase (n 1) 391. 
9 The information asymmetry and administration of employees in the hierarchical structure in the firm 
would also be costly. 
10 Coase (n 1) 395. 
11 Oliver Hart, ‘An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm.’ (1989) 89 Columbia Law 
Review 1762. 
12 Armen A Alchian and Harold Demsetz. ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization’ (1972) 62 The American Economic Review 777. 
13 Oliver E Williamson, ‘Transaction Cost Economics: The Comparative Contracting Perspective’ (1987) 
8 Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization 627. See also Henry N Butler, ‘The Contractual 
Theory of the Corporation’ (1989) 11 George Mason University Law Review 99, 100. 
14 Alchian and Demsetz (n 12) 790. 
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investigated the agency relationship by giving it an exact definition15 and demonstrated 
other related issues.16 As mentioned above, the agency theory focuses on the internal 
organizational structure of the firm. It is therefore a great lens with which to look inside 
the firm to see how the corporate governance mechanisms work. Before discussing 
agency problems and corporate governance frameworks, it is necessary to clarify this 
theoretical foundation: 
 
Agency theory is a useful tool for looking at corporations in the free market economy, 
such as the UK and US, as contractual theory requires a free and competitive market to 
survive. It is therefore not surprising that the rationality behind using agency theory in 
the Chinese context might be challenged as the extent of market orientation of the 
Chinese economy is still debatable. There are two reasons for explaining its 
appropriateness. First, almost all the theories are imperfect and the contractual theory 
is, to some extent, unsatisfactory. Although the contractual theory is meant to point out 
the voluntary, market-orientated nature of the firm, it has gone too far to neglect that 
there is no distinct line between the public and private elements in the lives of most 
persons and institutions, which means that the world is neither a complex of contracts, 
nor is it a delegated sovereign authority.17 As Bratton pointed out: ‘freedom of contract 
is freedom to ask the sovereign to confer power constraining your freedom on another 
party. At the same time, contract cannot exist where sovereign control is complete, it 
requires some minimum of individual autonomy.’18 Therefore, it is hard to make a 
thorough distinction between the market and the political environment, since they are 
intermixed to some extent. Eisenberg also stated that the contractual theory only caught 
half of the truth and the firm was not only a hierarchical organization, but also a 
‘bureaucratic hierarchical organization’.19 Therefore, Bratton claimed that the complex 
coexistence (i.e., contracts, hierarchies and the state) should be accepted as a starting 
                                                          
15 In Jensen and Meckling’s opinion, an agency relationship is ‘a contract under which one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent’. See Michael C Jensen and 
William H Meckling. ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure.’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305.  
16 Ibid 306. 
17 William W Bratton, ‘Nexus of Contracts Corporation: A Critical Appraisal’ (1988) 74 Cornell Law 
Review 407. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Melvin A Eisenberg, ‘The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual 
Nature of the Firm.’ (1998) 24 The Journal of Corporate Law 819.  
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point of the theory. Secondly, as will be discussed later in this chapter,20 since the first 
company law promulgated in 1993, liberalistic and market-oriented reform has never 
stopped in China, and the reform of SOEs and the promulgation of 2006 companies law 
was under the direction of ‘free-market and contractual theory’.21 Therefore, a market 
with state intervention should not be viewed as a market that rejects free contracting to 
prevent the application of contractual theory. The theory serves as a useful tool to 
examine the elements of corporate relationship closer. Therefore, it may seem 
inappropriate at first glance to apply contractual theory to the Chinese context. However, 
this theory was widely applied and works well when considering the internal 
relationship within companies in China. 
 
Having clarified this theoretical foundation, this chapter moves on to the principal–
agent relationship. When one or more persons (the principal(s)) entrust other persons 
(the agent(s) to act on their behalf with certain decision-making power passed on to the 
agent, an agency relationship is generated. 22  There are three kinds of agency 
relationships that could exist in business firms:  (1) a vertical agency relationship 
between shareholders and managers; (2) a horizontal agency relationship between 
majority shareholders and minority shareholders; and an (3) agency relationship 
between a firm itself and other contractual parties. 23  As the third kind of agency 
relationship could be regulated by other laws, such as contract law and tort law, it is, 
therefore, beyond the present discussion in the area of company law. However, the 
interest may not always be aligned between principals and agents, therefore, agency 
cost arises between the shareholders (principals) and the managers (agents) in three 
aspects: ‘the monitoring expenditures by the principal, the bonding expenditures by the 
agent and the residual loss.’24 To lessen the agency costs, controlling and monitoring 
mechanisms are put in place within the organization to align the interests of various 
parties. This checks-and-balances system is corporate governance. 25  The corporate 
                                                          
20 See section 1.3.1.2. 
21 Weiying Zhang, Corporate Theory and the Reform of Chinese Companies[企业理论与中国企业改
革] (Peking University Press 1999) 25. 
22 Jensen and Meckling (n 15) 309. 
23 Reinier Kraakman, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (3rd 
edn Oxford University Press 2017) 36. 
24 Jensen and Meckling (n 15) 312. 
25 David Larcker and Brian Tayan, Corporate Governance Matters: A Closer Look at Organizational 
Choices and their Consequences (Pearson Education 2015). However, there is no accepted definition of 
corporate governance and it has been said to be an ambiguous concept. One of the classic and often cited 
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world today can be divided into the rival system of concentrated and dispersed 
ownership, under which the balance of power may differ: shareholders may be more 
powerful in one jurisdiction, whereas shareholders are in an inferior position in other 
jurisdictions. Therefore, the agency problems may vary in jurisdictions with different 
ownership structures and the corporate governance mechanisms aimed at alleviating 
agency costs may be different. According to Cheffin’s classification, corporate 
governance systems in particular countries divide into two categories: ‘outsider/arm’s-
length’ and ‘insider/control-oriented’. 26  The ‘outsider’ typology is a kind of share 
ownership where the shares are not concentrated in one or more blockholders who enjoy 
decisive influence, it is the individual investors and the institutional investors that own 
the majority of the shares.27 The term ‘arm’s length’ represents the situation where 
investors are less likely to intervene in the operation of a business and keep a rational 
distance from the management team.28 The ‘insider’ typology is the kind of situation 
where share ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few people. The term ‘control-
oriented’ signifies that ‘core’ shareholders are capable of excising considerable 
influence and they hold the control rights tightly in their hands. Although this 
dichotomy could mislead to some extent, 29  it is basically accurate when only 
                                                          
definitions of corporate governance is taken from the Cadbury Report where it is said that ‘corporate 
governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled with boards of directors 
responsible for the governance of the company while the role of the shareholders in governance is to 
appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate structure is in place.’ 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) provided a narrower 
explanation saying that corporate governance is ‘a system by which business corporations are directed 
and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities 
among different participants in the corporation … By doing this, it also provides the structure through 
which company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance … it also provides the structure through which the objectives are set, and the means of 
attaining objectives, and monitoring performance, are determined.’  
26  Brian R Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control: British Business Transformed (Oxford 
Scholarship Online 2010) 5 <http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199236978.do>, accessed 
25 January 2017.  
27 John Armour, Brian R Cheffins and David A Skeel Jr, ‘Corporate Ownership Structure and the 
Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom’ (2002) 1 Faculty Scholarship 
<http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/712\nThis> accessed 3 September 2017. 
28 Ibid.  
29 According to Coffee, first, the assumption that something about the common heritage of the ‘Anglo-
Saxon’ countries – their common law, politics, cultural heritage, or whatever – explains their unique 
convergence on a ‘dispersed ownership’ system of corporate governance simply does not hold up under 
closer analysis. Australia and Canada have origins at least as ‘Anglo-Saxon’ as the United States, but in 
these countries concentrated ownership is more common than dispersed ownership. Second, an even 
more fundamental problem with attempts to attribute dispersed ownership to a particular set of legal or 
political circumstances is that companies with dispersed ownership are present in virtually all developed 
economies. See details in John C Coffee, ‘Dispersed Ownership: The Theories, the Evidence, and the 
Enduring Tension Between 'Lumpers' and 'Splitters'’ (2010) Columbia Law and Economics Working 
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considering the UK, US and China. The UK and US belong to the former camp which 
is characterised by an outsider/arm’s-length system of corporate governance, while 
insider/control-oriented corporate governance predominates in China. In the following 
section the different agency problems and corporate governance mechanisms in these 
two camps respectively are analysed. 
 
1.2 The United Kingdom and the United States 
 
1.2.1 Evolution of ownership structure and vertical agency problems 
 
Since Berle and Means published The Modern Corporation and Private Property, it 
has been widely accepted that modern large corporations, wherever located, will follow 
American norms under which share ownership would be widely dispersed.30 However, 
the empirical work carried out during the 1990s changed the perceptions markedly and 
revealed that a separation of ownership and control was the exception worldwide rather 
than the rule.31 Although dispersed ownership is not the norm, it is received wisdom 
that the UK and US are the spokespersons of dispersed ownership. However, most 
business enterprises start their life with high insider ownership.32 The control power of 
the firm is in the hand of the owners – one or more founders who provide the ‘start-up’ 
capital that is needed to form an enterprise. The divorce of corporate ownership and 
control can only occur when the blockholders are prepared to unwind or dilute their 
stakes and there are sizeable amounts of capital available for the purchase of shares. 
What follows is a brief historical description of the trajectory of the evolution of UK 
and US ownership structures. 
 
                                                          
Paper No. 363 < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1532922>, accessed 4 September 
2017. 
30 Adolf A Berle and Gardiner C Means. The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Macmillan 
1932). 
31 See, for example, Marco Becht and Colin Mayer, ‘Introduction’ in Fabrizio Barca and Marco Becht 
(eds), The Control of Corporate Europe (Oxford University Press 2001) 1–2, 20; Stijin Claessens, Simon 
Djankov and Larry HP Lang, ‘The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations’ 
(2000) Journal of Financial Economics 58, 81. 
32 Jean Helwege, Christo Pirinsky and René Stulz, ‘Why Do Firms Become Widely Held? An Analysis 
of the Dynamics of Corporate Ownership’ (2007) 62 Journal of Finance 995. 
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In UK, the word ‘company’ was first used when merchant adventurers were granted a 
Royal Charter for the purposes of trading overseas33 and business corporations emerged 
as a production of the Royal Charter in the seventeenth century. At the end of the 
seventeenth century, companies could be established without reference to any form of 
explicit state endorsement or involvement.34 Hence, ‘The Bubble Act’ came into force 
in 1720 to underscore the problematic legal status of such enterprises, followed by the 
bursting of the South Sea Bubble. The Industrial Revolution between 1760 and 1830 
provided conditions that were propitious for the widely held company to emerge.35 By 
the end of the eighteenth century, professional brokers and dealers were well developed 
and this led to the formation of an effective market for the trading of securities, the 
London Stock Exchange. By the mid-nineteenth century, a sizeable number of 
enterprises, operating in fields such as utilities, transport, banking, insurance and 
mining, had publicly traded shares and the largest railways were seen to be pioneers of 
the modern-style divorce of ownership and control36 as they had a sizeable shareholder 
base and lacked powerful blockholders. However, at this stage, while a certain amount 
of separation between ownership and control had emerged, control was still in the hands 
of blockholders.37 The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed a rapid 
growth in the number of companies that had made the move to the stock market, not 
only on the London Stock Exchange, but also on provincial stock exchanges.38 Besides, 
tax law provided a fresh incentive to the diffusion of share ownership. Considerations 
of the next generation, the irresistible generous exit offers and the capital-raising for 
mergers were constant incentives to unwind the controlling status.39 The transformation 
                                                          
33 Paul L Davies, Gower & Davies: The Principles of Modern Company Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 9th edn, 
2012). 
34 Cheffins (n 26) 134. 
35 On the period covered, see Joel Mokyr, ‘Editor’s Introduction: The New Economic History and the 
Industrial Revolution’ in Joel Mokyr (ed), The British Industrial Revolution: An Economic Perspective, 
(2nd edn Westview press 1999) 1, 3. 
36 François Crouzet, The Victorian Economy (Routledge 1982) 293; Geoffrey Channon, ‘A Nineteenth 
Century Investment Decision: The Midland Railway’s London Extension’, (1972) 3 Economic History 
Review 449; Terry Gourvish, Railways 1830–70: A Business History (Cambridge University Press 2011) 
83.  
37 According to Cheffins in Corporate Ownership and Control, market forces may be blamed for the 
deterrence in the growth of modern corporate enterprises. Factories usually operated on a small scale 
with no requirements for large capital and a sense of individualism prevailed at that time, and 
blockholders had no incentives. Therefore, they declined to exit.  
38 Edward Victor Morgan, The Stock Exchange: Its History and Functions (Elek Books 1969) 133. There 
are several reasons behind such growth. First is the decline of the factors that hampered diversified 
ownership structure; second is the rise of institutional shareholders. This point will be analysed in more 
detail at Chapter 2. 
39 Cheffins (n 26) 134.  
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to diffused ownership structure still continued. From the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, the pace was accelerated to a fully-fledged outsider/arm‘s-length 
system of ownership and control. Even though Britain’s economy experienced a decline 
in the middle of the twentieth century, competitive pressure, tax rules, company law 
reform and revisions of stock exchange listing rules paved the way for UK companies 
to become dispersed ownership structures. First, profits declined in the middle of the 
twentieth century and legal reforms deterred firms from creating anti-competitive 
alliances to seek refuge, which tempted blockholders to exit. Besides, merger activity 
and public offerings of shares were associated with rising stock prices, making the offer 
to blockholders to exit too good to refuse. Second, company law made its contribution 
to the separation of ownership and control at this stage.40 Third, even though company 
law is a crucial determinant of ownership structure, it arrived too late to act as a catalyst 
for the divorce of ownership and control. Instead, Stock Exchange listing rules filled 
the gap. The London Stock Exchange and provincial stock exchanges each imposed 
requirements on companies seeking to list shares for trading, with the relevant 
regulations being unified after the exchanges federated in 1965.41 Fourth, tax played an 
important role in forcing individual investors to quit. Given the fact that high rates of 
tax were imposed on dividends, those private investors with large incomes therefore 
turned to forms of savings that received more favourable tax treatment.42 Besides, the 
development of institutional shareholders and the establishment of some institutional 
investment organisations during this stage, such as the Institutional Shareholders 
Committee43 in 1973 and the Association of British Insurers44 in 1985, also contributed 
to the diversification of shareholder ownership in the UK. By 1990, the separation of 
ownership and control had become the norm in large business enterprises in the UK.45  
                                                          
40  The Companies Act 1967 further deepened the regulation on disclosure by imposing additional 
requirements to disclose financial data and compelled blockholders to disclose more confidential 
information. The Companies Act 1980 bumped the score from ‘3’ to ‘5’ on La Porta et al’s anti-director 
index and this was attributed to the requirement that companies issuing new shares make the equity 
available on a pro rata basis to existing shareholders in accordance with the percentage of shares already 
owned unless shareholders waived this protection. The Companies Act 1980 also criminalized insider 
dealing for the first time. See details in Rafal La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and 
Robert W Vishny ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 
<http://faculty.som.yale.edu/zhiwuchen/EmergingMarkets/LawAndFinance.pdf> accessed 27 
September 2017. 
41 Davies (n 34) 135.  
42 Marshall E Blume, ‘The Financial Markets’ in Tony Buxton, Paul Chapman, Paul Temple 
(eds), Britain’s Economic Performance (2nd edn Routledge 1997) 317. 
43 Hereinafter ‘ISC’. 
44 Hereinafter ‘ABI”. 
45 Cheffins (n 26) 19. 
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Although it is in the UK rather than in the US that the corporate form of business was 
originated and developed, the suitable soil and climate in the US made it a satisfactory 
place for the growth of corporations. 46  Until the nineteenth century, corporations 
established in the US were limited to public interest enterprises47 and they were mainly 
in the form of individual proprietorship and partnership. During the nineteenth century, 
there were isolated examples of companies with widely held shares and well-developed 
managerial hierarchies.48 Throughout the nineteenth century business enterprises were 
mainly held privately and in industrial enterprises, family control was very much the 
norm.49 The ‘corporate revolution’ occurred between 1880 and 1930.50 During this era, 
ownership evolved from private to public and the contour of the dispersed ownership 
structure took shape. By World War I, Chandler claimed that the crucial transformation, 
with more extensive managerial hierarchies and clear-cut separation of management 
and ownership, was developed. 51 Stock market capitalism thrived in the US during this 
stage. The number of companies traded on the stock exchanges increased rapidly, from 
682 in 1900 to 2,659 in 1930. 52  Some factors could account for this ‘corporate 
revolution‘. First, the growth of the public securities markets in the nineteenth century 
was driven by a lack of capital. Owing to the greater geographic distances to be 
connected in the US, the capital demands on the infrastructure industries, such as 
railroads, steel, auto and telephone, were exceptionally large. Therefore, these large-
scale enterprises needed to draw capital from widely dispersed shareholders and the 
infusion of foreign capital. However, the administrative tasks were too numerous and 
complex in these giants, specially trained full-time managers were needed to deal with 
the day-to-day businesses. The combination of a huge enterprise, special management 
team, and diversified shareholders shifted the control power from the hand of 
shareholders to that of managers. This became the quintessential characteristics of 
                                                          
46  Lori Verstegen Ryan and Marguerite Schneider. ‘The Antecedents of Institutional Investor 
Activism.’ (2002) 27 Academy of Management Review 568. 
47 Berle and Means (n 30). 
48 Naomi R Lamoreaux, ‘Entrepreneurship, Business Organization, and Economic Concentration’ 
(2000) 2 The Cambridge Economic History of the United States, 418. 
49 Ibid 412–13; Thomas R Navin and Marian V Sears. ‘The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities, 
1887–1902’ (1955) 29 Business History Review 112. 
50 Walter Werner, ‘Corporation Law in Search of Its Future’ (1981) 81 Columbia Law Review 1636. 
51 Alfred D Chandler Jr, ‘The United States: Seedbed of Managerial Capitalism’ in Alfred D Chandler 
and Herman Daems (eds) Managerial Hierarchies: Comparative Perspectives on the Rise of the Modern 
Industrial Enterprise (Harvard University Press 1980) 9; Alfred D Chandler Jr, Scale and Scope: The 
Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Harvard University Press 1990) 52, 84–85. 
52  Mary O’Sullivan, ‘The Expansion of the US Stock Market, 1885–1930: Historical Facts and 
Theoretical Fashions’ (2007) 8 Enterprise & Society 498. 
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constructing enterprises in the twentieth century.53  Second, tax rates exerted great 
influence on stock ownership. A sharp wartime increase in taxation of the income of 
the wealthy drove those with high income to switch to tax-favoured investments and 
equities.54  Although this fever halted abruptly in 1921 due to the fall of the high 
marginal tax rates, new economic optimism developed by revelations of new products 
and technologies, speculative excess and promising stock market fortified the demand 
for shares.55 Third, the special legislative system under federalism paved the way for 
this significant change. Corporate law was left to the states, and the states developed 
very liberal laws regarding corporations in efforts to attract capital to them. The 
Constitution of the US contained no provisions that dealt with incorporation. 56  In 
addition, the economic panic of 1907 resulted from massively over-leveraged stock-
market trading schemes on the largely unregulated New York Stock Exchange, which 
promoted the promulgation of the Securities Act of 1933 and 1934, which is the first 
sweeping legislative attempts with the aim of regulating the securities market and 
reforming business entities. From then on, a constant stream of legislation instilled the 
concept of corporate governance into US businesses. The good legal environment 
promoted the dispersion of shares. By 1930, the separation between ownership and 
control had been established in the US. The years after that saw the consolidation of the 
dispersed ownership structure. The pace of separating ownership from control had 
accelerated markedly in the following 30 years. The shares held by individual 
shareholders were only 6.5 million in 1952 and the number increased to 15 million in 
1961.57 A number of the studies conducted in the 1960s and 1970s indicated that there 
was a surging demand for shares by institutional investors and dispersed ownership was 
the norm.58  
 
                                                          
53 Alfred D Chandler, Jr, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business 
(Harvard University Press 1993) 87. 
54 Mark Smith, Toward Rational Exuberance: The Evolution of the Modern Stock Market (Farrar Straus 
Giroux 2001) 64–70; Steven A Bank and Brian R Cheffins, ‘Tax and the Separation of Ownership and 
Control,’ in Wolfgang Schön (ed), Tax and Corporate Governance (Springer 2008) 111, 136–37. 
55 Steve Fraser, Wall Street: A Cultural History (Faber & Faber 2005) 340–50. 
56 Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (AEI Press 1993). Not everyone is happy 
with this decentralization, with many analysts thinking it leads to rules that overly favour managers. For 
more see William L Cary, ‘Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware’ (1974) 83 Yale 
Law Journal 663, 705; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, ‘Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on 
State Competition in Corporate Law’ (1992) Harvard Law Review 1437. 
57 Smith (n 52) 179. Berle (n 30) 62. 
58 Brian Cheffins and Steven Bank, ‘Is Berle and Means Really a Myth?' (2009) 83 Business History 
Review 454.  
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Under the dispersed ownership structure in the UK and US, founders who provide 
‘start-up’ capital no longer fully control the company and professionally trained 
managers are hired with the expectation that their specialised human capital could 
maximise profits. An effective contract between shareholders and managers to specify 
what managers should do with the capital and how the returns will be allocated is 
possible.59 However, complete contracts are impossible as future contingencies cannot 
be anticipated.60 Therefore, some degree of control rights needs to be allocated to 
managers to allow them to make decisions when contingencies that were not foreseen 
in the contract arise. According to Jensen and Meckling, ‘the relationship between the 
stockholders and the managers of a corporation fits the definition of a pure agency 
relationship’.61 One has to admit that everyone has a self-interested utility-maximising 
motivation and managers are no exception to this. With the considerable control rights 
and advantage of information in hand, managers are likely to act opportunistically to 
benefit themselves. In contrast, the principal has to ensure that the agent is performing 
as promised, and exercises some kind of monitoring and controlling behaviour to ensure 
the quality of the agent’s performance. Therefore, costs are inevitable in this process 
and corporate governance was developed to respond to this problem. What corporate 
governance concerned with is how to deal with the relationship between principals and 
agents; how to assign the power and responsibilities between them, and how to cut 
agency costs. The corporate governance structure was built with the aim of controlling 
conflict between them and to reduce these agency costs. 
 
1.2.2 Internal corporate governance mechanism 
 
The starting point to building a corporate governance framework may be from the 
internal structure, given the fact that the balance of power between different actors 
within the company may be affected by how the company is operated. Under traditional 
corporate structures, shareholders elect the board of directors who control the operation 
of the company and choose the managers to run the day-to-day business on their behalf. 
Internal corporate governance encompasses the mechanisms that are designed to 
                                                          
59  Oliver D Hart, ‘Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm’ (1988) 4(1) Journal of Law, 
Economics, & Organization 121.  
60 Eugene F Fama and Michael C Jensen, ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’ (1983) 26 The Journal 
of Law and Economics 304. 
61 Jensen and Meckling (n 15) 326. 
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coordinate the relationship between various actors inside the firm: the company’s 
management, its board and the shareholders, and this is the foremost set of controls for 
a corporation. The issue of the allocation of power within the corporation and the need 
to control management’s power without harming the operation of the business has long 
been the focus of corporate law.62 A discussion of the internal corporate governance 
framework begins with the division of power within business entities, followed by 
detailed analyses of the power and responsibilities of shareholders, directors and 
managers. 
 
1.2.2.1 Division of power 
 
In the United Kingdom, The Companies Act 2006,63 which came into force in 2009 
with the aim to ‘create an effective corporate statute to ensure shareholders are informed 
and involved, to promote a good understanding and effective shareholder engagement 
between company and investors and thus to enhance company long-term 
performance’64 is the main legislation in terms of the division of power. Although the 
CA 2006 is as long as 955 pages,65 it does not have a clear statement about the power 
of the shareholder body or the board of directors. The general distribution of power is 
set out as a default rule in the Model Articles for public and private companies, which 
used to be Table A before the promulgation of the 2006 Act. The division of power is 
stated as follows: 
 
 3.  Directors’ general authority 
Subject to the articles, the directors are responsible for the management of the 
company’s business, for which purpose they may exercise all the powers of the 
company.  
 4.  Shareholders’ reserve power 
 (1)  The shareholders may, by special resolution, direct the directors to take, or 
refrain from taking, specified action.  
                                                          
62 Arthur R Pinto and Gustavo Visentini (eds), The Legal Basis of Corporate Governance in Publicly 
Held Corporations: A Comparative Approach (Kluwer Law International 1998) 259. 
63 Hereinafter ‘CA 2006’. 
64 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Company Law Reform Bill White Paper 2005 (2005) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dti.gov.uk/cld/WhitePaper.pdf> accessed 
27 January 2017. 
65 Including the schedules to the Act. 
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(2)  No such special resolution invalidates anything which the directors have 
done before the passing of the resolution. 
 
 5.  Directors may delegate 
(1)  Subject to the articles, the directors may delegate any of the powers which 
are conferred on them under the articles— 
(a) to such person or committee;  
(b) by such means (including by power of attorney); 
(c) to such an extent;  
(d) in relation to such matters or territories; and (e) on such terms and 
conditions; as they think fit.  
(2)  If the directors so specify, any such delegation may authorise further 
delegation of the directors’ powers by any person to whom they are 
delegated. 
(3)  The directors may revoke any delegation in whole or part, or alter its terms 
and conditions.66 
 
As the rules about the distribution of power above are default rules, it is left to the 
shareholder body to determine the content of the articles and it could be altered only by 
special resolution67 by the shareholder body. Therefore, if the shareholder body does 
not grant any power to the board through the articles, the board would be powerless. 
According to Kershaw, ‘the originating power of the company is located in the 
shareholder body acting in general meeting’ in UK company law and it is the 
shareholder body that empowers the board of directors. 68  
 
In the US, things are quite different. Unlike the system of government in the UK, the 
iconic federalized government in the US leaves much regulatory authority to the 50 
state governments according to the ‘internal affair rule’, with little intervention by the 
federal government. Company law, which is usually referred as corporate law in the 
US, is an area where the main regulations are provided by the states, although there are 
several areas of regulation that affect companies that are provided for by federal 
                                                          
66 Model Articles for public and private companies 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2008/3229/pdfs/uksi_20083229_en.pdf> accessed 
27 January 2017. 
67 Companies Act 2006, section 21. 
68 David Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (Oxford University Press 2012) 213. 
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legislation.69 Each state has its own judiciary and legal system, separate from the federal 
system and the state law is enacted by the state legislatures. Every state has its own 
corporate law statute that provides the corporate rules, such as the way in which to 
incorporate, the basic structure of the board of directors, shareholders’ and directors’ 
power and responsibilities, and financial and legal capital rules. Besides, each states 
also has its own body of common law. Corporations have the freedom to choose their 
incorporation state and it is widely accepted that Delaware is the winner in this battle 
for incorporation as it has the most sophisticated and most developed corporate law in 
the US. 70  Accordingly, in this thesis the primary, although not the exclusive, US 
corporate legal reference point will be Delaware law. It is state law that usually provides 
the rules and regulations governing the division of power between the shareholders, 
directors and managers and their interrelationship. So the sphere of corporate law of 
concern here is the corporate law in Delaware.   
 
In contract to the way shareholders who distribute management power to the board of 
directors in the UK, the board’s power in Delaware corporations is provided by the 
Delaware General Corporations Law. Section 141(a) of this law provides as follows: 
 
(a)  the business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be 
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be 
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation. If any such 
provision is made in the certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties 
conferred or imposed upon the board of directors by this chapter shall be exercised 
or performed to such extent and by such person or persons as shall be provided in 
the certificate of incorporation. If such provision is made in the certificate of 
incorporation, the powers and duties conferred or imposed upon the board of 
directors by this chapter shall be exercised or performed to such extent and by such 
person or persons as shall be provided in the certificate of incorporation.‘71  
 
                                                          
69 Among them, are some pieces of legislation that are important, such as the US Securities Act 1933 and 
the US Securities Exchange Act 1934. For more detailed discussion see chapter 2.1.2.  
70 Kershaw (n 68) 214. 
71 Delaware General Corporation Law, Section 141 
<http://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/sc04/index.shtml> accessed 03 March 2017. 
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That is to say, it is the statute rather than the shareholders that empowers the board to 
exercise the power of the company.72 As for the power of the managers, Delaware 
General Corporations Law authorises the board to appoint and to delegate powers to 
executive directors,73 which is the same as in the case of its UK counterpart.  
 
1.2.2.2 Directors and managers 
 
As the link between managers and shareholders, the board of directors is a fundamental 
element of good investor relationships and good corporate governance, and, hence, 
determines the success of the company.74 In the UK, although it is open to companies 
to choose a one-tier or two-tier board as the law has no mandatory rules about it, 
companies are more willing to have a single or unitary board of directors.75 The unitary 
board of directors comprises executive directors and non-executive directors, with the 
former responsible for the management and performance of the company, and the latter 
exercising the monitoring role of executive directors. In Table A, the predecessor of the 
Model Articles, it is prescribed that the ‘company shall be managed by the directors’.76 
In art. 3 of the Model Articles, the board is said to be ‘responsible for the management 
of the company’s businesses.’ 77  This change represents a shift away from the 
management function, to focus more on the delegation and monitoring function.78 
Therefore, it is the managers who are responsible for the management of the company 
and, in practice, the board of directors will delegate certain degrees of managerial power 
to full-time managers, just as art. 5 of the Model Articles of Association prescribed that 
‘the directors may delegate any of the powers which are conferred on them to persons 
they think fit’.79 That is to say the board has the discretion to decide the extent to which 
                                                          
72 Kershaw (n 68) 213. 
73 Delaware General Corporation Law, ss 141 and 142. 
74 Ben G Pettet, John P Lowry and Arad Reisberg. Pettet’s Company Law: Company Law and Corporate 
Finance (Pearson Education 2012). 
75 Kershaw (n 68) 230. Although the Companies Act has no mandatory rules about board structure, in 
various reports such as the Cadbury Report (UK) and Higgs Report (UK) the unitary board structure was 
preferred to the two-tier structure. It is an illustration of ‘path-dependency’ in terms of a company’s 
preference in selecting board structure.  
76 Table A, Companies Act 1948 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/386507/comm1July48
CoAct1948_P1.pdf> accessed 03 March 2017. 
77 Model Articles for Public and Private Companies, article 3.  
78 Kershaw (n 68) 235. 
79 Model Articles for Public and Private Companies article 5(1).  
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managers exercise management power on their behalf. In addition, art. 5 also empowers 
the board to revoke this delegation.80  
 
As for the duties of the directors, it was set out in case law until the Companies Act 
restated it. The general duties of directors are set out basically in Part 10 of the CA 
2006. The duties of directors begins with s 170 which addresses the scope and nature 
of the duties, and are followed by the substantive duties owed by the directors: s 171 
Duty to act within powers; s 172 Duty to promote the success of the company; s 173 
Duty to exercise independent judgement; s 174 Duty to exercise reasonable care, skill 
and diligence; s 175 Duty to avoid conflicts of interest; s 176 Duty not to accept benefits 
from third parties; s 177 Duty to declare interest in proposed transaction or 
arrangement. 81  Besides, the board structure and composition also matters in the 
corporate governance framework. The role of the non-executive directors and the 
design of the board enable it to function and discharge its task properly.82  As the duties 
and design of the directors is a broad topic that involves sophisticated design, it will not 
be expanded here given the limited space. 
 
In the United States, the unitary board of directors is also the statutory norm. Section 
141(a) of the Delaware General Corporations Law gives the board of directors the 
authority to manage the corporation.83 As in the UK, the board is empowered to appoint 
and delegate powers to managers.84 In the US, as with its UK counterpart, directors owe 
a duty of care and a duty of loyalty to the corporation, and these duties require the 
directors to act diligently and make decisions based on the corporation’s best interest. 
The duty of care is not prescribed precisely in the Delaware General Corporations Law, 
rather, it is in the case law. The case of Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien provides that ‘the 
directors of a Delaware corporation use that amount of care which ordinarily careful 
and prudent men would use in similar circumstances and consider all material 
information reasonably available in making business decisions.’85 Besides, directors 
are protected by the ‘business judgement rule’. It is a kind of presumption that ‘in 
                                                          
80 Ibid.  
81 Companies Act 2006, Part 10 
82 Marc Moore and Martin Petrin, Corporate Governance: Law, Regulation and Theory (Springer, 
2017) 171. 
83 Delaware General Corporation Law, section 141. 
84 Delaware General Corporation Law, Sections 141 and 142 
85 In re Walt Disney Derivative Legislation (Chancery Court) 825 A 2d 275 (2003).  
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making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis . . . 
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the company.’86 
This presumption applies when there is no evidence of fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing 
in the usual sense of personal profit or betterment on the part of the directors for the 
purpose of guaranteeing the corporation is managed under the direction of its boards 
with minimum interference from the court. This also shows the difference in attitude 
towards the power relationship between shareholders and directors in the UK and US. 
 
1.2.2.3 Shareholders 
 
The fact that management power is delegated to a board of directors does not 
necessarily mean that shareholders do not have any control over the company. On the 
one hand, art. 4 of the Model Articles provides the shareholder body with a reserve 
power; that is, the shareholder body retains the power to give the board direction by 
passing a special resolution. On the other hand, as observed by MacNeil, Nolan, Davies, 
and Rickford, the UK corporate legislation system entitles shareholders to a wide range 
of powers that enable them to act collectively to monitor the management team.87 The 
powers the CA 2006 confers on shareholders are the ‘power to change the company’s 
constitution; changes in the articles of association can be made by a ‘special resolution 
that requires a supermajority of 75% of votes at a shareholders’ meeting;88 power to 
remove directors;89 power to call a special meeting and to submit proposals.’90 In a 
number of cases, the approval of shareholders is required for certain managerial actions, 
such as the award of long-term service contracts to directors91
 
and substantial property 
transactions with directors.92 In Delaware, shareholders have similar powers to that 
                                                          
86 Sinclair Oil Corp v Levien, 280 A2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) 
87 Iain G MacNeil, ‘Activism and Collaboration among Shareholders in UK Listed Companies’ (2010) 5 
Capital Markets Law Journal 425; Richard C Nolan, ‘Indirect Investors: A Greater Say in the 
Company?’ (2003) 3 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 77; Paul Davies and Jonathan Rickford, ‘An 
Introduction to the New UK Companies Act: Part II.’ (2008) 5 European Company and Financial Law 
Review 239. 
88 CA 2006 s 21(1). 
89 CA 2006 s 168.  
90 CA 2006 s 303, 314.  
91 CA 2006 s 188.  
92 CA 2006 ss 190–196.  
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enjoyed in the UK, such as the power to call a special meeting93; and the power to 
remove directors.94 Section 141(k) provides that 
 
(k)  Any director or the entire board of directors may be removed, with or without 
cause, by the holders of a majority of the shares then entitled to vote at an election 
of directors, except as follows:  
 
(1) Unless the certificate of incorporation otherwise provides, in the case of a 
corporation whose board is classified as provided in subsection (d) of this 
section, stockholders may effect such removal only for cause. 
 
Equipped with these rights, shareholders could, although they may seem passive most 
of the time, exert influence on the operation of the company to some extent. In addition, 
the removal rights held by shareholders could threaten directors to let them know that 
removal rights will be exercised if they wish to pursue self-serving opportunistic 
behaviour. Accordingly, less agency costs will be incurred.  
 
1.2.3 External mechanism 
 
As analysed above, the internal governance mechanism divides the power between 
shareholders, directors and managers, and directors are expected to act within their 
power to fulfil their duties to promote the success of the company. However, on the one 
hand, the cost incurred in exercising shareholders’ rights causes their passivity. Even 
though the benefits exceed the cost, ‘free-riders’ would rather let someone else, 
especially large shareholders, enforce rights on their behalf. This rational apathy of the 
shareholder body leaves the directors much room to exercise their own interests. On the 
other hand, although the board has the power to appoint, monitor and remove 
management, and non-executive directors are supposed to monitor the exercise of 
corporate power, in practice, the board and management are dissolved into each other 
and non-executive directors often do little apart from rubber stamping what their 
‘paymaster’ executive directors have told them to do.95 Therefore, the mechanism for 
                                                          
93 Kidsco Inc v Dinsmore, 674 A.2D 483 (Del. Ch. 1995) permitting stockholders holding at least 10% 
of the votes to call a special meeting. 
94 Delaware General Corporation Law, s 1414. 
95 Kershaw (n 68) 191. 
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controlling management and reducing managerial agency cost does not work as it is 
supposed to. The inadequacy of internal control mechanisms has fuelled the need for 
other external mechanisms.96  
 
At the heart of proper corporate governance is the identification and correction of 
inefficiencies in the running of a firm. As corporations developed within market 
economies, a framework of law and regulation has evolved to bring order to their 
activities, to maintain competition and to ensure fair treatment of those who interact 
with corporations. In pursuing this objective, firms rely not only on their own internal 
mechanisms but also on external instruments. External mechanisms are exercised by 
those outside the business entities such as regulators, governments, trade unions and 
financial institutions. Here the focus will be on the legal and market external 
governance devices available to monitor the activities of the organization, and take 
corrective actions when the business goes off track. 
 
1.2.3.1 External legal mechanism 
 
This part describes legal strategies employed to address agency problems. According 
to Kraakman, some of the legal strategies are ‘regulatory’ in nature given that these 
rules constrain the actions of corporate actors directly; while others are ‘governance’ in 
nature given that these rules focus on the balance within the company to reduce 
opportunism. 97  In general, regulatory and governance strategies will be deployed 
together to mitigate the vulnerability of principals to the opportunism of their agents.98 
 
In the UK an attempt was made to reach a balance between the flexibility in the business 
entities themselves and their accountability and responsibility. Therefore, a ‘market-
based approach’ was developed and this was done primarily through non-statutory 
voluntary codes and guidance. The codes operate on the ‘comply or explain’ basis. It 
identifies good governance practices from which one can choose or not. If companies 
choose to adopt a different approach that is more suited to their situation, they have to 
                                                          
96 Pinto (n 62) 226. 
97 Reinier H Kraakman, The Anatomy Of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach. 
(Oxford University Press on Demand, 2009) 23. 
98 Ibid. 
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explain their reasons for doing so to their shareholders. The ‘comply or explain’ 
approach supports companies, investors and regulators in the UK, given its flexibility 
on a case-by-case basis. It has increasingly been adopted as a model in other markets.  
 
The key statute related to the regulatory strategies are the CA 2006 and the Financial 
Service and Market Act 2000.99 Apart from the division of power between shareholders, 
directors and managers, the CA 2006 also contains rules governing dishonest and 
fraudulent management. FSMA 2000 provides the framework for the regulation of the 
financial services industry in the UK. The law relating to public offers of shares and 
listing can be found in Part VI of the FSMA 2000. Stock exchanges also have a role to 
play. The London Stock Exchange is comprised of the main market and the Alternative 
Investment Market 100  which comprises mainly smaller, growing companies. 
Companies listed on the main market and AIM are required to abide by continuing 
obligations. These include the requirements to publish accounts that conform to 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, adopt the Model Code and do regulatory 
filings in accordance with company law and listing rules. 101  In addition, listed 
companies can expect scrutiny by the Financial Conduct Authority102 which performs 
many of the functions that the  Financial Services Authority used to perform as the UK 
listing authority. 
 
In the US, the framework of external legal governance mechanisms consists of a series 
of related but separate statutes that are administered by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. The Securities Act of 1933 mainly regulated the offering of securities to 
the public. It specifies the information that companies must provide when issuing 
securities in the public markets. It requires prospectuses with a significant amount of 
affirmative disclosure, including financial and other significant information to be 
provided to investors before public sale.103 The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
focuses on the trading of securities and the regulation of brokers, dealers, stock 
                                                          
99 Hereinafter ‘FSMA 2000’. 
100 Hereinafter ‘AIM’. 
101  Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, ‘Effective Corporate Governance 
Frameworks: Encouraging Enterprise and Market Confidence’ (2006) 19 <https://www.icaew.com/-
/media/corporate/files/technical/corporate-governance/dialogue-in-corporate-governance/effective-
corporate-governance-frameworks.ashx > accessed 04 March 2017. 
102 Hereinafter ‘FCA’.  
103 Thomas Clarke, International Corporate Governance: A Comparative Approach (Routledge 2007) 
141. 
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exchanges and the over-the-counter markets. It also covers anti-fraud and anti-
manipulation rules that may directly or indirectly affect corporate governance.  
 
Furthermore, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission104  was created by the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to guarantee the sound operation of the primary 
and secondary financial markets. The SEC has the authority to ‘regulate securities 
exchanges (such as the Nasdaq Stock Market105, the New York Stock Excahnge106 and 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange); bring civil enforcement actions against companies 
or executives who violate securities law; ensure the quality of accounting standards and 
financial reporting; and oversee the proxy solicitation and annual voting process’.107 As 
in the UK, US companies are also required to comply with the listing requirements of 
the exchanges on which their securities trade. Unlike the UK, the US has no single 
national, authoritative corporate governance code. However, this does not mean 
corporate governance codes are absent. One analysis identified 25 unique codes, which 
means the process of developing standards is decentralized,108 such as Analysis and 
Recommendations of Corporate Governance published by the American Law 
Institute109, the Business Roundtable  Principles of Corporate Governance, the National 
Association of Corporate Directors’ 110  Report on Director Professionalism, the 
Conference Board’s Recommendations, the Council of Institutional Investors 
Policies, 111  the California Public Employees’ Retirement System’s 112  Corporate 
Governance Principles, Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association113 and College 
Retirement Equities Fund’s114 Policy Statement, the American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organization 115  Voting Guidelines, and Institutional 
                                                          
104 Hereinafter ‘SEC’. 
105 Hereinafter ‘NASDAQ’. 
106 Hereinafter ‘NYSE’. 
107 Larcker and Tayan (n 25) 145. 
108  Ruth Aguilera and Alvaro Cuervo‐Cazurra, ‘Codes of Good Governance’ (2009) Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 17(3) 380. 
109 Hereinafter ‘ALI’. 
110 Hereinafter ‘NACD’. 
111 Hereinafter ‘CII’. 
112 Hereinafter ‘CalPERS’. 
113 Hereinafter ‘TIAA’. 
114 Hereinafter ‘CREF’. 
115 Hereinafter ‘AFL-CIO’. 
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Shareholder Services’116 Best Practices User Guide and Glossary.117 With tremendous 
variation in wording, emphasis and many specifics, each of these codes applies to 
different companies in different fields, which are flexible enough to deal with special 
situations.118 
 
1.2.3.2 External market mechanisms 
 
There are several market mechanisms that serve as additional constraining forces. First 
is the market for corporate control. The market for corporate control mainly refers to 
‘the market for acquisitions and mergers where underperforming or undervalued firms 
become attractive takeover targets by potential acquirers’. 119  Poor corporate 
performance is always associated with insufficient internal governance and, therefore, 
the market for corporate control will kick in when necessary. The potential acquirers 
might buy and build up large portions of the target firm’s shares with a view to replacing 
the incompetent management by taking control of the board. The aim of a takeover is 
to revitalize a poorly run company and achieve higher profitability after restructuring. 
The threat of the market for corporate control can serve as a useful external governance 
mechanism by aligning the goals and interests between management and shareholders 
and thus reduce agency costs. The second mechanism is capital market competition. 
Capital markets set the prices for the elements traded on the market. When capital 
markets are efficient, the price of the traded elements is the actual reflection of its value 
based on the information available to both parties in a transaction. Accurate pricing is 
necessary for firms to make rational decisions about allocating capital to its most 
efficient uses. Companies are held to a ‘market standard’ of performance. Those that 
fail to meet the standard are punished with a decrease in their share price. In this way, 
efficient capital markets act as a disciplining mechanism by putting share price pressure 
                                                          
116 Hereinafter ‘ISS’. 
117 Gotshal Weil and LLP Manges, ‘Comparison of Corporate Governance Principles and Guidelines: 
United States’ <https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Weil_Comparison-of-
Corp-Gov-Practices.pdf> accessed 12 March 2017 
118 Nolan Haskovec, ‘Codes of Corporate Governance: A Review’, (2012) A Working Paper published 
by the Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance   
<http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/millstein-center/ 
Codes%20of%20Corporate%20Governance_Yale_053112.pdf> accessed 12 March 2017 
119 Brian A Korman, ‘The Corporate Game of Thrones and the Market for Corporate Control’ (2016) 
12 Journal of Business and Technology Law 165. 
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on the management team.120 There is also a market for managers which encourages 
managers to do an efficient job because it enhances their ability to move to another 
position and product or service market in which the product and service provided by 
the company are competed, and the company could fail and the managers would lose 
their position if its products do not compete successfully in the market for products. 
 
1.3 China 
 
Unlike the UK and US with one principal kind of agency problem, incurred by the 
separation of ownership and control, China, however, suffers from two forms of agency 
costs, namely (1) vertical agency problems between shareholders and managers; and (2) 
horizontal agency costs between majority shareholders and minority shareholders. 
These circumstances are due to the special political and economic structure in China. 
These special circumstances also lead to the dual corporate governance mechanisms 
run within the SOEs. Before analysing these two agency costs and the governance 
structure in China, some background information is needed.  
 
1.3.1     The background 
 
In this section a political approach to analysing the influence of legitimacy management 
on the operation and governance of SOEs is adopted with a view to demonstrating the 
logic behind the SOE reform – the maintenance of political legitimacy.  
 
1.3.1.1  Political legitimacy management  
 
In China the culture of worshipping the authority has been deeply rooted in the history 
of the country which could be traced to its origins thousands of years ago.121 Feudal 
society heavily relied on an agrarian economy with the individual farmer being the 
major structure. Hence, the centralisation of power was needed to safeguard social 
stability to ensure that agricultural production could continue in this economic model. 
                                                          
120 Raghuram G Rajan and Luigi Zingales, ‘Power in a Theory of the Firm’ (1998) 113 The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 415. 
121 Qingjuan Wang, Rick D Hackett, Xun Cui and Yiming Zhang, ‘Cultural Differences and Applicants’ 
Procedural Fairness Perceptions: A Test of a Chinese Culture-based Model’ (2012) 6 Chinese 
Management Studies 358.  
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From 221 BCE, a system of centralised hierarchical governance was established in 
China, which represented the most administrative order in the world.122 The duty of 
obedience owed by an inferior to his or her superior led to collectivism, which began 
to emerge in this unchallengeable governance regime. In addition, Confucianism was 
preached by the emperor, largely because it set up a moral system in which sacrificing 
personal interests for the collective’s best interests and it was considered a good 
virtue.123 As a consequence, the individual interest was subordinated to that of the 
collective.124 The collapse of the Qing dynasty marked the beginning of a new era. 
Having suffered from wars and turbulence for hundreds of years, the Chinese 
Communist Party of China125 came to power and led the development of a new China 
under the ‘banner of Marxism’. Nevertheless, the influence of the centralised 
bureaucratic state is still with us today but in the form of a socialist system - a socialist 
system with Chinese characteristics. The socialist system is the cornerstone of the 
political institutional structure and policy-making system. According to Hayek, the 
emergence of various kinds of social orders are not dependent on the intentional 
creation and planning of interested individuals, but evolve spontaneously.126 Unlike the 
‘spontaneous order’ in the capitalist system, the essence of the socialist system is the 
rational construction of the scientific socialism theory, which means the elements of 
various social orders are designed and created intentionally.127  
 
The key to an understanding of the socialist system is the structure of power and the 
fundamental institution in the power structure is the Communist Party. As the only party 
that is in power, it has to prove its political legitimacy. Political legitimacy can be 
defined as ‘citizens’ trust in public officials and their conviction that governmental 
institutions are fair, responsive, and valuable’128 and it could explain ‘who deserves to 
                                                          
122 John O Haley, ‘Law and Culture in China and Japan: A Framework for Analysis.’ (2005) 27 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 899. 
123 Bee Chen Goh, Law Without Lawyers, Justice Without Courts: On Traditional Chinese Mediation 
(Routledge 2016) 57. 
124 Qingxiu Bu, ‘Will Chinese Legal Culture Constrain Its Corporate Governance-related Laws?’ (2015) 
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126 Friedrich August Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (Routledge & Kegan Paul 
1967). 
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have authority and why’.129 As Lipset points out, it also ‘involves the capacity of the 
[political] system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political 
institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society’.130 As the CPC cannot base 
its legitimacy on democratic election, it must use other means to hold on to power, 
which are mainly focused on two aspects: (1) controlling resources and (2) delivering 
performance.131  Controlling resources is aimed at binding citizens to the Party by 
controlling the country’s economic, political and social resources, and delivering 
performance is aimed at gaining the support of the citizens by improving living 
standards for the Chinese people through economic growth. 132  Therefore, political 
legitimacy management has focused on two main aspects, with the ultimate goal of 
preserving the CPC’s power base.133 The first is the control financial resources. It is 
necessary to have sufficient financial resources to constitute the financial basis for a 
legitimate regime. This demand determines the orientation of the policy towards state 
and privately owned enterprises. The SOEs fulfil this economic duty and provide a 
financial foundation for the CPC’s reign. Therefore, the CPC is fully aware of the vital 
importance of SOEs and, as will be shown later, that the Party exercises tight and direct 
control of SOEs and, to some extent, SOEs determine the economic reform pattern. The 
second is maintaining the official ideology. As some scholars have noted, ‘ideology 
fulfils various functions crucial to political, social and economic life, such as 
interpreting political order, cementing national identity, mobilizing support and 
reducing economic transaction costs by enhancing social trust’.134 The official ideology 
is codified in the Party’s resolution, the party leader’s speeches and writings, articles in 
the Party’s media and other official pronouncements.135 Therefore, Party organizations 
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are established within the SOEs to ensure its ideological influence. The following 
discussion shows that legitimacy management to strengthen the ruling position of the 
CPC is embodied in every aspect of SOEs, from their reform to their governance 
structure.  
 
1.3.1.2  SOE reform and the evolution of its ownership structure 
 
As early as the revolutionary period, the CPC established factories and shops in 
provinces under its control which could be regarded as the origins of SOEs.136 The 
establishment of the People‘s Republic of China in 1949 marks the beginning of the 
rapid growth of SOEs. By carrying out ‘Three Great Transformations’,137 the assets and 
enterprises once owned by capitalists and foreign investors were expropriated and 
nationalized as state property. In order to guarantee the concentration and preservation 
of power, the CPC adopted a central planned economy, and enterprises were owned and 
controlled by the state (or claimed as being owned by the whole people) which was 
deeply influenced by the ‘Soviet model’.138 In this period the ownership structure was 
totally concentrated. Under the centralized economy, resources, products, the labour 
force and the essential consumption were allocated according to state plans as a basic 
unit to implement production plans, and as markets did not exist, SOEs did not consider 
supply and demand, and the state was responsible for any results and served as the ‘last 
resort’ lifesaver.139 Within the enterprises, top-down state agencies, such as a ministry, 
provincial government or local government, used strict administrative commands to 
ensure that the enterprises were under rigid supervision and control. The so-called 
managers had almost no independence of management as all the input and output of 
production were determined by the state. In addition, they were appointed by the state 
and its agencies, and their performance was not evaluated by the financial performance 
of enterprises, as long as the assigned production plan was fulfilled.140 Moreover, SOEs 
                                                          
136 See Jinglian  Wu, Understanding and Interpreting Chinese Economic Reform (Texere 2005). See also 
Furen Dong, The Economic History of the People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和国经济史] 
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have multiple roles and objectives given the fact that they are ‘grassroots organizations 
of the Party–state political system with extensive social functions’.141 As noted: 
 
The state regarded SOEs as instruments to achieve its political and economic objectives, 
such as to establish a strong military industry and to catch up with and surpass Western 
countries. Therefore, managers of SOEs were regarded as cadres of the party and were 
governed in the same way under the same system as staff of the party and government 
organs. Moreover, SOEs integrated the functions of employment, social security, and 
social relief, providing a full spectrum of social services from cradle to grave.142 
 
As a consequence, production inefficiency and economic stagnation have prevailed in 
China. Therefore, the market-oriented ‘reform and opening up’ was initiated in 1978. 
The main aim of the reform in terms of the enterprises was to increase managerial 
autonomy by allowing SOEs to retain a part of the profits and have discretion over the 
output produced in excess of the plan.143 In 1984, the Third Plenary Session of the 
Twelfth CPC Central Committee promulgated the ‘Decision of the Central Committee 
of the CPC on Reform of the Economic Structure‘, which permits the ‘enterprise 
contracting system’.144 Under this policy, the management of SOEs signed a contract 
with the government department concerned to entrust it with the responsibilities of 
management on the government’s behalf. SOE managers were only agents hired by the 
government and in order to institutionalize this reform, the National People’s 
Congress145  promulgated ‘The Law on Industrial Enterprise Owned by the Whole 
People’, which still governs SOEs yet to be corporatized.146 It should be noted that the 
reform at this stage focused on the incentives that could boost the efficiency of the 
SOEs within the original ownership structure. The state still held the controlling power 
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of these enterprises. However, these reforms could not reach their target because central 
planning constrained the effectiveness of incentive contracts between the government 
and management. To make things worse, the heavy tax burden starved the companies 
of capital, consequently, loans could not be repaid and the financial assets in the 
banking sector declined rapidly. China stood on the doorstep of revolutionary reform. 
 
In 1990, the Shanghai Stock Exchange 147  and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 148  were 
established, indicating the beginning of a market economy and Chinese capital market. 
In 1992, Deng Xiaoping’s (the former Chinese president) speech about creating a 
market economy during his visit to the south of China marked the beginning of a new 
era and the China Securities Regulatory Commission149 and Securities Commission of 
the State Council were set up in that year. In 1993, the Third Plenary Session of the 
14th
 
Party Congress issued the ‘Decision on Issues Concerning the Establishment of a 
Socialist Market Economic Structure’ 150  and officially adopted the policy of 
establishing a socialist market economy.151  The Decision also established ‘modern 
corporations’ as a new form of enterprise reform. The main target of the enterprise 
reform at this stage was to clarify the property rights and transfer large SOEs into legal 
entities through corporatization. In 1993, the Company Law of the People’s Republic 
of China was launched, which provided a legal foundation for the deepening reforms. 
Pursuant to art. 3 of the 1993 Company Law, joint stock companies152 and limited 
liability companies153 became the standard form of company and ‘all incorporated 
companies were legal persons with independent personality in law, and responsible for 
their own behaviour’.154 Through the process of ‘corporatization’, former SOEs were 
restructured into  forms of company governed by company law and some of them could 
issue shares by being listed on the SSE or SZSE and a flood of foreign investors forming 
joint ventures with SOEs. At least theoretically, the state became the shareholder of a 
corporation rather than the direct owner and controller. The ownership structure of the 
                                                          
147 Hereinafter ‘SSE’. 
148 Hereinafter ‘SZSE’. 
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SOEs began to change. In the non-public sector, after being permitted in the late 1980s, 
private ownership became an irresistible force in the economy, from about 40,000 in 
1978 to about 450,000 private enterprises in 1994.155 The Fourteenth and Fifteenth CPC 
National Congress gave birth to the subsequent amendment to the Constitution in 1999 
and it is prescribed that ‘non-public sectors of the economy, including the individual 
and private sectors, constituted an important component of the socialist market 
economy.’156 Multiple forms of ownership structure, particularly private ownership, 
burgeoned. 
 
However, the necessity of legitimacy management requires the CPC to control financial 
resources and, therefore, limits SOE reform. As SOEs are permitted to list on the stock 
exchange and anyone can buy the shares of SOEs, the state is afraid of the risk of 
changing the nature of SOEs to privately owned or foreign-owned. Hence, 70% of the 
stock is non-tradable, held by the state and legal person. 30% of the stock is tradable, 
which could be traded on the stock exchange. The split ownership structure established 
at this time is widely seen as an impediment to the further reform of SOEs and despite 
the incredible growth in China’s securities markets, stock-issuing activities were still 
very limited and the ‘big-brother directorship’ became, as will be seen later, the main 
problem of Chinese corporate governance.  
 
During this stage, the ownership of non-tradable shares was fragmented and controlled 
by many bureaucracies, from central ministries to departments of local governments. 
In 2003, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the 
State Council157 was established. With ‘a combination of powers previously dispersed 
among different ministries and agencies’, 158  SASAC exercises the ‘duties and 
responsibilities of the state investor’159 and this could be regarded as CPC’s efforts to 
consolidate the control rights over SOEs. 
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Having existed for decades, the split ownership structure seriously affected the 
development of Chinese capital market. Therefore, in 2005, the Chinese government 
issued the Notice of the China Securities Regulatory Commission on Piloting the Share-
trading Reform of Listed Companies,160 Guidance Notes on the Split Share Structure 
Reform of Listed Companies161
 
and Measures on the Administration of Split Share 
Structure Reform of Listed Companies162 to guide the split share structure reforms 
which were aimed at lowering the state shareholding by converting non-tradable shares 
into tradable shares. By the end of 2008, the vast majority of listed companies had 
completed the process of converting part of non-tradable shares to tradable shares.163 
The reform of the split share structure enables the controlling shareholders to be 
exposed under the pressure of the market and offers both individual and institutional 
investors a fairer environment with more accessible protection. The reform represents 
one big step forward on the way to develop a mature stock market and it has produced 
wide effects on the governance structure of Chinese companies. 164  However, as 
Figure 2.8 shows, 165  the portion of shares which transferred from non-tradable to 
tradable is still held by the government, but in another form. Therefore, the CPC’s 
control over SOEs is through reform, and SOE reform is part of the CPC’s effort to 
rebuild and maintain political legitimacy.166 
 
1.3.1.3          Vertical and horizontal agency problems 
 
Against the background sketched above, the agency problems within the SOEs are 
discussed below: 
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First, vertical agency problems between managers and shareholders exist within SOEs. 
During the process of SOE reform, autonomy was granted to the management for the 
benefit of boosting production. However, this creates enormous opportunities for 
managers to expropriate assets and infringe the interests of shareholders.167 The state, 
as the delegation of all the people in China, is expected to play a monitoring role of 
managers. However, the state is only a conceptual existence and the central 
governments, local governments, and the SASAC at central and local level act as 
agencies that represent the state. On the one hand, the multiplicity of agencies may lead 
to a race to maximize departmental interest. On the other hand, supervision 
responsibilities are evaded in this lengthened agency chain. In addition, officials within 
the government lack information and skill to exercise proper monitoring. Their 
monitoring role is limited given the great number of SOEs. Managers of SOEs are 
mainly appointed by the government and the focus of their work is not only on daily 
management but to coordinate relationships with local government. Therefore, the 
managers could take advantage of this autonomy and discretion given to them to 
maximize their own profits.  
 
Second, the agency costs generated by the conflicts between majority shareholders and 
minority shareholders give rise to the horizontal agency problems in Chinese SOEs. 
According to research conducted by SASAC in 2009, 900 out of 1,600 listed companies 
are controlled by the government and SOEs occupied more than 80% of the total share 
value of all listed companies.168 One may argue that the state, acting on behalf of all the 
people may not act against the interest of minority shareholders as the minority 
shareholders are part of the people. However, this might not always be the case as 
government interests may not always align with the interests of minority shareholders 
or even the company itself169 because the government needs to consider political, social 
and environmental issues when making a decision. A large percentage of SOEs are now 
controlled and monitored by local government and the local authority plays a key role 
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in deciding which SOE should be listed. The criteria for selecting ‘best’ companies are 
not just financial performance, but also social and political importance. Those 
companies with bad financial performance but social and political importance, have to 
do something to meet the listing requirements. On the one hand, false listing documents 
may be produced; on the other, all the prime and core assets are transferred to the 
companies to be listed, while the bad assets and redundant debt are transferred to their 
parent or related company. Therefore, minority shareholders and the company itself 
were sacrificed. As some scholars pointed out, ‘many SOEs are debt-ridden enterprises 
‘repackaged’ for listing and continue to be controlled by their parent companies who, 
having successfully seen to their IPO, look towards them as cash cows for ready 
milking.’170 Furthermore, SOEs sometimes have the responsibilities to rescue other 
SOEs when they are in financial trouble to ensure social stability. Besides, many forms 
of tunnelling activity are undertaken by controlling shareholders to maximize their own 
benefits.171 Given the fact that the controlling right is too powerful and the voice of 
minority shareholders is often overlooked or ignored, minority shareholders can do 
nothing when their rights are infringed and it is minority shareholders who pay for this 
ultimately.  
 
1.3.2 Dual corporate governance mechanisms 
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As discussed above, in order to guarantee the concentration and preservation of power, 
the CPC needs to control financial resources and SOEs are the main part of the power 
base. Therefore, the CPC places great emphasis on the governance of SOEs. The 
existing literature on Chinese corporate governance largely focuses on the universal 
model of corporate governance which comprises the internal governance system that 
governs the division of power within the company and external governance mechanism 
that relevant laws, codes and markets have a role to play, as in the UK and US. However, 
it should be noted that SOEs in China are subject to parallel corporate governance 
structures.172 One is the UK and US model of corporate governance and the other is 
political governance, in which the control power of personnel appointments and 
decision-making in SOEs are in the hands of CPC-related departments. With the 
political governance run in the shadows, these two governance mechanisms coexist in 
Chinese SOEs. 
 
Before analysing these two governance structures in detail background information on 
the typology of companies and classes of shares will be provided. 
 
Two forms of company are stipulated in Chinese company law: (1) Joint Stock 
Companies and (2) Limited Liability Companies. Joint Stock Companies are similar to 
public companies in the UK and their shares are open to the public. Meanwhile,  LLCs 
are similar to private companies in the UK and are incorporated by small business 
entities.  
 
The distinction between tradable and non-tradable shares is the primary basis when 
talking about classes of shares. As mentioned above, afraid of losing control of SOEs, 
the state assigned 70% of the listed stock are non-tradable shares and the remaining 30% 
of the stock are tradable and could be traded on the stock exchange. Tradable shares 
can be divided into different types according to their nature. ‘A’ shares are the most 
common type of tradable shares and they are exclusively available to Chinese domestic 
investors.173 ‘B’ shares are those shares that are only available to foreign individuals 
and institutions. In addition, a small part of China’s stocks are ‘Red chips’, ‘L’ shares, 
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‘H’ shares and ‘N’ shares.174 ‘Red chips’ are stocks ‘traded on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange and issued by Hong Kong-registered companies that have a mainland 
Chinese shareholder holding of at least 35% of the shares.’175 ‘L’, ‘H’ and ‘N’ shares 
refer to shares issued by Chinese companies that are listed on the London Stock 
Exchange, Hong Kong Stock Exchange and New York Stock Exchange. Non-tradable 
shares are subject to strict restrictions on their circulation and they could be divided 
into ‘state shares’ and ‘legal person shares’; the former owned by the state and the latter 
retained by government-related organizations with legal personalities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Main classes of shares in China
 
 
For an analysis of the Anglo-American sector, the anatomy of corporate governance is 
presented from the internal and external perspective. For the discussion of the Chinese 
sector, the same approach is followed. First, the legal governance, which is the same as 
that of the UK and US, is analysed from the internal and external perspective, followed 
by the political governance. 
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1.3.2.1 Internal corporate governance mechanism 
 
No matter what the ownership structure, political system or ideology, internal checks 
and balances are necessary to work as a basic incentive and restraint system to solve 
agency problems. The same approach applies to China. From the beginning when the 
Chinese internal governance mechanism was started, the process of learning never 
stopped. The division of power within Chinese companies not only drew on the 
Germanic two-tier governance system, but also benefitted from the single-tier 
governance structure in the Anglo-American system. According to the company law of 
2005, three organs have to be established within a public company, which will be 
discussed below. 
 
1.3.2.1.1 Division of power 
 
Unlike the Anglo-American model of company law, which does not have a clear 
statement about the power of the shareholder body or the board of directors, Chinese 
company law clearly states the powers that belong to the shareholder in art. 4: ‘The 
shareholders of a company shall, according to law, enjoy such rights of owners as 
benefiting from assets of the company, making major decisions and selecting 
managerial personnel.’176 
 
Article 37 states that ‘it shall be the authority of the company’, which shares some 
commonalties with its UK counterparts that the shareholders meeting is the source of 
power and authority; this is a kind of ‘shareholder primacy’. Article 38 clearly states 
the rights enjoyed by the shareholders meeting.177 
 
As for the board and management, the powers enjoyed by them are also clearly stated 
in arts. 47 and 50. As in the UK and US, managers are appointed by the directors and 
are responsible for the management of the company. The powers held by managers are 
listed in art. 50: 
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A limited liability company shall have a manager, who shall be appointed or dismissed 
by the board of directors. The manager shall be responsible to the board of directors and 
shall exercise the following functions and powers: (1) to be in charge of the production, 
operation and management of the company, and to organize the implementation of the 
resolutions of the board of directors; (2) to organize the implementation of the annual 
business plans and investment plans of the company; (3) to draw up plans on the 
establishment of the internal management organs of the company; (4) to draw up the 
basic management system of the company; (5) to formulate specific rules and regulations 
of the company; (6) to recommend the appointment or dismissal of the deputy manager(s) 
and of persons in charge of the financial affairs of the company; (7) to appoint or dismiss 
management personnel other than those to be appointed or dismissed by the board of 
directors; (8) other functions and powers granted by the board of directors.178 
 
1.3.2.1.2 Board of directors and supervisory board 
 
According to company law, a board of directors and supervisory board are required to 
be established within listed companies in order to separate the management power from 
monitoring power. Therefore, a two-tier board structure is adopted in China.179 The 
board of directors exercises the following powers: 
 
(1)  to be responsible for convening shareholders’ meetings and to report on its work 
to the shareholders meetings;  
(2)  to implement the resolutions of the shareholders meetings;  
(3)  to decide on the business plans and investment plan of the company;  
(4)  to formulate the annual financial budget plan and final accounts plan of the 
company;  
(5) to formulate plans for profit distribution and plans for making up losses of the 
company;  
(6)  to formulate plans for the increase or reduction of the registered capital and 
issuance of company bonds;  
(7)  to formulate plans for the merger, division, transformation and dissolution of the 
company;  
(8)  to decide on the establishment of the company’s internal management organs;  
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(9)  to decide on appointment and dismiss the company’s manager and the matter on 
the manager’s remuneration, and, upon recommendation of the manager, to decide 
on appointment and dismiss the company’s deputy manager(s) and persons in 
charge of the financial affairs of the company and the matters concerning their 
remuneration;  
(10)  to formulate the basic management system of the company;  
(11)  to exercise other functions and powers provided in the articles of association of 
the company.180 
 
The board is required to ‘bear the duties of loyalty and due diligence towards the 
company . . . shall not, by taking advantage of their positions and powers, accept bribes 
or other unlawful incomes, nor may they misappropriate the property of the 
company.‘181 These prescriptions are, to some extent, the same as the directors’ duty to 
exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence and avoid conflicts of interest in the UK. 
Article 149 lists the boards of directors’ and senior management’s responsibilities 
clearly: 
 
The directors and senior executives of a company shall not commit any of the following 
acts:  
(1)  Misappropriate the company’s funds;  
(2)  Deposit the company’s assets in their own personal accounts or in personal 
accounts of other individuals;  
(3)  In violation of the company’s articles of association and without the consent of the 
shareholders’ meeting or the shareholders’ general meeting or the board of 
directors, lend the company’s funds to others or use the company’s property to 
provide guarantee to others;  
(4)  In violation of the company’s articles of association or without the consent of the 
shareholders ‘meeting or the shareholders general meeting or the board of 
directors, enter into contracts or conduct transactions with the company;  
(5)  Without the consent of the shareholders’ meeting or the shareholders’ general 
meeting, by taking advantage of their positions, seek for themselves or others the 
commercial opportunity that should belong to the company, or operate for 
themselves or others the same category of business as that of the company;  
                                                          
180 Company Law 2005 s 47. 
181 Company Law 2005 s 148. 
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(6)  Accept and possess the commission in the transaction between others and the 
company;  
(7)  Disclose the company’s secrets without authorization;  
(8)  Commit other acts in violation of the duty of loyalty to the company.182 
 
A joint stock limited company is required to set up a board of supervisors with no fewer 
than three persons and art. 118 also requires that  
 
[t]he supervisory board shall be composed of shareholders’ representatives and an 
appropriate proportion of representatives of the staff and workers of the company, the 
proportion of such representatives shall not be less than one-third and the specific 
proportion shall be provided for by the articles of association of the company. Directors 
and senior executives shall not serve concurrently as supervisors.183 
 
The powers of the supervisory board are as follows: 
 
(1)  to examine the financial affairs of the company;  
(2)  to supervise the acts of the directors and senior executives performing their 
functions, and to bring the proposal to dismiss those directors and senior 
executives violating the laws, administrative regulations, the articles of association 
of the company or the resolutions of the shareholders’ meetings;  
(3)  to demand directors and senior executives to make corrections if any of their acts 
is found to have damaged the interests of the company;  
(4)  to propose the convening of interim shareholders’ meetings, and to convene and 
preside over the shareholders’ meetings in case the board of directors fails to its 
function of convening and presiding over the shareholders’ meetings as provided 
by this Law;  
(5)  to bring proposal to the shareholders’ meetings;  
(6)  to bring a lawsuit against the directors or senior executives in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 152 of this Law; and  
(7)  to exercise other functions and powers as provided in the articles of association of 
the company.184 
 
                                                          
182 Company Law 2005 s 149. 
183 Company Law 2005 s 118. 
184 Company Law 2005 s 54. 
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The responsibilities of the supervisory board are prescribed in art. 148. They share the 
same responsibilities with the directors and managers. Article 148 states that ‘[t]he 
directors, supervisors and senior executives of a company shall comply with the laws, 
administrative regulations and the articles of association of the company, and bear the 
duties of loyalty and due diligence towards the company. The directors, supervisors and 
senior executives of a company shall not, by taking advantage of their positions and 
powers, accept bribes or other unlawful incomes, nor may they misappropriate the 
property of the company.’ However, no detailed forbidden acts are cited as for the 
directors and managers, given the quite weak position of supervisory boards in China. 
 
1.3.2.1.3 Shareholders  
 
Article 38 of the company law grants shareholders’ meeting the following powers: 
 
(1)  to decide on the business policy and investment plan of the company;  
(2)  to elect and recall directors and supervisors not acted as by the representatives of 
the staff and workers, and to decide on matters concerning the remuneration of 
directors and supervisors; 
(3)  to examine and approve reports of the board of directors;  
(4)  to examine and approve the reports of the supervisory board or supervisors;  
(5)  to examine and approve the annual financial budget plan and final accounts plan 
of the company;  
(6)  to examine and approve plans for profit distribution of the company and plans for 
making up losses;  
(7)  to adopt resolution on the increase or reduction of the registered capital of the 
company;  
(8)  to adopt resolutions on the issuance of company bonds;  
(9)  to adopt resolutions on matters such as the merger, division, transformation, 
dissolution and liquidation of the company;  
(10)  to amend the articles of association of the company;  
(11)  to exercise other functions and powers as stipulated in the articles of association.185 
 
Article 10 prescribe the responsibilities held by shareholders:  
 
                                                          
185 Company Law 2005 s 38. 
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The shareholders . . . shall not abuse their rights to damage the interests of the company 
or other shareholders nor abuse the independent status of corporate legal person and 
shareholders’ limited liability to damage the interests of the company‘s creditors. The 
shareholders, who abuse their rights so as to cause losses to the company or other 
shareholders, shall undertake the liability for compensation. If the shareholders of a 
company abuse the independent status of corporate legal person and shareholders’ 
limited liability to avoid debts and damage the interests of the company’s creditors, they 
shall undertake the joint and several liability for the company’s debts.186 
 
Although shareholders in the UK are very powerful in terms of the powers granted to 
them, the rights enjoyed by their Chinese counterparts are far more extensive. Apart 
from the powers enjoyed by UK shareholders, some powers belonging to the UK 
directors are part of powers enjoyed by Chinese shareholders, namely the powers to 
determine the company’s operational guidelines and investment plans. Therefore, the 
general meeting of shareholders could be considered the supreme power in corporate 
governance. 187  The rationale behind the institutional arrangement still lies in the 
legitimacy of management. The state, who plays a role as shareholder in companies, 
uses its role as the legislator outside the companies to maintain legitimacy. Therefore, 
there is no doubt that the state gives shareholders as much power as possible to 
strengthen its position.  
 
1.3.2.2      External mechanisms 
 
As with UK and US, the internal mechanism that is aimed at building a checks-and-
balances system within the company sometimes does not work as it is supposed to. The 
inadequacy of internal control fuelled the need for other external mechanisms. 188 
Therefore, how these external mechanisms operate in the Chinese context require 
examination.  
 
1.3.2.2.1 External legal mechanisms 
 
                                                          
186 Company Law 2005 s 20. 
187 Junhai Liu, ‘Experience of Internationalization of Chinese Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: 
How to Make the Hybrid of Civil Law and Common Law Work’ (2015) European Business Law Review 
113. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2611556> accessed 22 April 2017. 
188 Pinto and Visentini (n 62).  
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In a socialist society, which features departmentalism, the hierarchical system can be 
seen in all government-related areas, including the legislative process. The discussion 
that follows is structured in line with the top-down hierarchical legal system. Here, a 
brief description about the hierarchy in legislative power is provided. In a socialist 
country where people’s democracy is an indispensable part of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, one way to achieve democracy is for people to elect their own delegates 
through a multi-tiered representative electoral system, which form the National 
People’s Congress189. The NPC is the organ with supreme power. Therefore, the NPC 
has the highest legislative power of the state190 and this kind of legislation is described 
as state law or basic law. This is the first layer of the legislative system that is enacted 
by central authorities. The second layer are those administrative regulations and rules 
promulgated by the State Council, including the central government and the Ministries 
under the State Council. 191  The ministries of the State Council could formulate 
legislation within the power conferred upon them. 192  The third level are those 
regulations and rules formulated by local government.193 They fill the gaps left by the 
first two layers of legislative power according to their local circumstances.194 
 
Laws in the first layer, including company law and securities law, are promulgated by 
the standing committee of the NPC. Company law, which focuses on the creation and 
the internal governance of the company, has been discussed above. The Securities Law 
2005 195  focuses on the regulation of securities markets, such as general listing 
requirements, share offering and information disclosure.196 The second layer comprises 
the rules and regulations published by the CSRC. There are 28 ministries and 
                                                          
189 Hereinafter ‘NPC’. 
190 Legislation Laws of the People’s Republic of China (Hereinafter Legislation Law) s 7. 
191  The formulation of legislation to govern the following matters is authorised: (a) when matters 
requiring the formulation of administration regulation to implement the provisions of law; (b) when 
regulations are needed to govern matters are within the administrative functions and powers of the state 
council as stipulated by the Constitution; and (c) when the NPC and its standing committee authorized 
the SC to formulate administrative regulations for matters originally under the responsibilities of the 
NPC and its standing committee. Legislation Law s 56. 
192 Legislation Law s 71. 
193 Legislation Law, ss 63, 71. 
194 Jiangyu Wang, ‘An Overview of China's Corporate Law Regime’ (2008) 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=1222061 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1222061> accessed 23 April 
2017. 
195 Hereinafter ‘SL 2005’. 
196 Enacted by the standing committee of the NPC on 29 December 1998, first revised on 28 August 2004, 
second and most recent revision on 27 October 2005, effective on 1 January 2006. Applied to the issuance 
and transaction of stocks, corporate bonds and any other securities as lawfully recognized by the SC 
within the territory of the People’s Republic of China.  
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commissions in the State Council and the CSRC is one of them. It is a ministerial-level 
public institution under the direct control of the State Council.197 CSRC is responsible 
for ‘enacting rules governing companies such as corporate structure, information 
disclosure, listing of companies, shareholder protection and directors’ system’.198 The 
CSRC is regarded as the central regulatory institution in Chinese corporate governance 
systems given the fact that it is responsible for almost every aspect of corporate 
governance, such as information disclosure, shareholder protection and listing rules. 
 
The CSRC places great emphasis on good corporate governance and its main effort is 
the promulgation of various regulations, circulars, standards and guidelines.199 Among 
these regulations, the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China is 
the most comprehensive code regulating the governance of public companies listed on 
China’s stock exchange and unlike the ‘comply or explain’ approach in UK corporate 
governance code, the Chinese code requires mandatory compliance. Besides the power 
of legislation, the CSRC is also entitled to sanction those who fail to comply with its 
regulations. The third level concerns the local regulations and rules of local government. 
Unlike the state’s role in the US corporate area, Chinese local government does not use 
its legislative power frequently in terms of corporate governance. Unlike the Anglo-
American system, the stock exchange operates as a self-regulatory body to govern the 
behaviour on the stock exchange. However, in China, the SSE and SZSE are two 
subsidiaries of the CSRC, and the CSRC appoints their senior personnel. Therefore, the 
regulations published by the SSE and SZSE could be regarded as the third layer in the 
legislative system. Similar to many other stock exchanges, the SSE and SZSE are not 
only markets that provide capital-raising and share-trading functions, but also 
undertake a number of regulatory tasks, such as rules and standards in trading, listing, 
                                                          
197 Official website of China Securities Regulatory Commission 
<http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/> accessed 23 April 2017. 
198 Ibid. 
199 These include ‘August 2001 Guidance Opinion on the Establishment of an Independent Directors 
System in Listed Companies’; ‘January 2002 Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies; 
December 2004 The Provisions on Strengthening the Rights and Interests of Public Shareholders’; 
‘March 2006 Guidelines on Articles of Association for Listed Companies’; ‘March 2006 Rules on the 
General Shareholders’ Meeting of Listed Companies’; ‘January 2007 Administrative Measures for the 
Disclosure of Information of Listed Companies’; ‘July 2007 Interim Measures for the Administration of 
State-owned Shareholders’ Transfer of Their Shares of Listed Companies’; ‘October 2014 Measures for 
the Administration of the Takeover of Listed Companies’; ‘October 2014 Several Opinions on 
Reforming, Improving and Strictly Implementing the Delisting System of Listed Companies’. 
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disclosing and investor protection. 200  These rules clearly illustrate the rights and 
responsibilities of any one who participates in the stock exchange market and serve as 
a significant tool in regulating the behaviour of market players.  
 
1.3.2.2.2 External market mechanism 
 
There are several market mechanisms that serve as additional constraining forces. The 
first is the capital market. A well-developed financial market is extremely important 
when considering its role in disciplining the behaviour of companies. It is beyond 
argument that the UK and US both have the most effective capital markets in the world 
and this plays a great role in promoting business entities. Although China established 
its stock exchange in the 1990s and has experienced great development during recent 
years, the development of the capital market is still restricted by political and 
ideological factors. Given the inefficient capital market, companies must instead rely 
on alternative sources of financing for growth, such as influential wealthy families, 
large banking institutions, other companies or governments. Figure 1.2 shows that loans 
from various sources comprise the major portion of financial capital and equity remains 
a small component in China. As providers of capital, these parties’ objectives may differ 
from the pure financial returns that the investing public seeks. Therefore, their capacity 
to act as a disciplining mechanism might not coincide with the interests of shareholders 
and stakeholders, and the effect of the capital market as an external governance 
mechanism is quite disappointing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
200  These include: Trading Rules of Shanghai Stock Exchange; Trading Rules of Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange; Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks on Shanghai Stock Exchange; Rules Governing Listing 
of Stocks on Shenzhen Stock Exchange; Guidelines on Protection of Investor Rights and Interests for 
SME Board 
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Figure 1.2: Composition of corporate financing201 
 
The second mechanism is the labour market. In China, as will be analysed later, the 
Chinese government is in the position to appoint key personnel to listed companies and 
exert great political influence over these companies’ operations. It is therefore not 
surprising that the labour market is quite undeveloped.  
 
The third mechanism is the product or service market. Given the fact that most SOEs 
benefit from a monopoly position, the product or service market is not fully functional 
in China and even if the company is poorly run and its products do not compete 
successfully, SOEs will not be affected due to its monopoly position. However, the 
market for corporate control, which is regarded as an important market discipline in the 
UK and US, exercises limited influence in the Chinese context. On the one hand, 
according to one commentator, ‘the presence of highly concentrated ownership 
structures with large blocks of non-tradable shares, combined with inadequate 
information disclosure, regulatory barriers and inexperienced management suggest that 
the market for corporate control remains under-developed and ineffective’.202  In a 
market like this, misconduct suffers from limited punishment. On the other hand, 
companies that perform badly could easily conceal their failure through manipulating 
or misleading investors; for example, the losses caused by low share prices could be 
transferred to investors through insider trading. In such a market, the function of a 
corporate control mechanism is impaired substantially. 
 
1.3.2.3      Political governance 
 
As has been shown, the management of legitimacy to guarantee the CPC’s ruling 
position requires it to maintain control of SOEs, which constitutes the most important 
pillar of the Chinese economy. In order to maintain official ideology, Party 
organizations are established within SOEs to ensure the Party’s ideological influence. 
                                                          
201 Data selected from China Statistical Yearbook China (Statistics Press 2012) and analysed by the 
present author.  
202 Thomas W Lin, ‘Corporate Governance in China: Recent Developments, Key Problems and Solutions’ 
(2004) Journal of Accounting and Corporate Governance < 
https://msbfile03.usc.edu/digitalmeasures/wtlin/intellcont/04JACG-LIN_CHINA%20CorpGov-1.pdf> 
accessed 06 September 2017. 
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Therefore, political governance is exercised from two perspectives: (1) the SASAC and 
other ministries, who act as the de facto shareholders,203 and tightly control the SOEs 
and (2) Party organizations continue to influence the operation of SOEs from inside. 
 
State assets belong to the state, namely the Chinese people as a whole, according to 
State Assets Law.204 Therefore, the State Council represents all the people to exercise 
the functions and responsibilities of the ‘shareholders’ and claims it regulates for the 
public good.205 The State Council further delegates or assigns powers to SASAC, as 
well as other ministries according to the nature of the enterprises. At the central 
government level, several ministries and commissions are responsible for SOEs 
separately. SASAC is only responsible for the central SOEs that provide public 
products, such as telecommunications, petroleum, infrastructure and other industrial 
goods. All financial SOEs are monitored and regulated by the China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission,206 China Banking Regulatory Commission207 and the CSRC. 
Other ministries and commissions are responsible for SOEs in their own department, 
such as tobacco, gold, publication and broadcast.  
 
                                                          
203 Although they exercise shareholders’ rights, duties and responsibilities, they are not entitled to receive 
the benefits or receive distributed dividends that belong to shareholders. It is the central and local 
government that do so. Therefore, to some extent, SASAC and other ministries are regarded as de facto 
shareholders only insofar as it exercises only some of shareholders’ power. 
204 Law on State-owned Assets in Enterprises [中国人民共和国企业国有资产法], promulgated by the 
Fifth Session of the Standing Comm. National People’s Congress, 28 October 2008, effective 1 May 
2009. (China) (hereinafter ‘State Assets Law’) art. 3. 
205 State Assets Law art. 4. 
206 Hereinafter ‘CIRC’. 
207 Hereinafter ‘CBRC’. 
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Figure 1.3: The governance of SOEs208 
 
According to the Constitution of the CPC, the Party’s leadership role in the country 
‘means mainly political, ideological and organizational leadership’. 209  A 1997 
resolution of the CPC Central Committee detailed this leadership in the following 
manner: 
  
Maintaining the Party’s political leadership over SOEs is a principle of fundamental 
importance that shall never be shaken and undermined. The political leadership of the 
Party is embodied in the following aspects: adhering to the Socialist direction of SOEs 
to ensure that the Party’s line, principles, policies as well as state laws and regulations 
are thoroughly implemented in SOEs; adhering to the principle of Party control of the 
cadres by lawfully selecting or recommending property representatives on behalf of the 
state or persons in charge of managing the SOEs according to the respective 
administrative authorities of the Party organizations concerned, as well as, taking charge 
of their education, training, evaluation and supervision; and ensuring that the Party 
                                                          
208 State-owned assets could be divided into operating assets and non-operating assets. Non-operating 
assets refers to assets that are owned by the state, but not used for operation, such as in real estate or for 
hospitals and schools owned by government sectors. Reference to listed SOEs, normally refers to the 
companies that own the operational assets.  
209 Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party [中国共产党章程], promulgated by the Ninth Nat’l 
Congress Communist Party, effective Apr. 14, 1969, revised by the Eighteenth National Congress 
Communist Party 14 November 2012) (hereinafter ‘CPC Constitution’), Preamble, see 
<http://www.china.org.cn/ chinese/18da/2012-11/19/content_27156212_2.htm> accessed 16 October 
2017.  
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organizations play the role of the political core and that individual Party members play 
exemplary roles in SOEs. The emphasis on upholding the Party’s political leadership of 
SOEs does not mean that the Party should act on behalf of or to replace the government 
or the enterprise.210 
 
Therefore, there are four mechanisms through which the Party exercises its control 
power: 
 
i All Party members need to advocate and comply with the Party line  
 
The Constitution of the CPC requires all CPC members to comply with the Party’s 
political line211 and study, understand, and implement the Party line, principles, policies 
and resolutions, putting ‘the interest of the Party and the people above everything, 
abiding by the Party’s discipline, upholding the Party’s solidarity and unity, 
maintaining close ties with the masses to ensure that the Party’s policies are 
implemented, and collecting public views and feedback to inform the Party.’212 In 
China, being a CPC member is regarded as being the most advanced individuals in all 
walks of life, and most of the executives and management are CPC members. Therefore, 
the Party formed control over SOEs by implementing the Party line along with other 
rules and regulations. Under certain circumstances, the execution of Party line and Party 
orders outmatches other duties. 
 
ii The CPC decides on the appointment and dismissal of important personnel in 
SOEs 
 
The primary principle regarding to the personnel system within the Party is the Principle 
of Party Control of Cadres.213 According to this principle, the CPC dominates the 
                                                          
210 Notice of the Central Committee of the CPC on Further Strengthening and Improving the Party 
Building Work in SOEs [中共中央关于进一步加强和改进国有企业党的建设工作的通知 ] 
promulgated by the CPC Central Committee, Part II, available at 
<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71382/71383/ 4844844.html> (hereinafter 1997 CPC 
Notice on Party Building in SOEs).  
211 CPC Constitution (n 209) art. 3 
212 CPC Constitution, ibid, art. 3. 
213 Sebastian Heilmann and Sarah Kirchberger. The Chinese Nomenklatura in Transition: A Study Based 
on Internal Cadre Statistics of the Central Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party 
(Center for East Asian and Pacific Studies Trier University 2000). 
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appointment and dismissal of all state officials in China. As the top executives in SOEs 
enjoying administrative ranks, the CPC regulates and approves their appointment and 
promotion CPC. CPC members who are accused of wrongdoing are investigated by the 
related Party department and punished under Party disciplinary codes. Therefore, the 
CPC ‘maintains the nomenclature system that covers cadre selection and appointment 
in all state-related institutions in China’214 through this personnel system. This unified 
management system ‘reaches into almost every important nook and cranny in the public 
sector of the Chinese system’. 215 The Joint Opinions of the CPC Central Organization 
Department and the SASAC Party Committee prescribe the following: 
 
a.  The Party Control of Cadres system requires the Party organization’s 
participation in the appointment, management and supervision of all SOE 
officers above the middle level. The main responsibility of the Party 
organization is to set the selection criteria, select the initial candidates, 
carefully examine these candidates, and recommend these candidates for 
final appointment. In addition, the Party organization, not the board or 
general manager, is in charge of supervising the SOE’s personnel system. 
  
b.  In principle, a balance should be maintained between the principle of Party 
Control of Cadres and the requirements of China’s corporate laws that 
authorize the board to appoint managers and the general manager to appoint 
lower-level officers. Technically, the selection of personnel can adopt 
market-based mechanisms to recruit the most competent and competitive 
candidates.  
 
c.  The appointment of senior corporate executives should follow these steps: 
(1) the Party organization department’s examination of the qualifications of 
the candidates; (2) the Party Committee’s full deliberation of the candidates; 
and (3) the appointment of the candidates by the board of directors based 
                                                          
214 Wang (n 131) 639. 
215 Gaye Christoffersen, ‘Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform’ (1995) 3 China Review 
International 487. 
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on the recommendation of the Party Committee, following all legal 
procedures and formalities.216 
 
In this way, the CPC exercises further controls over SOEs. 
 
iii Party departments are established within the SOEs to ensure that the operation 
of the company is consistent with the Party line 
 
Each SOE has at least one Party department, known either as the Party Group (dangzu), 
Party Committee (dangwei) or Party Subgroup (dangzhibu). The functions of the Party 
department in SOEs are defined in the CPC Constitution as follows: 
 
In a state-owned or collective enterprise, the primary Party organization acts as 
the political nucleus and works for the [better] operation of the enterprise. The 
primary Party organization guarantees and supervises the implementation of the 
principles and policies of the Party and the state in its own enterprise and backs 
the meeting of shareholders, board of directors, board of supervisors and 
manager (factory director) in the exercise of their relevant functions and powers 
according to law. It relies wholeheartedly on the workers and office staff, 
supports the work of the congresses of representatives of workers and office 
staff and participates in making final decisions on major questions in the 
enterprise. It works to improve its own organization and provides leadership 
over ideological and political work, efforts for cultural and ethical progress and 
the trade unions, the Communist Youth League and other mass organizations.217 
 
The 1997 CPC Notice on Party Building in SOEs states the powers and obligations of 
the Party department in a more explicit way. It requires that the Party organization . . . 
supervise[s] the enterprise in order to ensure that the CPC line is faithfully implemented, 
and authorizes it to participate in the decision-making on material and important matters 
                                                          
216 Joint Opinions on Strengthening and Improving Party Building Work in Central SOEs [关于加强和
改进中央企业党建工作的意见], promulgated by the CPC Central Organization Department and 
SASAC Party Committee (2004), available at 
<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/102565/182143/10993484.html> art. 10. The text was 
translated by Wang (no 131) 
217 Constitution of the Communist Party of China [中国共产党章程] art. 32 para 2. 
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of the SOE and provide support to the factory leader/general manager, shareholders’ 
general meeting, board of directors and supervisory board to perform their duties 
according to law.’218 Therefore, the board of directors or general manager is required 
to ‘consult and respect the opinion of the Party organization ‘before making any 
important decisions, and brief the Party organization on the implementation of said 
decision.219  
 
1.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the agency problems and the corporate governance mechanisms in the 
UK, US and China were discussed. In the first section it is shown that the UK model of 
corporate governance shares many similarities with that of the US (Figure 1.4). These 
similarities may contribute to the commonalities between these two jurisdictions in 
terms of legal traditions, regulatory approach, social value, ideology and capital market 
structure. Under the Anglo-American system, there is usually a shareholder body that 
formally has the right to use its voting power to select the board of directors and decide 
on key issues in the company; a single board of directors who enjoy the power to 
manage the company and appoint the management team. However, no single 
mechanism can provide an answer to the vertical agency problems between 
shareholders and management. Therefore, external mechanisms have a role to play in 
mitigating this agency cost. The UK and US place great emphasis on transparency and 
disclosure to ensure business is conducted in an open and transparent way. In addition, 
both these countries have highly decentralized and well-developed equity markets, and 
are greatly dependent on equity finance, which promotes the market for corporate 
control and the role of takeover is quite dynamic and its functions can be effectively 
brought into play. 
                                                          
218  Central Committee of the CPC, ‘Notice of the Central Committee of the CPC on Further 
Strengthening and Improving the Party Building Work in SOEs’ [中共中央关于进一步加强和改进国
有企业党的建设工作的通知], promulgated by the CPC Central Committee, Zhong Fa [1997] 4 Hao, 
24 January 1997) part II, available at <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71382/71383/ 
4844844.html> (hereinafter ‘1997 CPC Notice on Party Building in SOEs’).  
219 Ibid, 1997 CPC Notice on Party Building in SOEs, part IV. 
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Figure 1.4: Anglo-American model of corporate governance 
 
In China the legitimacy management to strengthen the ruling position of the CPC is 
embodied in every aspect of SOE development and, therefore, leads to both vertical and 
horizontal agency problems within SOEs. The corporate governance framework in 
Chinese SOEs could be regarded as a combination of features from different 
jurisdictions, but working together to guarantee that SOEs are within the CPC’s control. 
In terms of the internal governance structure, unlike the ‘permissive regime’ adopted 
by its UK counterpart, the Chinese internal governance system relies heavily on a 
mandatory approach to prescribe a clear allocation of decision-making power among 
shareholder meetings and the board of directors. In order to make the control system 
more efficient, a two-tier governance system was established, which benefits from the 
independent directors of the single-tier governance structure in the Anglo-American 
system and supervisory board of two-tier governance system in Germany. In terms of 
the external mechanism, the role of the external market mechanism in China, that is, 
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capital market, labour market, product or service market, and market for corporate 
control, is limited. The most important feature embodied in the Chinese model of 
corporate governance is the ruling position of the CPC. Although SOEs are organized 
in the corporation form, the Party still controls SOEs through both general requirements 
on policy compliance and specific powers such as appointing the senior executives of 
SOEs (Figure 1.5). 
 
Figure 1.5: Chinese model of corporate governance 
 
This chapter points out that two classic mechanisms are usually deployed to mitigate 
agency costs. One is the utilization of legal measures. By allocating powers and 
responsibilities sophisticatedly between the shareholders, directors and managers, the 
company could operate with minimum internal friction. In addition, the rules and 
regulations could act as deterrents by punishing misconduct. The second is the market 
mechanism. The market for corporate control, capital market, labour market, product 
or service market work together to provide a second layer of protection. Although an 
attempt has been made to build a sophisticated mechanism to make sure the corporate 
is operated efficiently with minimum agency costs, the defects in the corporate 
governance system make it hard to realize. In recent decades increasing power has 
emerged in the UK, US and in China through the rise of the institutional shareholders. 
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The massive developments in the scale of institutional investors, together with increases 
in their level of corporate governance activity, suggest the possibility of the beginning 
of a new era in the relationships between investment institutions and the corporates in 
which they invest. Institutional shareholder activism, for many scholars and officials, 
is the solution to corporate governance problems. Do they fulfil this expectation? The 
following chapters will attempt to answer this question.  
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Chapter 2: The Development and Typologies of Institutional Shareholders 
  
From the early twentieth century institutional investors have been developing rapidly 
in the UK and US. Although Chinese institutional investors have had a late start, they 
have been catching up quickly in recent decades. Although there is no simple and fixed 
definition of institutional investors, it usually means ‘specialized financial institutions 
that manage savings collectively on behalf of small investors toward a specific 
objective in terms of acceptable risk, return maximization, and maturity of claims’.1 
This chapter examines the evolution of institutional shareholders to see how they have 
become a viable and important player in the securities market through time. A clear 
picture of the environment in which institutional investors developed provides a better 
understanding of their behaviour. Data that characterizes the growth and size of 
institutional investors is then presented. As institutional investors vary in their purpose, 
objects, operations and organizational form, it is necessary to look into different types 
of institutions. However, although the present author is fully aware of the fact that the 
list of institutional investors is incomplete, given the limited available data, space 
constraints in the thesis and the influence exerted on corporate governance, only 
institutional shareholders, which accounted for a relatively large percentage according 
to the share ownership figures will be examined. Other types of institutional investors, 
such as foundations and endowments could form part of future studies. The chapter 
ends with a probe of the reasons for the development of institutional investors and a 
conclusion is drawn at the end. 
 
2.1  The development of institutional investors in the United Kingdom and 
United States 
 
The emergence of institutional investors was related to the Age of Discovery in the 
seventeenth century when the extensive exploration and the establishment of overseas 
colonies by the Europe powers dominated the economy. Frequent trading spawned the 
merchant class and, among them, the elite and economists who proposed Mercantilism.2 
Mercantilism was aimed at promoting governmental regulation of the economy for the 
                                                          
1 E Philip Davis and Benn Steil. Institutional Investors (MIT Press 2004) 12. 
2 Robert B Ekelund Jr and Robert F Hébert, A History of Economic Theory and Method (5th edn, 
Waveland Press 2007). 
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purpose of augmenting state power and one way was to accumulate monetary 
reserves through a positive balance of trade. The expansion and exploitation of the 
colonies therefore gave birth to the first collective investment scheme in the world: the 
Foreign and Colonial Government Trust in the UK. 3 The emergence of the very first 
institutional investors marks the beginning of the development of institutional investors. 
As discussed in chapter 1, the dispersed ownership structure in the UK and US took 
decades to come into being, and the rise and development of institutional investors was 
part of this process. The following section looks at the rise and development of 
institutional shareholders in the UK and US respectively from a historical perspective 
and the factors that promoted their development.  
 
2.1.1  Development of institutional investors in the United Kingdom 
 
Chapter 1 showed that professional brokers and dealers were well developed at the end 
of the eighteenth century and led to the formation of an effective market for the trading 
of securities (the London Stock Exchange). By the 1830s a sizeable number of 
enterprises, operating in fields such as utilities, transport, banking, insurance and 
mining, had publicly traded shares. Company law reform occurring in this stage 
improved the legal climate for corporate enterprise, giving those operating businesses 
a straightforward and reliable procedure to incorporate a company with full legal 
personality, transferable shares, limited liability and other essential corporate 
attributes.4 This greatly promoted the growth of corporate enterprises and by the mid-
nineteenth century the largest railways seemed to be the pioneers of the modern-style 
divorce between ownership and control,5 and they had a sizeable shareholder base. The 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed a rapid growth in the number of 
companies that made the move to the stock market, not only on the London Stock 
                                                          
3 David Chambers and Rui Esteves, ‘The First Global Emerging Markets Investor: Foreign and Colonial 
Investment Trust 1880–1913’ (2014) 52  Explorations in Economic History 13. 
4  Brian R Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control: British Business Transformed (Oxford 
Scholarship online 2010) 165 <http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199236978.do> 5 accessed 
25 January 2017. 
5 François Crouzet, The Victorian Economy (Routledge 1982) 293; Geoffrey Channon, ‘A Nineteenth 
Century Investment Decision: The Midland Railway’s London Extension’ (1972) 3 Economic History 
Review 449; Gourvish, Terry Gourvish, Railways 1830–70: A Business History (Cambridge University 
Press 2011) 57, 83. 
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Exchange, but also on provincial stock exchanges.6 In addition, most large railways and 
some banks had established pension plans for their employees. Pension funds grew 
rapidly and life insurance companies were also an important kind of institutional 
investor.7 However, as research conducted by some scholars indicates, corporate shares 
were not the first option of investment at this stage. Insurance companies generally 
preferred to invest in debentures8 and industrial equities made up only 3.9% of total 
invested assets as of 1903.9 As for pension funds, they invested almost entirely in fixed 
interest securities issued by British and overseas governments, and by public utilities.10 
Therefore, institutional investors were relatively minor players at this stage and the 
shares were still in the hands of blockholders and individual shareholders.11 Private 
investors owned upwards of 80% of the securities traded on the London Stock 
Exchange in the early 1930s.12 The Financial News’s explanation was that ‘[i]nvestors, 
on the whole, seem to prefer to have the fun of managing their investments 
themselves through their own stockbrokers rather than to entrust their savings to an 
insurance company, an investment trust or a building society.’13 
 
This trend remained prevalent and individuals investing on their own behalf dominated 
the buy side in the UK until after World War II.14 What needs to be mentioned here is 
that although the number of individuals owning shares in UK companies kept growing 
in the interwar years, institutional investment grew in importance at this stage, but 
                                                          
6 Edward Victor Morgan and William Arthur Thomas. The Stock Exchange: Its History and Functions 
(St. Martin’s Press 1971). 
7 William P Kennedy, Industrial Structure, Capital Markets and the Origins of British Economic Decline 
(Cambridge University Press 1987) 131-132. 
8 See Lance E Davis and Robert E Gallman, Evolving Financial Markets and International Capital Flows: 
Britain, the Americas and Australia (Cambridge University Press 2001) 163; see also Mae Baker and 
Michael Collins, ‘The Asset Portfolio Composition of British Life Insurance Firms’ (2003) 10 Financial 
History Review 153.  
9 H.A.L (Hugh Anthony Lewis) Cockerell and Edwin Green, The British Insurance Business: A Guide 
to its History and Records, (2nd edn Sheffield Academic Press 1994) 114. 
10  Leslie Hannah, Inventing Retirement: The Development of Occupational Pensions in 
Britain (Cambridge University Press 1986) 10–12, 18–19. 
11  Gordon Boyce, Information, Mediation and Institutional Development: The Rise of Large-Scale 
Enterprise in British Shipping, 1870–1919 (Manchester University Press 1995) 89. 
12  Ranald C Michie, The London Stock Exchange: A History (Oxford University Press 1999) 
<https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_London_Stock_Exchange.html?id=DygTDAAAQBAJ&
printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false> accessed 
25 January 2016 258; Bank of England, ‘Historical United Kingdom Overseas Investments 1938-1958’ 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Pages/digitalcontent/historicpubs/ukoi.aspx> accessed 
25 January 2016. 
13 Michie, ibid. 
14 P Sargant Florence, The Logic of British and American Industry: A Realistic Analysis of Economic 
Structure and Government (Routledge 2003) 187–189. 
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nevertheless played only a supporting role in comparison to direct investment in shares 
by individuals. On the one hand, life insurance companies, who are the first institutional 
investors, began to treat UK equities as a serious investment option during the interwar 
years, with nearly 10% of British life assurance assets being invested in ordinary shares 
by 1937. 15  On the other hand, institutional investment organisations, such as the 
Pensions and Lifetime Saving Association16 established in 1932, the Association of 
Investment Trust Companies17  formed in 1932, and the Association of Unit Trust 
Managers 18  formed in 1959. They represent the interest of different institutional 
shareholders, play an active role in the growth of institutional investment. 
 
In 1957, detailed statistics on share ownership were published for the first time and 
individual investors held 66% of the shares of UK public companies. By 1969, retail 
investors no longer owned a majority of the shares of UK public companies and 
institutional investors largely filled the gap. A survey of London’s financial district 
observed that institutional shareholders had become ‘the mainstay of the stock markets’ 
as ‘(t)he rich and well-to-do who used to invest their savings through the Stock 
Exchange are not now able to save on any scale’ and ‘only the institutions . . . have 
“new money” to invest’.19 By 1975 pension funds and insurance companies held more 
than 33% of the shares of UK public companies.20 Investment trusts and unit trusts were 
of lesser importance but still qualified as the third and fourth legs of the institutional 
market.21 The fact that institutional investors became the dominant buyers of UK shares 
after World War II could be attributed to several aspects. First, tax was of central 
importance. Given the fact that high rates of tax were imposed on dividends, those 
private investors with large incomes therefore turned to forms of savings that received 
more favourable tax treatment and this provided them with strong incentives to invest 
                                                          
15 Cheffins (n 4), ch 8.  
16 Hereinafter ‘PLSA’. It used to be the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF). 
17 Hereinafter ‘AITC’. 
18 In 1976, the Association of Unit Trust Managers was renamed the Unit Trust Association (hereinafter 
‘UTA’). The UTA was rebranded the Association of Unit Trusts and Investment Funds (hereinafter 
‘AUTIF’) in 1993. In 2002, AUTIF merged with the Fund Managers’ Association (hereinafter ‘FMA’) 
and created the Investment Management Association (hereinafter ‘IMA’). 
19 Quoted by Cheffins (n 4) from Oscar R. Hobson, How the City Works (5th edn News Chronicle Book 
Department 1955) 120. 
20 Cheffins (n 4) 134.  
21 Peter G Moore, ‘The Wilson Committee Review of the Functioning of Financial Institutions: Some 
Statistical Aspects’ (1981) Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A (General) 35. 
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through financial intermediaries.22 As the Economist observed in 1979, ‘Tax efficiency 
has replaced productive efficiency as the main criterion in many investment decisions 
because of tax rates that make the actual returns on capital almost irrelevant to personal 
investors.’23 Pension funds were the beneficiaries that benefited from the tax privilege. 
With no tax being levied on pension funds’ investment income or on capital gains, 
pension funds were regarded as ‘gross funds’. 24 Life insurance was another example 
of a tax-advantaged investment vehicle. Private investors therefore turned to these 
forms of tax-favoured institutional investment by forsaking their direct ownership of 
shares.25 As the Economist stated in 1977, ‘The enormous advantages of institutional 
saving for the rich who might once have invested in equities but who are now prevented 
from doing so by tax, explains the overwhelming dominance the institutions have 
acquired in the stock market.’26 The second factor would be the attraction of UK 
equities. On the one hand, British investors used to allocate a sizeable proportion of 
capital to overseas assets, particularly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. However, the regulatory regime, which was initially introduced under the 
Exchange Control Act 1947, tightly restricted overseas portfolio investment.27 On the 
other hand, the 1979 election brought Margaret Thatcher’s market-friendly 
Conservatives to power, and the corporate profitability rebounded strongly after 
slumping in the 1960s and 1970s.28 Institutional investors selected corporate equities 
as a good option when investing. Returns for investors during the 1980s were higher 
than in any other decade during the twentieth century.29 The third reason would be 
company law and stock exchange regulation. In the decades following World War II, 
amendments made to company legislation and alterations made to stock exchange 
listing rules both played a role. The Companies Act 1948 stated that the annual profit 
                                                          
22 Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions (Chairperson, Sir Harold Wilson) 
(hereinafter ‘Wilson Committee’), ‘Evidence on the Financing of Trade and Industry’, vol. 3 (1977) 269; 
Marshall E. Blume, ‘The Financial Markets’ in Richard E Caves and Lawrence B Krause (eds), Britain’s 
Economic Performance (Brookings Institution 1980) 317. 
23 ‘Personal Finance’ (Survey) The Economist (24 March 1979) 22; cited by Cheffins (n 4) 
24 David Blake, Pension Schemes and Pension Funds in the United Kingdom (2nd edn Oxford University 
Press) 38–40. 
25 Blume (n 22) 317. 
26 Cheffins (n 4) 49. 
27 Benjamin J Cohen, ‘The United Kingdom as an Exporter of Capital’, in Fritz Machlup, Walter S Salant 
and Lorie Tarshis (eds), International Mobility and Movement of Capital (Columbia University Press 
1972) 25, 37; Stephen Bond, Evan Davis and Michael Devereux, Capital Controls: The Implications of 
Restricting Overseas Portfolio Capital (Pearson Education Limited 1987) 18–23.  
28  Christine Oughton, ‘Probability of UK Firms’ in Kirsty Hughes (ed), The Future of UK 
Competitiveness and the Role of Industrial Policy (Policy Studies Institute 1993) 55, 58. 
29 Cheffins (n 4) 353. 
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and loss accounts, which were previously only available to shareholders, required to be 
filed publicly. 30  An additional 1948 departure from past practice was detailed 
regulation of the form and content of both the balance sheet and the profit and loss 
account.31 Another innovation was to require company accounts to be prepared so that 
they gave a ‘true and fair view’ of a company’s financial position. 32  Finally, the 
1948 Act tightened up disclosure requirements for holding companies and their 
subsidiaries.33 Under the new scheme, a holding company’s balance sheet, and profit 
and loss account had to be presented in the form of group accounts giving a true and 
fair view of the state of the affairs of the group as a whole. Further changes were made 
to disclosure regulation in the 1980s. The Companies Act 1981 obliged companies for 
the first time to require that accounts be prepared in a standardized format.34  The 
Financial Services Act 1986 empowered the Stock Exchange’s listing rules with the 
status of subordinate legislation as the Stock Exchange is regarded as the competent 
authority responsible for promulgating and enforcing listing requirements for 
companies with publicly traded shares.35 The Act also specified the Stock Exchange’s 
enforcement powers, stipulating that the Exchange could suspend trading in a 
company’s shares and publicize breaches of its listing rules.36 
 
From then on, institutional investors acted as the dominant players in the UK equity 
market. Owing to scientific and technological progress, and financial innovation, 
mutual funds grew rapidly and hedge funds emerged in the recent decade. Figure 2.1 
shows that pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds and hedge funds are the 
main institutional investors in the UK and from 1998 to 2014, the ownership was still 
widely held by individuals and various financial intermediaries, such as pension funds, 
unit trusts and insurance companies. The rest of the world witnessed tremendous growth, 
holding 53.8% in 2014. Figure 2.2 shows that among institutional shareholders, 
insurance companies, pension funds, unit trusts and other financial institutions, 
collectively accounted for a large percentage of shares by value. 
                                                          
30 Companies Act 1948, ss 126(1), 127(1), 156(1). 
31 Companies Act 1948, s 149(2). 
32 Companies Act 1948, s 149(1). 
33 Companies Act 1948, ss 150–53. 
34 Companies Act 1981, s 62. 
35 Financial Services Act 1986, ss 142(6), 143–44. 
36 Financial Services Act 1986, ss 145(b), 153. 
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Figure 2.1: Beneficial ownership of UK shares by value from 1998 to 201437 
                                                          
37 Data reproduced from National Statistics Online Database 
<http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/pnfc1/share-ownership---share-register-survey-report/2014/stb-shared-
ownership.html > accessed 02, Feb, 2016. Analysed by the author. 
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Figure 2.2: Percentage of UK stock market owned by value in 2014 38 
 
2.1.2  Development of institutional investors in the US 
 
As explained in Chapter 1, until the nineteenth century, corporations established in the 
US were limited to public interest enterprises39 and they were mainly in the form of 
individual proprietorship and partnership and business enterprises. Throughout the 
nineteenth century mainly privately held industrial enterprises with family control was 
                                                          
38 Analysis based on figure 2.1. 
39 Adolf A Berle and Gardiner C Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (MacMillan 
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very much the norm.40 The ‘corporate revolution’,41 which occurred between 1880 and 
1930, witnessed the flourishing of the stock market and the public securities market.42 
During this stage, as Berle and Means described in their work The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property, there was ‘a shift in corporate ownership . . . of almost 
revolutionary proportions’. 43  Data compiled by Means reveal that the number of 
Americans who owned shares rose dramatically between 1916 and 1921, with the 
middle class being the main contributors.44 Although the ownership was, to some extent, 
dispersed during this stage, institutional investors were negligible and their holdings 
were small.45 
 
The stock market crashed in 1929 which greatly influenced the US economy in the 
1930s and the damages to institutional investors were inevitable. Many reasons 
accounted for this great depression, among which the weakness in the banking system, 
the speculation that prevailed in the stock market and economic imbalances were the 
main factors. Therefore, the US government set out to regulate the financial market. Its 
first action was to establish the Securities and Exchange Commission.46 The SEC was 
set up in 1932 with a view to protecting investors; maintaining fair, orderly and efficient 
markets; and to facilitate capital formation. It was the federal agency empowered with 
broad authority over all aspects of the securities industry, including the power to 
register, regulate and oversee investment companies, investment advisers and broker-
dealers; and securities self-regulatory organisations such as the New York Stock 
Exchange and the NASDAQ.47 Second, the Securities Act 1933 was promulgated to 
govern the securities industry. The aim of this enactment was to guarantee the full and 
fair disclosure of the character of securities. Therefore, the Securities Act 1933 
                                                          
40 Naome R Lamoreaux, ‘Entrepreneurship in the US, 1865–1920’ in David S Landes, Joel Mokyr and 
William J Baumol (eds), The Invention of Enterprise: Entrepreneurship from Ancient Mesopotamia to 
Modern Times (Princeton University Press 2010). 
41 Reasons behind the corporate revolution were discussed at section 1.2.1.  
42 Gardiner C. Means, ‘The Corporate Revolution in America: Economic Reality vs Economic 
Theory’ (Crowell-Collier Press 1962); Walter Werner, ‘Corporation Law in Search of its Future’ 
(1981) Columbia Law Review 1611. 
43 Berle and Means (n 39).  
44 Gardiner Means, ‘The Diffusion of Stock Ownership in the US’ (1930) 44 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 561. 
45 Robert W Hamilton, ‘Corporate Governance in America 1950–2000: Major Changes but Uncertain 
Benefits’ (1999) 25 Journal of Corporation Law 349. 
46 Hereinafter ‘SEC’. 
47  Information from the official website of the US Securities and Exchange Committee, 
<https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml> accessed 23 February 2016. 
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specified the information that a company had to provide when issuing securities in 
public markets and prohibited deceitful misrepresentation and other fraud in the sale of 
securities. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 addressed all aspects of securities 
transactions and the aim of this Act was to provide regulation for securities exchange 
and over-the-counter markets so as to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on 
exchanges and markets.48 There are many provisions related to institutional investors: 
first, s13(a) required all issuers of equity securities subject to registration requirements 
to file annual and quarterly reports and copies thereof as provided by the applicable 
SEC rules. The general form for annual reports of issuers subject to the Exchange Act 
regulation and reporting requirements was Form 10-K.49. SEC rule 13a-13 sets out the 
Exchange Act’s quarterly reporting requirements for issuers of registered securities 
which are generally to be filed on Form 10-Q. Disclosure requirements specific to 
investment companies included (1) annual and semi-annual reports to the SEC on Form 
N-SAR and Form N-CSR; and (2) annual and semi-annual reports to shareholders. 
According to s 13(d), those who acquired more than 5% of the stock of an issuer with 
securities registered under the 1934 Act had to report to the SEC and disclose their 
intention of doing so. Furthermore, s 16(a) required that every person who was directly 
or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10% of any class of any equity security 
(other than an exempted security) which was registered pursuant to s 12 or who was a 
director or an officer of the issuer of such security, had to file the statements required 
by this subsection with the Commission. 50 The principal statute that governed 
investment companies was the Investment Company Act of 1940, which was designed 
‘to mitigate and, so far as is feasible, to eliminate certain conditions, enumerated in that 
section, which adversely affected the public interest and interest of investors.’51 The 
requirement of full and fair disclosure lay the foundation for the US Securities Laws 
and it tied together all the specific provisions of the Act.52 Investment companies were 
therefore generally subject to substantially similar disclosure and reporting 
requirements that applied to publicly traded companies. 
 
                                                          
48 Maksymilian Del Mar and William Twining, Legal Fictions in Theory and Practice (vol 110 Springer 
2015) 387. 
49 Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation (5th edn West Group) 414. 
50 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, s 16(a). 
51 Investment Company Act of 1940, s l(b). 
52 See official website of the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
<https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch402.htm> accessed 18 October 2016.  
64 
 
According to the political theory forwarded by Roe, US legislators responded to a 
populist agenda in the 1930s by limiting the power exercised by large financial 
institutions. Commercial banks were forbidden to participate in investment banking 
business and invest in stock as a result of the promulgation of the Glass–Steagall Act 
in 1933. Mutual funds, were prohibited from investing more than 5% of their regulated 
assets in the securities of any one issuer according to the Investment Company Act of 
1940.53 Insurance companies, as well as pension funds, were limited by the amount of 
shares they could own.54 Therefore, institutional investors were prevented from taking 
a substantial block position in American business during this stage.  
 
With the rise in an ageing population and the decline in birth rate in the 1970s, a 
sophisticated social security system was needed. Therefore, the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 197455 was enacted with the aim of regulating the operation of 
pension plans. This marked the beginning of the extraordinary growth of institutional 
investors in the US.56 During the 1980s, institutional investors began to rise due to the 
increased wealth in society, policy changes and its own popularity.57 The legal barriers 
that once prevented the development of institutional investors were loosened, and due 
to scientific and technological progress and financial innovation, funds became a 
popular investment tool. The possibility of automatic investment or redemption of 
funds at current market values made ‘open-end’ mutual funds an attractive investment 
option. Many new investors lacked sophistication and were attracted to investment 
companies that offered professional investment services to small investors at a low cost. 
Mutual funds and hedge funds grew rapidly. Figure 2.3 indicates that the ownership 
structure showed only small fluctuations during the period from 2004 to 2015. Apart 
from the shares owned by individuals, mutual funds were the largest owners of 
                                                          
53  Mark J Roe, ‘A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance’ (1991) 91(1) Columbia Law 
Review 20 < http://www.jstor.org/stable/1122856> accessed 08 October 2016. 
54 ibid 21 
55 Hereinafter ‘ERISA’. 
56 Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon, ‘The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and 
the Revaluation of Governance Rights’ (2013) Columbia Law Review < 
https://www.law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/gfmc/session_3/1_gilson_and_gordon-
agency_costs_of_agency_capitalism-2013.pdf > accessed 08 October 2016. 
57  Hamilton (n 45) 353.  
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corporate equities, followed by federal and state government retirement funds, private 
pension funds and insurance companies. 
 
Figure 2.3: Ownership of corporate equities from 2004 to 201558 
                                                          
58 Data selected from the Financial Accounts of the US Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, Washington DC 20551 <https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20160310/z1.pdf> 
accessed on 2 June 2016; analysed by the present author. 
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Figure 2.4: Percentage of US stock market owned by value in 201559  
 
2.2  The landscape of institutional investors 
 
2.2.1  Mutual funds 
 
A mutual fund is ‘a company that pools money from many investors and invests the 
money in stocks, bonds, short-term money-market instruments, other securities or 
assets, or some combination of these investments’.60 In the UK, mutual funds offer 
short-term liquidity on pooled funds and it is either through direct redemption of 
                                                          
59 Data collected from the Financial Accounts of the US Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, Washington DC 20551 <https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20160310/z1.pdf> 
accessed on 2 June 2016; analysed by the present author. 
60 The explanation was quoted from the official website of the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission, <https://www.sec.gov/investor/tools/mfcc/mutual-fund-help.htm> accessed on 5 June 
2016. 
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holdings, that is, open-end funds, or through the ability to trade shares in the funds on 
exchanges, that is, closed-end funds.61 
 
Closed-end funds in the UK mainly refer to ‘investment trusts’. They are public 
companies rather than real ‘trusts’ in the legal sense, and are regulated by company law 
and their shares are traded on the London Stock Exchange.62 These companies invest 
in a wide range of assets such as shares, private equity, property and bonds. The 
directors of the company appoint fund managers who are responsible for the investment 
decisions and the great majority of investment trusts are managed by external fund 
management companies.63 
 
Open-end funds, can be divided into two categories according to the legal structure 
under which they fall: (1) unit trusts and (2) open-ended investment companies64. They 
have grown rapidly in the UK and account for more than 9% of the UK stock market. 
The UK fund industry enjoys the leading position in the number of funds under 
management, (835 billion pound sterling). It increased by 8.2% compared with 2014.65 
The majority of open-end fund clients are institutional investors, such as insurance 
companies and pension funds.66  
 
A unit trust is a kind of collective investment scheme67 under which ‘the assets are held 
in trust for the investors, by the trustee, who has legal ownership of the scheme 
property’.68 The unit trust is constituted by a trust deed, entered into by the trustee and 
the manager who are independent of each other, with the manager operating the 
schemes and the trustee overseeing the activities of the manager. A unit trust is not a 
                                                          
61 Davis and Steil (n 4). 
62 Geof Stapledon, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance (Clarendon Press 1996) 23; 
Paul Myners, ‘Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review’ (2001) < 
http://uksif.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/MYNERS-P.-2001.-Institutional-Investment-in-the-
United-Kingdom-A-Review.pdf > accessed on 5 June 2016. 
63 Myners (n 62) 73. 
64 Hereinafter ‘OEICs’; also known as investment companies with variable capital (hereinafter 
‘ICVCs’). 
65 ‘Asset Management in the UK 2014–2015: The Investment Association Annual Survey’ 
<http://www.theinvestmentassociation.org/assets/files/research/2015/20150914-ams2014-2015-
chapter4.pdf> accessed on 5 June 2016. 
66 ‘Asset Management in the UK 2014-2015’ (n 65). 
67 Hereinafter ‘CIS’. 
68 IMA, ‘Authorised Funds: A Regulatory Guide’ <http://www.hearthstone.co.uk/getattachment/ 
d1488598-3ff7-4347-ac94-7cc83b77dd89/> accessed on 5 June 2016. 
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separate legal entity and the investors hold units representing their undivided shares of 
the trust assets. An OEIC is different from a unit trust from the perspective of its legal 
structure. It operates under the company structure and cannot exist in unauthorised 
form.69 Both unit trust and OEICs are open-ended, which means that units could be 
issued whenever investors buy certain portions and investors are also free to dispose of 
their units whenever they want to sell them. 
 
In the US it is usually called an investment company, legally known as an ‘open-ended 
company’. According to the classification of SEC,70 a mutual fund is one of three basic 
types of investment companies; the other two are close-end funds71 and unit investment 
trusts72. Therefore, the mutual fund in the US is basically the same as OEICs in the UK. 
A mutual fund is the most popular investment choice in the US due to its professional 
management, diversification and liquidity.  
 
There are basically three main types of mutual funds in the US: 
 
1. Money market funds: This is a type of mutual fund with relatively low risks 
compared with other kinds of mutual funds. They are required by law to invest 
in certain high-quality, short-term and low-risk investments issued by the US 
state and local government and corporations.73  
2. Bonds fund: This is another type of mutual fund with higher risks compared 
with money market funds, mainly because of the high yield strategies they 
pursue. Unlike money market funds, bond funds are not limited to certain 
                                                          
69 The formation of OEICs is governed by prt II of the OEIC Regulations, which state that an OEIC is 
incorporated upon the coming into effect of an authorisation order from the FCA. Since the only 
method of incorporating an OEIC is through this FCA authorisation procedure, it is not possible to 
have an unauthorised OEIC in the UK (unlike a unit trust, which may be either authorised or 
unauthorised). 
70 This classification is quoted from the official website of the US Securities and Exchange Commission, 
<https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm> accessed on 15 June 2016, 
71 Closed-end funds, which sell a fixed number of shares at one time that are later traded on a secondary 
market. 
72  Hereinafter ‘UITs’; UITs make a one-time public offering of only a specific, fixed number of 
redeemable securities called ‘units’ and which will terminate and dissolve on a date specified at its 
creation. 
73  For more information, see the official website of the US Securities and Exchange Commission, 
<https://www.sec.gov/answers/mfmmkt.htm> accessed on 15 June 2016. 
69 
 
investments under the SEC rules and they could vary dramatically in their risks 
and rewards.74 
3. Stock funds: These funds can be contrasted with money market funds and 
bonds funds as they are invested in stocks. They aim to provide long-term 
growth even though their value is likely to experience more ups and downs 
over the short term. 
 
2.2.2  Insurance companies 
 
The second type of institutional shareholder which is important is insurance companies. 
As the third largest insurance and long term savings industry in the world, they are 
second largest domestic equity holders in the UK, collectively holding 9% of 
investment in the UK stock market in 2014 (see Figure 2.5). Although it has 
experienced some decreases, insurance companies still play an essential part in the 
UK’s economic strength.75 Meanwhile, the US is the world’s largest insurance market 
by premium volume.76  
                                                          
74  Office of Investor Education and Advocacy, SEC ‘Mutual Funds: A Guide for Investors’ 
<https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/sec-guide-to-mutual-funds.pdf> accessed on 15 June 2016. 
75 ABI, ‘UK Insurance and Long Term Savings Key Facts 2015’ <https://www.abi.org.uk/~/media/Files/ 
Documents/Publications/Public/2015/Statistics/Key%20Facts%202015.pdf> accessed 15 June 2016. 
76 Federal Insurance Office, US Department of the Treasury, ‘Annual Report on the Insurance Industry’, 
2016 45 <https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports-and-
notices/Documents/2016_Annual_Report.pdf> accessed 15 June 2016. 
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Figure 2.5: Funds managed by insurance and long-term savings providers, 
by asset class in the UK77 
 
The UK insurance industry is mainly constituted of life business and other kinds of 
long-term insurance contracts, with 90% of the total assets held by them, whereas other 
forms of insurance, such as household, casualty and health, hold a relatively small 
percentage.78 Like insurance in the UK, insurance in the US also consists of life, health, 
property and casualty. No matter what kind of insurance contract, an individual pays 
certain amounts of money to insurance companies according to contract and gets back 
a promissory sum when an insured event happens or upon the termination of the 
insurance contract.79 To ensure that the needs of the clients can be met, insurance 
companies invest in stocks, bonds, real estate or property and other investment goods 
at maximum return. A large percentage of insurance assets are managed in-house by 
asset management subsidiaries on behalf of the parent groups’ insurance companies or 
                                                          
77 Figure taken from the UK Insurance and Long Term Savings Key Facts 2015 (n 75). 
78 Ibid. 
79 Davis and Steil (n 4). 
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have a large insurance component with the group.80 Insurance companies often act as 
external fund managers for pension funds.81 
 
2.2.3  Pension funds 
 
Since the mid-1990s, UK pension funds have been cutting their holdings of UK equities 
and have been looking for safer asset classes instead, such as bonds and Sovereign 
Wealth Funds,82 but they still occupy a large portion of shares. Pension funds are those 
who ‘collect, pool, and invest assets contributed to provide for the future pension 
entitlements of beneficiaries’.83 It could be an unfunded, or funded pension scheme. 
Unfunded pension schemes are known as ‘pay-as-you-go’, which are financed ‘from 
the current contributions of the employers and of existing employees or from other 
revenues on a year-to-year basis’. 84  Beneficiaries have the power to choose from 
various investment options which vary from higher returns with risky funds to safer 
funds with low risk. Funded pension schemes are those financed from ‘a reserve or fund 
which has been built up over a period of years by investing accumulated contributions 
in earning asset’.85 Unfunded schemes are not discussed in this thesis because they are 
funded pension schemes that buy shares in listed companies.  
 
Funded pension schemes can be either ‘defined benefits’86 or ‘defined contributions’87. 
For those with DB schemes, a defined proportion of their final or career average salary 
on retirement88 is provided to them. Both employer and employee make contributions 
to the scheme which are then invested to generate benefits. Those with DC schemes, 
unlike DB schemes, have no entitlement to a fixed level of income on retirement and 
their income is determined by ‘the performance of investments brought with the 
contributions they have made to the scheme’.89 In the past, most pension funds were set 
                                                          
80 UK Insurance and Long Term Savings Key Facts 2015 (n 75). 
81 Ibid. 
82 Hereinafter ‘SWF’; Law Commission, ‘Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries (2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/325509/41342_HC_36
8_LC350_Print_Ready.pdf> accessed on 15 June 2016. 
83 Davis Steil (n 4) 15. 
84 Blake (n 24). 
85 Ibid. 
86 Hereinafter ‘DB’. 
87 Hereinafter ‘DC’.  
88 Law Commission (note 82). 
89 Ibid. 
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up as DB schemes. However, because of the increasing cost of providing DB schemes,90 
DC schemes have taken their place and are expected to make further gains. At present, 
under the Pension Act 2008, every employer in the UK must register certain employees 
in a pension scheme and contribute towards it. This auto-enrolment brings many new 
employers and employees into DC workplace pensions. DB schemes can be divided 
into public sector and private sector schemes. Public sector DB schemes are established 
under statute and private sector DB schemes are set up under trust. DC schemes are 
also trust-based or contract-based. Where pension schemes are set up under trust, the 
trustees owe fiduciary duties to their beneficiaries and are regulated largely by the 
Pensions Regulator (TPR). Duties under trust law do not apply to contract-based 
pensions and it is the extensive regulations made by the FCA91 that regulate them.92 
 
In the US pension funds can also be divided into public sector and private sector funds. 
Public sector pensions are offered by federal, state and local levels of government. They 
are available to public sector employees. These plans may be DB or DC pension plans. 
The public sector pension plan that operates at federal level is the Federal Employees 
Retirement System. In every state there is at least one retirement system for its 
employees, such as the California Public Employees’ Retirement System93 and the New 
York State Teachers’ Retirement System94. Regulations governing public funds exist 
at both the state and federal levels. In the private sector, employers could offer their 
employees different pension schemes and the most common forms are DB, DC or a 
hybrid. Traditional DB plans were historically the main types of pension plans until 
they were surpassed by DC plans, among which, the 401(k) plan is the most important.95  
 
2.2.4  Hedge funds 
 
Hedge funds, which are different from the traditional institutional shareholders given 
their unique organizational structure and investment strategies, have witnessed rapid 
                                                          
90 Myners (n 62) 109. 
91 They are also subject to supervision by the Prudential Regulation Authority, which considers issues of 
financial safety and capital liquidity. 
92 Law Commission (n 82). 
93 Hereinafter ‘CalPERS’. 
94 Hereinafter ‘NYSTRS’. 
95 See Organisation for Economic Development (hereinafter ‘OECD’) Private Pension Outlook (OECD 
2008) <http://www.oecd.org/pensions/private-pensions/42169565.pdf> accessed on 6 June 2016. 
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development in recent years. Most hedge funds are based in the US. In the early 1950s, 
the hedge fund industry was still an insignificant market participant. After decades of 
development, it is now a major industry operating in international financial markets. As 
discussed by Davis, MacNeil, Amour and Cheffins, hedge funds have the potential to 
play an increasingly more important role in their investee companies.96 There is no 
universally accepted definition of a hedge fund. According to the definition given by 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission, a ‘hedge fund is principally no more than 
a marketing tool, intending to group absolute return strategies so as to distinguish them 
from other types of funds’.97  
 
As mentioned earlier, hedge funds are differentiated from traditional institutional 
shareholders by their unique organizational structure and investment strategies. From 
the perspective of organizational structure, hedge funds are typically organized as 
limited partnerships with the founder and managers being the general partner and the 
investors as the limited partners or members.98 The investment funds threshold is very 
high which makes it an option only to wealthy, high net-worth institutions or 
individuals.99 From the perspective of investment strategies, like mutual funds, hedge 
funds invest the money from investors in multiple products with the aim of gaining 
positive returns. However, hedge funds have more flexible investment strategies 
compared with mutual funds. Hedge funds use leverage, short-selling and other 
speculative investment practices.100 They often utilize sophisticated computer models 
to determine whether particular assets are over- or under-priced. The hedge fund will 
buy the under-priced asset and/or sell the over-priced asset until the traditional pricing 
relationship is restored. 101  Therefore, hedge funds are generally said to pursue 
                                                          
96 Davis and Steil (n 4); Iain G MacNeil, ‘Activism and Collaboration among Shareholders in UK Listed 
Companies’ (2010) 4 Capital Markets Law Journal 419-438; John Armour and Brian Cheffins, ‘The 
Rise and Fall (?) of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds’ (2012) 14(3) The Journal of Alternative 
Investments 27. 
97 Ashley Kovas, ‘Hedge Funds and UK Regulation’ (2004) 10 Journal of Financial Transformation 51. 
98 Jonathan R Macey, Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Promises Broken (Princeton University 
Press 2010) 242. 
99  Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy and Randall Thomas, ‘Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate 
Governance, and Firm Performance’ (2008) 4 The Journal of Finance. 
100  Official website of the US Securities and Exchange Commission <https://www.sec.gov/fast-
answers/answershedgehtm.html> accessed on 7 June 2016. 
101 Macey (n 98) 245.  
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investment strategies of identifying ‘pre-existing value inherent in market inefficiencies 
and pricing anomalies’.102 
 
Historically, hedge funds were privately held, privately managed investment funds and 
had been exempt from registration under the so-called private adviser exemption in the 
US. With a increasing level of investor demand and its significant development, 
regulation has gradually been applied to them. Hedge funds are currently subject to 
many restrictions on their investment.103 
 
2.2.5  Others 
 
As shown in Figure 2.1, the rest of the world constitutes 54% of the UK stock market. 
Among the rest of the world group, are institutions mentioned above, such as pension 
funds, insurance companies and mutual funds. In addition, a distinct type of fund are 
the SWFs. According to the definition given by the US Treasury, SWFs are 
‘government vehicles funded by foreign exchange but managed separately from foreign 
reserves.’104 The main financial sources of SWFs come from reserves, natural resource 
payments and the like.105  
 
Typically, SWFs are established with the primary focus on one or more of the following 
aims: ‘macroeconomic stabilisation (to smooth short- and medium-term fluctuations), 
higher returns (to increase investment return), and future generations (create a reserve 
of funds for future) and domestic industries (to restructure and encourage domestic 
industries)’.106 To reach those aims, the vast majority of SWFs invest heavily in safe 
products, such as US Treasury and other national government bonds.107 Recent years 
                                                          
102 Franci J Blassberg, The Private Equity Primer: The Best of the Debevoise and Plimpton Private 
Equity Report (Debevoise & Plimpton 2006). 
103 Such as the anti-fraud and anti-manipulation requirements; insider trading prohibitions, both in the 
funds’ investment and portfolio trading activities and in the funds’ offers and sales of units to their own 
investors, and so forth. 
104 Lowery Clay, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds and the International Financial System’, (US Department of 
the Treasury, 21 June 2007) < https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp471.aspx> 
access 30 may 2016. 
105 Hong Kong ‘The World's Most Expensive Club’ (The Economist, 24 May 2008)  
<http://www.economist.com/node/9230598?story_id=9230598> accessed 30 may 2016 
106  Bryan J Balin, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Critical Analysis’ (2009) < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1477725> accessed 30 may 2016. 
107 Ronald J Gilson and Curtis J Milhaupt, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds And Corporate Governance: A 
Minimalist Response To The New Mercantilism’ (2007) 60(5) Stanford Law Review 1354. 
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have witnessed a shift taken by SWFs from conservative investment to some higher-
risk/higher-return investments in equities or corporate acquisitions.108 
 
Until now, there has been no comprehensive and complete study to show the influence 
of SWFs on their investee companies and some evidence even shows that they have no 
or little interest in engaging in the corporate governance of their portfolio companies.109 
Owing to its growing shareholding percentage, a brief introduction to SWFs is 
discussed here. Considering  its limited influence on corporate governance, they will 
not be included in the detailed analysis of institutional shareholder activism in the 
following chapters. 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Sovereign Wealth Fund rankings110 
 
                                                          
108 Ibid. 
109 Balin (n 106). 
110  Figure taken from Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings, Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 
<http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund-rankings/>, accessed 30 May 2016. 
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2.3  The development of institutional investors in China 
 
Compared with their UK and US counterparts, Chinese institutional investors 
experienced a late start. Pension funds and insurance companies were the earliest 
institutional investors in China. On the eve of the founding of the People’s Republic, 
‘labour insurance’ (former pension funds) was introduced as a pilot programme in 
certain provinces under the influence of the Soviet Union. The pension scheme 
established at that time covered only urban areas. The first insurance companies, 
People’s Insurance Company of China was established in 1949 and it dominated the 
insurance industry. However, owing to the political influence of the ‘Cultural 
Revolution,111 all industries were reduced to ruins, and pension scheme and insurance 
companies were not spared. The economic reforms in 1979 marked the new beginning 
of the institutional industry. In the late 1980s, the establishment of China Pacific 
Insurance Company and Ping An Insurance broke the monopolistic position of the 
People’s Insurance Company of China. In addition, at the same time, some reforms 
took place in the pension schemes. The establishment of stock exchanges in the early 
1990s was the necessary prerequisite for the Chinese fund industry. In 1991, the first 
two security investment funds, the Shenzhen Nanshan Risk Investment Fund and the 
Wuhan Securities Investment Fund, were founded in China, which indicates the start 
of the development of the fund industry in China. These ‘old funds’112 were regulated 
and supervised by the People’s Bank of China 113 . The relatively late beginning, 
however, did not impede the rapid growth of the fund industry and it emerged as a 
significant investment tool for investors in the stock market. However, the rapid growth 
of Chinese securities funds resulted in many problems due to the lack of standardized 
national regulation and their own incapacity. Therefore, national legislation was 
urgently needed and the Provisional Measures for the Administration of Securities 
                                                          
111 This was a socio-political movement that took place in China from 1966 to 1976. Set into motion 
by Mao Zedong, then Chairman of the Communist Party of China, its stated goal was to preserve 
'true' Communist ideology in the country by purging remnants of capitalist and traditional elements from 
Chinese society, and to re-impose Maoist thought as the dominant ideology within the Party. To 
eliminate his rivals within the Communist Party of China, Mao insisted that these ‘revisionists’ be 
removed through violent class struggle. It resulted in widespread factional struggles in all walks of life.  
112 Those funds established before 1997 were operated in an absence of regulation and thus were referred 
to as ‘old funds’ as opposed to the ‘standards investment fund’ established after the Provisional Measures 
for the Administration of Securities Investment Funds were promulgated. 
113 Hereinafter ‘PBOC’. 
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Investment Funds114 were issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission115 in 
1997.116 Shortly after that, old funds were restructured into standardized new Securitas 
Investment Funds117 and the government adopted a series of measures to nurture their 
development. For example, it allocated 20% of all newly issued SOEs’ shares to fund 
management companies.118 In 1998, the Hua’an Fund Management Company, which 
was based in Shanghai, launched the first open-ended fund, which indicated the arrival 
of a new era of the development of the SIFs industry.119 
 
In 1999, the CSRC claimed to ‘promote the development of institutional investors in 
an extraordinary way’ and in the following years, several related policies and legislation 
were published. In the same year, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission120 
promulgated the ‘Interim Measures for Insurance Companies that Invest in Securities 
Investment Funds’, which means that insurance companies could invest in equities in 
an indirect way and the threshold for indirect investment was no more than 5% of the 
company’s total assets. In 2000, the CSRC released the ‘Measures of the Pilot 
Programme for Open-ended Investment Funds’ and, at the same time, the upper limit 
of investing in securities for insurance companies was increased to 10% of its total 
assets. Owing to the inadequate social security system in poor areas and the ageing 
population, the government set up the National Social Security Fund121 in 2000, which 
worked as a back-up reserve fund, or ‘fund of last resort’ to support the social security 
system in China.122 In 2001, NSSF was allowed to invest in equities indirectly with no 
more than 40% of its total asset according to the ‘Interim Measures for the Regulation 
of the National Social Security Fund’. In 2002, open-ended investment funds were 
adopted nation-wide. The promulgation of the ‘Insurance Law of the People’s Republic 
of China’ greatly promoted the development of insurance companies by allowing their 
direct investment in equities In addition, the government launched the Qualified 
                                                          
114 Hereinafter ‘Provisional Measures’. 
115 Hereinafter ‘CSRC’. 
116 Provisional Measures issued by the CSRC on November 1997 and abolished on October 2004. 
117 Hereinafter ‘SIFs’. 
118 Child, John. Management in China during the age of reform (Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
Xiaoxing He, ‘A Discussion About the History of Chinese Securities Investment Funds’ [中国证券投资
基金发展论] (Tsinghua University Press 2003).  
119 Ibid. 
120 Hereinafter ‘CIRC’. 
121 Hereinafter ‘NSSF’. 
122 Official website of National Social Security Fund, 
<http://www.ssf.gov.cn/Eng_Introduction/201206/t20120620_5603.html> accessed 14 February 2017. 
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Foreign Institutional Investors123 programme to open up its domestic market to large 
overseas investors and published the ‘Interim Provisions on the Administration of 
Foreign Exchange in Domestic Securities Investments of Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors’. As we will see in figure 6, all these policies and legislations 
greatly promoted the rise in the number of institutional investors in the Chinese stock 
market and this period could be regarded as a golden age for institutional investors. In 
the years that followed, this trend continued, the major institutional investors became 
well developed in China. 
 
Year 
Institutional 
accounts 
newly opened Related policies, laws and regulations 
1996 15,000  None 
1997 24,900  Provisional Measures for the Administration of Securities 
Investment Funds are published 
1998 17,300  None 
1999 51,600  The CSRC claims to ‘promote the development of 
institutional investors in an extraordinary way’ 
 CIRC promulgates the Interim Measures for Insurance 
Companies that Invest in Securities Investment Funds, 
which permit insurance companies to invest in equities in an 
indirect way with no more than 5% of the company’s total 
assets 
2000 96,000  The CSRC releases the Measures of the Pilot Programme 
for Open-ended Investment Funds 
 The threshold for insurance companies is increased to 10% 
 The NSSF is set up 
2001 55,300  The NSSF is allowed to invest in equities indirectly with no 
more than 40% of its total assets according to the Interim 
Measures for the Regulation of the NSSF. 
2002 50,800  Open-ended investment funds are rolled out nation-wide 
                                                          
123  Hereinafter ‘QFIIs’. 
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Year 
Institutional 
accounts 
newly opened Related policies, laws and regulations 
 The Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China is 
promulgated which permits insurance companies to  invest 
directly in equities 
 The Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors  Programme is 
launched and the government published the ‘Interim 
Provisions on the Administration of Foreign Exchange in 
Domestic Securities Investments of Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors’ 
2003 15,200  Corporate pension funds are allowed to invest in equities. 
 The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Securities 
Investment Fund is promulgated 
2004 16,400  The Interim Measures for the Administration of Stock 
Investments of Insurance Institutional Investors are 
promulgated 
2005 13,000  Notice of the China Securities Regulatory Commission on 
Piloting the Share-trading Reform of Listed Companies is 
published 
 Guidance Notes on the Split Share Structure Reform of 
Listed Companies are issued 
 Measures on the Administration of Split Share Structure 
Reform of Listed Companies are promulgated 
2006 33,800  Split Share Structural Reforms are issued aimed at lowering 
the state shareholding by converting non-tradable shares to 
tradable shares 
 
Figure 2.7: The number of newly opened institutional accounts the related policies, 
laws and regulations124 
 
                                                          
124 The data were collected from the statistics book 1996–2006 (restricted translation) by China Securities 
Depository and Clearing Corporation Limited (hereinafter ‘CSDC’) and the related policies and 
regulations were sorted by the present author. 
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Figure 2.7 shows that the number of newly opened institutional accounts are closely 
related to the policies and regulations promulgated. From 1999 to 2002, there was a 
sharp increase in the number of institutional investors that traded on the stock exchange 
with an average of 63,425 per year. The reason behind this growth is the CSRC’s appeal 
to ‘promote the development of institutional investors in an extraordinary way’. This 
appeal was implemented by promulgating a series of regulations in these years. 
Therefore, the development of institutional investors was encouraged, and the 
limitation and thresholds faced by some of the institutions were gradually loosened. 
The increase in the number of newly opened institutional accounts in 2006 is mainly 
due to the split share structure reform. This reform broke the tight control of 
blockholders in SOEs by transferring a certain percentage of non-tradable shares into 
tradable shares. Therefore, on the one hand, there are more shares available for 
institutional shareholders to invest in; on the other hand, the promising market prospect 
attracts institutional investors investment.  
 
Figure 2.7 shows that from 2004 to 2014 insurance companies (0% to 3.87%), pension 
funds (1.07% to 1.31) and QFIIs (0.64% to 1.38%) are all growing rapidly. At the same 
time, tradable A shares held by individuals fell sharply, from 77.65% to 25.03%. Figure 
2.8 shows that the majority of shares are in the hands of general institutions, that is, 
controlling shareholders and legal person enterprises. The key professional institutional 
shareholders in China are securities investment funds, insurance companies, pension 
funds and qualified foreign institutional investors.  
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Figure 2.8: Percentage of tradable A shares owned by value from 2004 to 2014 
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Figure 2.9: Percentage of tradable A shares owned by value in 2014125 
 
2.4  The landscape of institutional investors 
 
2.4.1  Securities Investment Funds 
 
Mutual funds or so-called securities investment funds (SIFs) are the largest group of 
institutional investors in China.126 Although they witnessed a continued decline during 
the past ten years, they still held 4.79% tradable A shares in 2014. Having been in 
                                                          
125 Data collected from the Annual Report for Chinese Securities Investment Funds for the Year 2014 
[中国证券投资基金业年报] <http://www.amac.org.cn/tjsj/cbw/390448.shtml> accessed on 16 June 
2016. The analysis was done by the present author. 
126 Hua Yang and Jun Zhou, Reforms in Need: Exploring the Roads for Marketization Reform of the 
Chinese Capital Market [变革与突破：中国资本市场发展研究] (China Financial and Economic 
Publishing House 2014). 
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existence for less than two decades, securities investment funds are relatively young 
compared with their UK and US counterparts. According to research conducted by a 
leading securities research centre, there were 621 securities investment funds in 2009, 
with assets of 2,676 billion yuan in total.127 As shown in Figure 2.8, SIFs hold 4.79% 
of the tradable A shares and it is the largest institutional investors in the Chinese A 
share market. 
At present, the Securities Investment Fund Law is at the centre of China’s legal 
framework for the regulation of SIFs.128 It stipulates the provisions with regard to ‘fund 
managers, custodians, the investment activities of funds, subscription and redemption 
of funds, information disclosure, rights and interests of fund holders, supervision and 
administration of funds, and legal liabilities.’129 The securities law stipulates that only 
fund management companies approved by the CSRC can establish an SIF and a strict 
threshold is established to set the entry restriction. Article 13 of the fund law requires 
that ‘the company must have a registered capital of at least RMB 100 million and it 
must have a principal or key Chinese shareholder with the highest stake in the company, 
who must have at least RMB 300 million registered capital’. 130  The principal 
shareholder could be a securities company, a securities investment consultant, a trust 
management company or other financial institution approved by the CSRC.  
 
Fund managers, fund custodians and fund unit holders are three of the most important 
players involved in SIFs. Fund managers are required to pass the qualification 
examinations before engaging in the fund industry and they are responsible for raising 
the fund, offering, subscription and redemption of fund shares, and fund investment 
strategies.131 Fund custodians are commercial banks who are licensed by the CSRC. 
                                                          
127  China Galaxy Securities Research, ‘Report on China’s Securities Investment Funds in 2009’, 
<http://www.Chinastock.com.cn/research/ResearchHYYJ.shtml> accessed on 16 June 2017. China 
Galaxy Securities Research, founded in 2000, is a leading securities research institute in China. 
128 The latest amendment of the Securities Investment Fund Law was in 2015. The CSRC also issued 
many regulations and rules to supplement and clarify the fund law, which include (1) the Circular on 
Issues Concerning Warrant Investment by Securities Investment Funds in the Split Share Structure 
Reform (issued in 2005); (2) the Provisional Code of Corporate Governance for Securities Investment 
Fund Management Company (issued in 2006); (3) Measures for the Administration of Securities 
Investment Fund Management Companies (2012); (4) Measures for the Administration of Securities 
Investment Fund Custody Business (2013); and (5) Measures for the Administration of the Operation of 
Publicly Offered Securities Investment Funds (2014). 
129 Bo Gong, Understanding Institutional Shareholder Activism: A Comparative Study of the UK and 
China (Routledge 2013). 
130 Securities Investment Fund Law s 13(2)(3). 
131 Securities Investment Fund Law s 19. 
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They are responsible for ‘safeguarding the security of fund assets, opening and 
maintaining bank accounts, and handling the clearing and settlement of investment 
orders of the fund manager pursuant to the stipulations of fund contracts.’132 In addition, 
they are also responsible for the supervision of fund managers’ investment behaviours 
and report any illegal activities to the CSRC. The unit holders are the ultimate owners 
of the fund and they are given special protection under the fund law. For example, unit 
holders who have more than 10% of the fund’s shares separately or aggregately, could 
convene a general unit holders’ meeting to discuss and decide related matters. 
 
2.4.2 Insurance companies 
 
Insurance companies are the second largest kind of institutional shareholders in the 
Chinese securities market with 3.87% holding in tradable A shares. There are 
approximately 120 insurance companies in China. However, most of the market shares 
are occupied by a few insurance companies,133 for example, the China Life Insurance, 
the largest life insurance company in China, who own 35% of the life insurance market.  
 
The economic reforms of in the late 1970s marks the beginning of the insurance 
industry. With a steadily increasing demand, the insurance companies witnessed 
significant development. Furthermore, the Chinese government was required to lower 
the entry threshold to foreign insurers under the Word Trade Organization framework. 
Therefore, joint venture insurance firms were being established in China which further 
promotes its development. At an early stage, insurance companies were required to 
invest only in ‘safe investment instruments, such as bank deposits, government and 
financial bonds, and other assets approved by the State Council’134 and investment in 
equities are prohibited. The Interim Measure on the Administration of Insurance 
Company’s Investment in Securities Investment Funds promulgated in 1999 allowed 
insurance companies to invest in equities up to 15% of their assets indirectly through 
SIFs.135 Given the high level of profits generated from investing in equities, many 
                                                          
132 Securities Investment Fund Law s26. 
133 Dingfu Wu, The Development of Insurance Industry in the Past 60 Years [保险业发展波澜壮阔六
十年] (China Insurance News, 23 September 2009) 
<http://business.sohu.com/20090923/n266934430.shtml> accessed 23 December 2015. 
134 The Insurance Law of 1995 s 104. 
135 According to the Interim Measures on the Administration of Insurance Company’s Investment in 
Securities Investment Funds, the upper limit of each insurance company has to be approved by the China 
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insurance companies became large clients of SIFs. As a result of the rapid asset 
expansion and increasing demand for access to securities market, the Provisional 
Measures for the Administration of Stock Investment by Insurance Institutional 
Investors enacted in 2004 allowed insurance companies to manage their own 
investment portfolios and invest in equities directly with a maximum threshold of 10% 
of the total assets.136 More recently, the Provisional Measures on the Administration of 
the Operation of Insurance Capital issued by the CIRC on 2010 raised the threshold to 
20%.137 
 
However, compared with their UK and US counterparts, whose assets are allocated to 
stocks in large proportions, Chinese insurance companies still rely heavily on safe 
investment vehicles such as government bonds.138 With further relaxing on investment, 
as well as the increasing demands from the market, insurance companies may become 
major investors in equities.  
 
According to the policy on ‘separate business, separate regulation’, the regulator of the 
insurance industry is CIRC. Chinese insurance companies are regulated by the 1995 
insurance law, which was revised in 2009. The insurance law covers many aspects, such 
as insurance contracts, incorporation, investment and supervision of insurance 
companies, and it stipulates the regulatory principles and operating framework of 
insurance companies. Article 68 of the insurance law stipulates that the registered 
capital requirement for establishing insurance companies is RMB 200 million, which 
is twice as much as the amount required for fund management companies.139 Article 
106 also states that ‘the investment scope of insurance companies assets includes listed 
stocks, real estate, government bonds, bank deposits and other channels laid down by 
the insurance regulator, and that the assets allocation of insurance companies portfolios 
should follow the relevant requirements of the regulator’. 140  In addition, the law 
                                                          
Insurance Regulatory Committee. Generally, the investment is subject to 5% to 15% of the total assets 
of the insurance company. See Zhimin dai, On the Normal Development of Institutional Investors in 
China’s Securities Market [证券市场机构投资者规范化发展研究] (Zhejiang University Press 2008). 
136 Interim Measures for the Administration of Stock Investments of Insurance Institutional Investors [保
险机构投资者股票投资管理暂行办法] promulgated by CSRC and CIRC in 2004. 
137 Provisional Measures, s 16(4). 
138 Gong (n 129) 231. 
139 Insurance Law s 68. 
140 Insurance Law s106. 
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empowers CIRC with a number of regulatory powers, such as the right to supervise the 
insurance market, to issue qualification requirements for the senior managers of 
insurance companies and to grant approval for insurance agencies.141 
 
2.4.3  Pension funds 
 
Pension funds are the third largest institutional shareholders in China, apart from 
securities investment funds and insurance companies. The ‘Decision on Developing a 
Unified Basic Old Age Pension System for Enterprise Employees’ 142  built a new 
framework based on the recommendations of the World Bank. 143  The system is 
composed of several ‘pillars’ and different subsystems. 144  ‘Pillars’ means that the 
government, employers and employees all participate in contributing to the pension 
pool. Subsystems, including the rural residents system, urban employee system and 
public service employee system coexist. The newly published ‘Decision of the State 
Council on the Reform of the Pension Insurance System for Employees of State Organs 
and Public Institutions’145 reformed the dual track of urban employee system and public 
service employee system, where currently corporate employees contributed 8% of their 
salary to the system and government employees contributed no part of their salary. 
From then on, government employees needed to contribute part of their salary in the 
same way as their corporate counterparts.   
 
On the recommendation of the World Bank, China now has a three-pillar pension 
system. The first pillar is the ‘basic old-age insurance system’ which comprises the 
contribution made by employers and employees. The second pillar is a supplementary 
                                                          
141 Insurance Law s 120. 
142 Stuart Leckie and Ning Pan, ‘A Review of the National Social Security Fund in China’ (2007) 
12(2) Pensions: An International Journal 90. 
143 Ibid 92. 
144  The multi-pillar pension system only provides funding for urban workers. Rural residents are 
covered by a separate rural pension system, or the Minimum Life Security System. They are unfunded 
program and thus, will not be discussed in the thesis. 
145 Decision of the State Council on the Reform of the Pension Insurance System for Employees of 
State Organs and Public Institutions [国务院关于机关事业单位工作人员养老保险制度改革的决
定], promulgated by State Council, 
<http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=18699&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeywor
d=%b9%fa%ce%f1%d4%ba%b9%d8%d3%da%bb%fa%b9%d8%ca%c2%d2%b5%b5%a5%ce%bb%
b9%a4%d7%f7%c8%cb%d4%b1%d1%f8%c0%cf%b1%a3%cf%d5%d6%c6%b6%c8%b8%c4%b8%e
f%b5%c4%be%f6%b6%a8>, accessed on 17 June 2016. 
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or voluntary system called ‘enterprise annuities’ or corporate pension funds.146 This 
pension contribution is set up by eligible employers who can afford to contribute 
financially and the company has the autonomy to decide on the percentage of this 
voluntary occupational pensions under the instruction of local government. The third 
pillar are the voluntary schemes which are managed by private companies or insurance 
companies, by means of which employees could contribute as much as they can afford 
in order to provide a better life for themselves when they are old.147 
 
Although this multi-pillar pension system has been established in China, it is far from 
enough given the wealth gap between less-developed provinces and developed 
provinces. Apart from the inadequate social security system in poor areas, the ageing 
population also makes the situation worse. Therefore, the government set up the 
National Social Security Fund148 in 2000. The NSSF does not from part of the three 
pillars mentioned above. Instead, it is a complementary vehicle that works as a back-
up reserve fund or ‘fund of last resort’ to support the social security system in China. It 
aims to install a national long-term reserve fund to offset the gap between the pension 
system’s expenses and the future demands of China’s rapidly aging population.149 
 
Not all pension pillars can make investments as they like. The operation of pillar one, 
the basic old-age insurance system and pillar three, voluntary schemes, is limited to 
conservative investment tools, such as government bonds. Only pillar two systems, the 
CPFs and the NSSF, are permitted to invest their assets on the stock market and these 
two are the subjects that this thesis addresses. 
 
a. Pillar two: Corporate pension fund  
 
When the reform of the old pension system began in the 1990s, the CPF was introduced 
as a step forward to the multi-pillar model.150  It was not until 2004, when the Ministry 
                                                          
146 Hereinafter ‘CPF’. 
147 Yongbeom Kim, Irene SM Ho, and Mark St Giles, ‘Developing Institutional Investors in People’s 
Republic of China’ (2003) World Bank Country Study Paper < 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.197.4266&rep=rep1&type=pdf> accessed 12 
December 2015. 
148 Hereinafter ‘NSSF’. 
149 The official website of NSSF, <http://www.nssf.gov.cn/zyjh/ldjhhbg/> accessed 12 December 2015. 
150 For a discussion on the reform, see Bingwen Zheng, ‘Reforming Complementary Enterprise Pensions: 
Overview, Assessment and Prospect’ in Dasong Deng and Changping Liu (eds), China's Economic 
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of Labour and Social Security151 released Interim Measures for Enterprise Annuities 
and Interim Measure for the Management of Enterprise Annuities Fund152 with a view 
to consolidating the Chinese CPF markets and enhancing supervision 153 that the CPF 
was formally endorsed in regulation. 
 
Under these regulations, the CPF has to operate under a trust model, which is similar to 
the 401(k) scheme in the US.154 The IMMEA also establishes quantitative thresholds 
on the investment of CPFs. Article 47 of IMMEA requires that ‘investment in 
government bonds alone shall not drop below 20% of net assets’155 and ‘the maximum 
investment in stocks is limited to no more than 20% of net assets’.156 According to 
limited information and data regarding the investment activities of CPFs, CPF asset 
managers are more inclined to invest in conservative products such as government 
bonds and bank deposits.157 
 
The total assets of CPFs were approximately RMB 230 billion by the end of 2009158 
and it has great potential for future growth given its currently low coverage.159 It is 
estimated that the CPF market will grow to RMB 14.4 trillion by 2030160  and the 
market is confident that CPFs will become an important category of institutional 
investor in the Chinese securities market. 
 
b. National Social Security Fund  
                                                          
Reform in the Past 30 Year: Overview, Assessment and Prospect (China Social Science Publishing House, 
Beijing 2009). 
151 Hereinafter ‘MoLSS’. 
152 Hereinafter ‘IMMEA’. 
153  Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Interim Measures for the Management of Enterprise 
Annuities Fund (Order No. 23) jointly issued by the MLSS, the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(hereinafter ‘CBRC’), the China Securities Regulatory Commission (hereinafter ‘CSRC’), and the China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) in 2004. 
154 IMEA s 15. 
155 IMMEA s 47. 
156 IMMEA s 47. 
157 Yu-Wei Hu, Gregorio Impavido and Xiaohong Li, Governance and Fund Management in the Chinese 
Pension System, (IMF Working Paper No. 9-246)  
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09246.pdf> accessed 16 December 2015. 
158 No author ‘The Assets of Chinese Enterprises Pension Funds are Estimated to Reach 230 Billion in 
2009’ [2009年中国企业年计规模预计 2300亿元] (Caijin, 21 January 2010) 
<http://www.caijing.com.cn/2010-01-21/110363001.html> accessed 27 January 2015. 
159 Hu, Impavido and Li (n 157). 
160  Yu-Wei Hu, Fiona Stewart and Juan Yermo, ‘Pension Fund Investment And Regulation: An 
International Perspective and Implications for China’s Pension System’ in Private Pension System: 
Developments and Issues (OECD published 2007) 
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A ministerial level organization under the management of the State Council, the NSSF 
Council, is responsible for the operation of the NSSF. The assets of the NSSF mainly 
come from four sources: ‘(1) the funds allocated by the central government’s budget; 
(2) capital derived from reduction or transfer of state-owned shares – a proportion of 
the IPO proceeds arising from the public offering of state-owned enterprises; (3) sales 
of lottery tickets; and (4) return on investment’.161 
 
The investment behaviours of the NSSF are governed by the Interim Measures on the 
Administration of the Investment of National Social Security Fund issued by the 
MoLSS and Ministry of Finance 162  in 2001 163 . The NSSF Measures established 
investment thresholds for its in-house and outsourcing asset allocation. The in-house 
asset management is confined to government bonds and bank deposits. The asset 
outsourcing to external fund managers could be invested in stocks and funds.164 From 
the moment the NSSF was established, safety has been regarded as the supreme goal of 
fund investment and this makes the investment strategy adopted by the NSSP quite 
conservative. Before 2002, most of the fund assets were managed by in-house experts 
and these assets were invested in low-yielding instruments such as cash and government 
bonds, and the returns on these investments were relatively low given China’s low 
interest environment.165  When lack of money became severe, the NSSF varied its 
investment channel by developing new investment instruments that generated a high 
return based on the low-risk premise. Since 2003, the NSSF has delegated its 
investment to six best domestic fund managers to invest fund assets in the securities 
market. 166  Within years, the NSSF has increased its assets which are allocated to 
external fund managers. The investment channels of the NSSF have been expanded to 
overseas markets as well.167  Even though the NSSF accounts for a small portion of the 
                                                          
161 NSSF, ‘About the National Council for Social Security Fund’, website  
<http://www.ssf.gov.cn/Eng_Introduction/ >Accessed 24 June 2015 
162 Hereinafter ‘MOF’. 
163 Hereinafter ‘NSSF Measures’. 
164 Interim Provisions on Administration of NSSF Investment, issued by the MoLSS in 2003, s 25. 
165 Hu, Impavido and Li (n 157). 
166  The six fund management companies are Boseri, Changsheng, Huaxia, Harvest, Penghua and 
Southern. 
167  In 2006, The National Council of the NSSF issued the Interim Provisions Concerning the 
Administration of Overseas Investment, allowing fund managers to invest in foreign financial tools 
subject to limits. 
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securities market in China, with the expected SOE reforms, the NSSF will receive a 
substantial contribution.  
 
2.4.4  Qualified foreign institutional investors   
 
Qualified foreign institutional investors are ‘foreign institutions who meet certain 
conditions and may therefore invest directly in the Chinese A share market under the 
quota granted by the Government.’168 It is a relatively new phenomenon in China given 
the fact that foreign investors were prohibited from investing in the Chinese A share 
market before 2002. Qualified foreign institutional investors not only boost the Chinese 
securities economy, but they also vest the power of control over the securities market 
in the hands of the government. The QFII system is widely welcomed by many newly 
developing market economy countries as it opens its market without the complete 
opening-up of capital investment.169  
 
The CSRC is responsible for the regulation and supervision of QFII activities. At 
present, the primary legal regulations within the legal framework for QFIIs the 
Provisional Measures and Measures for the Pilot Programme of Securities Investment 
in China by RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors, which was jointly issued 
by the CSRC, People’s Bank of China and State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
on 2006 and 2013 respectively, supplemented by a series of rules.  
 
2.5  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the development of institutional investors in the UK, US and China was 
analysed. Data was presented to show the components of share ownership and the 
percentage of different institutional investors. Finally, the major institutional investors 
in each country were discussed. 
With the benefit of hindsight, one could isolate four principal factors that led to the 
growth of institutional investors in the UK and US from the discussion on the 
development of institutional investors above. First, from the perspective of the supply 
                                                          
168 Gong (n 129) 92. 
169 Steven Yeo, ‘The PRC Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors Market’ (2003) 14 China Economic  
Review 445. 
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side, there are several factors that contributed to the rise of institutional investors. On 
the one hand, the development of institutional investors, along with the evolution of 
dispersed ownership, made many shares available for institutional investors to invest 
in. In addition, tax rules at certain stages became unfriendly to individual investors and 
compelled them to exit. Therefore, institutional investors filled the gap when 
blockholders and individual shareholders all exited the stage. Second, the development 
of institutional investors can be analysed from the perspective of the demand side. 
Notable demographic developments and growing wealth called for a more sophisticated 
social security system and, therefore, pension funds and insurance companies became 
those institutional investors that enjoyed rapid growth at an early stage. The convenient 
and flexible open-ended mutual funds attracted those small investors who lack 
professional knowledge in investment. 170  The explosive growth of institutional 
shareholders happened at a time when there was a shift from banking through markets 
to a securities phase. Institutional investors took advantage of technological 
developments, fulfilling part of the role that used to be played by the bank and met the 
various demands of the financial system. Third, according to Roe, major US financial 
institutions were prevented from taking substantial block positions at several points in 
the twentieth century, given the popular mistrust of concentrated financial power, 
populist fears, interest group manoeuvring and American political structure. 171 
However, this situation was derailed by the policy support and deregulation and, 
therefore, a friendlier environment had come into being for the development of 
institutional investors. Fourth, several pieces of legislation and regulations were 
enacted with the evolution of institutional investors, which not only set boundaries for 
proper investment behaviour, but also provided a fairer and clearer market by requiring 
strict information disclosure.  
 
However, in China, the emergence and growth of institutional investors was driven by 
governmental need. In order to solve the obstacles faced by SOEs, the government 
established a stock exchange and institutional investors were needed for their huge 
amount of capital. Given the fact that institutional shareholders fit in well with the stock 
markets in the Western world, the Chinese government learnt from this and expected 
                                                          
170  Hamilton (n 45) 353. 
171 Mark J Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance. 
(Princeton University Press 1996), preface x. 
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Chinese institutional investors to perform as well as their UK and US counterparts to 
promote the development of the securities market. The ‘Provisional’ prescribed that 
one of the aims of the SIFs was to ‘promote the healthy and stable development of 
securities markets’.172 In 1999, the CSRC claimed to ‘promote the development of 
institutional investors in an extraordinary way’ and SIFs have been given priority in 
several aspects. Figure 2.7 shows that SIFs are by far the most important institutional 
investors under this policy bias. Figure 2.7 also shows that there is a positive correlation 
between the number of newly opened institutional accounts, and policies and 
regulations promulgated. The rapid development of institutional investors from 1999 to 
2002 was a result of the CSRC policy in 1999. Moreover, some factors, such as 
demographic developments, growing wealth, promulgation of related legislation and 
deregulation, also promoted the development of institutional shareholders.  
 
Therefore, the emergence and development of institutional investors in the UK and US 
were driven by the demand from the market and it is, to some extent, self-motivated in 
nature. Numerous pieces of legislation and regulation were put in place within this 
process to ensure institutional investor activities took place within certain boundaries. 
Further deregulation and policy support served as accelerators to boost the growth of 
institutional investors. Different types of institutional investors developed in a balanced 
way. However, in China the evolution of institutional investors was largely a 
governmental action with the aim of fulfilling certain of its own needs and this led to 
the uneven growth of different institutional investors. The SIF-led institutional 
investors’ landscape will have a further impact on the institutional shareholder activism. 
In the next chapter, institutional shareholder activism will be examined from a 
theoretical perspective.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
172 Interim Measures for the Administration of Securities Investment Funds [证券投资基金管理暂行办
法] promulgated by CSRC, art 1.<http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/imftaosif719/> accessed 12 
June 2017. 
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Chapter 3: Institutional Shareholder Activism: Theoretical Perspective 
 
In Chapter 2 the emergence and development of institutional investors in the UK, US 
and China was examined, and followed by an analysis of the different types of 
institutional investors. Chapter 3 aims to provide an overview of institutional 
shareholder activism from a theoretical perspective, which could help to provide a 
better understanding of their behaviour. This chapter begins with a brief overview of 
shareholder activism, that is, its meaning and objectives. This is followed by the 
theoretical foundations of shareholder activism. The theoretical arguments that both 
support and oppose shareholder activism are presented. Related researches on the 
effects of institutional shareholder activism are collected. The section that follows deals 
with institutional shareholder passivity, which lays the foundation for the discussion in 
the Chapters 4 and 5. Given the fact that institutional shareholder activism has never 
been a subject of consensus and there are various deterrents to their engagement, why 
has institutional shareholder activism grown so rapidly in the last few decades? This 
chapter answers this question in two ways: one aspect is the internal driving force, that 
is, the internal elements that push institutional shareholders to engage rather than stand 
by; the other is the external driving force, namely the wider economic and political 
environment. Chapter 3 ends with a conclusion.  
 
3.1  Overview of shareholder activism 
 
Shareholder activism, as described by the European Corporate Governance Institute, is 
‘the way in which shareholders can assert their power as owners of the company to 
influence its behaviour.’1 Some scholars define shareholder activism as ‘actions taken 
by shareholders with the explicit intention of influencing corporations’ policies and 
practices, rather than as latent intentions implicit in ownership stakes or trading 
behaviour.’ 2  It is used to describe an approach or a set of measures taken by a 
shareholder or shareholder group to seek effective change within a company. One or 
more aims may be considered, such as to ‘address management issues, including 
                                                          
1 The definition of shareholder activism is taken from the official website of the European Corporate 
Governance Institute <http://www.ecgi.org/activism/> accessed 06 March 2016. 
2  Maria L Goranova and Lori Verstegen Ryan. ‘Shareholder Activism: A Multidisciplinary 
Review’ (2014) 40 Journal of Management 1231. 
94 
 
remuneration and other corporate governance issues; to improve business performance; 
to change the company’s strategy; to seek to unlock value through returns of capital, 
spin-offs and other divestments; to influence corporate activity, in particular the 
outcome of takeover situations; or to remove one or more directors or appoint new 
directors’.3 It is not a novel phenomenon given the fact that shareholders were permitted 
to submit shareholder resolutions as early as 1942.4 The major forms of shareholder 
engagement, such as communication with companies, which pose challenges for 
companies’ strategies, could all be regarded as early forms of shareholder activism.5 
The last decades have witnessed an increased presence of large institutional investors, 
which fostered a group of well-resourced and highly skilled shareholders. They are 
expected to make informed use of their rights to trigger good corporate governance 
changes in their investee companies with a greater willingness. According to 
Filatotchev and Dotsenko: ‘More proactive activist approach of traditional institutional 
shareholders and growing role of hedge funds and international investors facilitate and 
reshape the development of shareholder activism.’6  
 
As shareholder activism is a means of ‘defence’ against managerial deviations, 7 
shareholders are entitled to express their dissatisfaction and usually they have three 
choices: (1) ‘vote with their feet’, that is, sell their shares and avoid exposure to the 
dissatisfaction; (2) keep their shareholding while voicing their dissatisfaction; or 
(3) keep their shareholding but do nothing. Hirschman has characterized these 
alternatives as: exit, voice and loyalty.8 Jansson further develops shareholder activism 
as the use of voice into two categories: (1) defensive and (2) offensive shareholder 
                                                          
3 Credit Suisse, ‘The Activism Agenda: What Are Activist Investors Looking for?’ <https://www.credit-
suisse.com/media/assets/microsite/docs/corporate-insights/credit-suisse-corporate-insights-q3-2016.pdf> 
2016 accessed 06 March 2017. Credit Suisse Group is a leading global financial services company 
headquartered in Zurich. 
4  Kevin W Waite, ‘The Ordinary Business Operations Exception to the Shareholder Return to 
Predictability’ (1995) 64 Fordham Law Review 1254.  
5 Talner, Lauren, ‘The Origins of Shareholder Activism’ (Investor Responsibility Research Centre 1993), 
now out of print, cited in R Franklin Balotti, Jesse A Finkelstein and Gregory P Williams, Meetings of 
Stockholders (Aspen Publishers Online 1995) par 5.4; see also Iris HY Chiu, The Foundations and 
Anatomy of Shareholder Activism (Bloomsbury Publishing 2010) 2. 
6 Igor Filatotchev and Oksana Dotsenko. ‘Shareholder Activism in the UK: Types of Activists, Forms of 
Activism, and Their Impact on a Target’s Performance’ (2015) 19 Journal of Management & Governance 
5. 
7 Chiu (n 5) 7. 
8 Albert O Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and 
States (Harvard University Press 1972). 
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activism.9  Defensive activism happens when dissatisfaction arises among investors 
regarding a management decision or corporate performance and, as a result, the 
investors lobby for relevant changes. Jansson is of the view that where share prices do 
not dramatically increase as a result of shareholder activism, the activism could be 
explained as a defensive type, where shareholders see the need to safeguard their 
investment in the company, but are not prepared to sell.10 Defensive activism could be 
public or private: it could be a private discussion among related parties or the 
shareholders at the general meeting. This type is defensive in the sense that activists 
seek to protect pre-existing investments. Offensive activism is usually taken when 
investors who currently hold a small portion of shares, build up their holdings 
offensively with the expectation that some substantial changes will take place and, thus, 
return them with huge profits. Jansson believes that where abnormal returns on share 
price are generated, such activism could be regarded as offensive activism. This type 
of activism is ex ante in nature, characterised by hedge funds and different from 
defensive activism which seeks to rectify a concern within the dissatisfied company. In 
short, the former kind of activism seeks to defend the value of an existing position and 
the latter form of activism is made explicitly on the basis that intervention will follow.11 
While there are fundamental differences between defensive and offensive activism 
from the perspective of their approach and techniques, MacNeil maintains that the 
objective is the same, namely ‘an improvement in the returns to shareholders’. 12 
However, Judge et al. think that the motivation behind shareholder activism could be 
driven by financial or social factors. 13  Goranova and Ryan completed a 
multidisciplinary review of shareholder activism14 which shows that the literature on 
                                                          
9  Andreas Jansson, Collective Action among Shareholder Activist (Växjö University Press 2007) 
<http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:205504/FULLTEXT01.pdf> accessed 03 August 2016; 
See also John Armour and Brian Cheffins, ‘The Rise and Fall (?) of Shareholder Activism by Hedge 
Funds’ (2012) 14(3) The Journal of Alternative Investments 27. 
10 Jansson ibid. See also Chiu (note 5) 8. 
11 Jansson’s typology draws the distinction between defensive and offensive shareholder activism too 
starkly. There are circumstances where shareholder activism is driven by defensive concerns, which 
makes offensive gains at the same time. Contemporary shareholder activism features both defensive and 
offensive elements. 
12 Iain G MacNeil, ‘Activism and Collaboration among Shareholders in UK Listed Companies’ (2010) 
5(4) Capital Markets Law Journal 420. However, it does not necessarily mean that shareholder activism, 
regardless of its forms, is positive in its effect. This point will be discussed further in section 3.2 of this 
thesis. 
13 William Q Judge, Ajai Gaur and Maureen I Muller‐Kahle, ‘Antecedents of Shareholder Activism in 
Target Firms: Evidence from a Multi-Country Study’ (2010) 18 Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 261. 
14 Goranova and Ryan (n 2) 1241. 
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activism has tended to emerge as two streams, with one stream being in the majority 
which focuses on financial activism, that is, activism which deals with shareholder 
value or governance issues,15  and the other stream exploring the consequences of 
activism on broader corporate outcomes and stakeholder issues, namely firms’ 
environmental impact 16 , corporate social performance 17  and political activity 18 . 
Therefore, the objectives of shareholder activism may be mixed. This thesis, however, 
will mainly focus on the financial objectives, owing to constraints of space and 
availability of data. It contributes an interesting topic for the future research to explore 
institutional shareholders activism from the perspective of broader corporate outcomes. 
 
3.2  Theoretical foundation of shareholder activism  
 
Shareholder activism is often perceived as a legitimate exercise of ownership rights.19 
As shareholder activism is an incidence of shareholder ownership, 20  it could be 
                                                          
15 See generally, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy and Randall Thomas, ‘Hedge Fund Activism, 
Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance’ (2008) 63(4) The Journal of Finance 1749; Robin 
Greenwood and Michael Schor, ‘Investor Activism and Takeovers’ (2009) 92(3) Journal of Financial 
Economics 368. 
16 See generally, Min-Dong Paul Lee and Michael Lounsbury, ‘Domesticating Radical Rant and Rage: 
An Exploration of the Consequences of Environmental Shareholder Resolutions on Corporate 
Environmental Performance’ (2011) 50 Business & Society; Erin M Reid and Michael W Toffel, 
‘Responding to Public and Private Politics: Corporate Disclosure of Climate Change Strategies’ (2009) 
30(11) Strategic Management Journal. 
17 See generally, Parthiban David, Matt Bloom and Amy J Hillman ‘Investor Activism, Managerial 
Responsiveness, and Corporate Social Performance’ (2007) 28 Strategic Management Journal; Kathleen 
Rehbein, Sandra Waddock and Samuel B. Graves, ‘Understanding Shareholder Activism: Which 
Corporations are Targeted?’ (2004) 43 Business & Society. 
18 See generally, Cynthia E Clark and Elise Perrault Crawford. ‘Influencing Climate Change Policy: The 
Effect of Shareholder Pressure and Firm Environmental Performance’ (2012) 51 Business & Society. 
19 The UK government even considered shareholders as possibly owing a fiduciary duty to engage in 
appropriate activism in their investee companies. See Department of Work and Pensions, Encouraging 
Shareholder Activism Consultation Paper (2002) 
<https://www.abi.org.uk/~/media/Files/Documents/Consultation%20papers/2002/05/DWPHMTESAC
TIVISM_240505111007.pdf> accessed 03 August 2016. 
20 The question of whether shareholders own the company is one of the key debates in company law. 
Lorraine Talbot claimed that shareholders were not the owners of the company because what they owned 
was not the company. The case Bligh v Brent [Bligh v Brent (1837) 2 Y & C Ex 268] established that 
whatever it was that shareholders did own, it was not the company asset. In deciding the case in this way, 
the court was faithfully following the principles laid down in Salomon v Salmon [Salomon 
v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1896] UKHL 1, [1897] AC 22] that the company was a separate legal being 
which required its own insurance and the company owned itself; the rights granted to shareholders did 
not add up to the ownership of the company. Others argue that shareholders are the owners of the 
company because of the legal rights they hold in the company, the law gives shareholders the power one 
would attribute to owners. For more discussions, see Lorraine Talbot, Great Debates in Company Law 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2014); Lynn A Stout, ‘Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder 
Primacy’ (2001) Cornell Law Faculty Publication 
<http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1833&context=facpub> accessed 03 
August 2016. 
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legitimated in the name of protecting shareholders’ residual interests.21 Therefore, the 
starting point to illustrate the rationale behind shareholder activism lies in the ‘agency 
problem’ of managerial control proposed by Jensen and Meckling.22 As discussed in 
Chapter 1, the separation of ownership and control could result in the divergence 
between managers’ self-serving interests and shareholders’ interest in the maximization 
of corporate wealth23 and, therefore, corporate governance frameworks are established 
to ensure that managers are effectively monitored or controlled. Shareholder activism 
is seen as a ‘necessary monitoring force to combat management deviation and 
shirking’. 24  The agency problem places shareholder activism within the internal 
governance framework of a corporation and shareholder activism could be 
characterised as a ‘form of market-based discipline’ that is intended to monitor 
management. The fundamental rationale for shareholder activism is arguably a means 
of ‘defence’ against managerial deviations.25 Shareholder activism is, to some extent, 
beneficial theoretically insofar as it reduces agency costs by monitoring the agent’s 
actions to ensure its proper behaviour. Therefore, those in favour of shareholder 
activism claim that it results in improved corporate governance and that it has positive 
externalities because the monitoring benefits all shareholders.26 
 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the belief that shareholders have a positive role 
to play in corporate governance was revitalized and some scholars, such as Bebchuk, 
call for greater managerial accountability to shareholders with the aim to improve firm 
performance.27 However, shareholder activism is a topic mired in controversy. Others 
claim that shareholder activism is detrimental to corporate value28 and Lorraine Talbot 
                                                          
21 Lucian A Bebchuk, ‘The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power’ (2005) 118 Harvard Law Review; 
see also Chiu (note 5). 
22 Michael C Jensen and William H Meckling. ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure.’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics. 
23 ibid. 
24 Chiu (note 5) 20. 
25 Ibid 7. 
26 See generally, Lucian A Bebchuk, ‘The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise.’ (2007) 93 Virginia Law 
Review; Bebchuk (n 21). 
27 See generally, Bebchuk (n 21); Bebchuk (n 26); Dimitrov, Valentin and Prem C Jain, ‘It’s Showtime: 
Do Managers Report Better News Before Annual Shareholder Meetings?’ (2011) 49 Journal of 
Accounting Research. 
28 See generally, Lynn A Stout, ‘The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control.’ (2007) Virginia Law 
Review; Lynn A Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, 
Corporations, and the Public (Berrett-Koehler Publishers 2012); Stephen M Bainbridge, ‘Director 
Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment’ (2005) 119 Harvard Law Review; William W Bratton and 
Michael L. Wachter. ‘The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment.’ (2010) University of Pennsylvania 
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once claimed that shareholders were uniquely unsuited to exercise powers within the 
company and the existing powers possessed by shareholders should be removed.29 The 
following paragraph sets out the objections to shareholder activism.  
 
The first objection comes from Bainbridge, who followed Arrow’s theory and argued 
in favour of the necessity of a centre of power that could exercise fiat within the 
corporation.30 Arrow stressed that the importance of a central authority is that it is often 
the only possible way to make decisions and process information within a large 
organization that employs many thousands of people.31 Therefore, Bainbridge argues 
that the board should be the single and central organ to exercise decision-making 
authority.32 He views shareholder activism as something that could be detrimental to 
the board’s authority and, therefore, shareholders should not play a role in corporate 
governance. He also expressed his concerns that the power of shareholders may be 
misused by self-interested investors.33 Lipton and Roseblum also held the view that 
whether shareholders would act in the best interests of the company was doubtful.34 
Their objection also focuses on the information asymmetry and lack of expertise. Their 
opponents claim that shareholders lack either time and channels to gather information 
needed when engaging with a company35 and therefore shareholders are unable to make 
‘sound decisions on either operational or policy questions’.36  
 
In addition, shareholders are also criticised for their preference for short-termism and 
liquidity, especially institutional shareholders. The European Commission Green Paper 
on the corporate governance and remuneration policy of financial institutions 37 
                                                          
Law Review; Leo E Strine, ‘Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s 
Solution for Improving Corporate America.’ (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review. 
29 Talbot (n 20) 50.  
30 Kenneth J Arrow, The Limits of Organization (W. W. Norton & Company 1974). 
31 Ibid 68-69. 
32 Stephen M Bainbridge, ‘Shareholder Activism and Institutional Investors’ (2015) UCLA School of 
Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 05-20 <http://ssrn.com/paper=796227> accessed 
13 December 2016. 
33 Bainbridge (n 28); Stephen M Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice 
(Oxford University Press 2008). 
34 Martin Lipton and Steven A. Rosenblum, ‘Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose 
Time Has Not Come’ (2003) The Business Lawyer 72. 
35 Martin Lipton and Steven A. Rosenblum, ‘A new system of corporate governance: The quinquennial 
election of directors’ (1991) 1 The University of Chicago Law Review 195. 
36 Bainbridge (n 32) 621. 
37 European Commission, Green Paper on the Corporate Governance and Remuneration Policies (2010) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/com2010_284_en.pdf> accessed 13 
December 2016. 
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criticises shareholders for their pursuit of short-term profits. The Green Paper also noted 
that shareholders ‘may even be responsible for encouraging excessive risk-taking in 
view of their relatively short, or even very short (quarterly or half-yearly) investment 
horizon’.38 Talbot argues further that what institutional shareholders want is liquidity 
and the company is a means of extracting value in the eyes of institutional shareholders. 
They would therefore spread their investment as wide as possible and may leave the 
company when the maximum value extraction has been achieved, which may 
undermine the company’s long-term sustainability.39 Bainbridge says that ‘institutional 
shareholder[s] will prefer liquidity to activism. For fully diversified institutions even 
the total failure of a particular firm will not have a significant effect on their portfolio, 
and may indeed benefit them to the extent that they also hold stock in competing 
firms.’ 40  Wong argues that it is excessive portfolio diversification that makes 
monitoring more difficult. ‘Large portfolios . . . give rise to difficulties in monitoring – 
particularly the resource-intensive engagements between institutional investors and 
boards of directors contemplated by stewardship codes in the UK and other markets – 
and weaken an “ownership” mindset.’41 
 
Finally, shareholder activism also faces some competition from stakeholder activism. 
Recent literature in the realm of corporate governance increasingly directs its attention 
to the firm’s stake-holding consideration and institutions’ social performance. While 
corporate governance broadly addresses the needs of shareholders and investors, the 
‘stakeholder’ view of the corporation has gained ground in the past decades, which is   
driven by the position that the modern corporation needs to be better governed for the 
whole of society as well.42 Being regarded as one of the most important and radical 
changes in the Companies Act 2006, the enlightened shareholder value (ESV) approach 
enshrined in section 172 requires that it is the duty of the directors to ‘promote the 
success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole.’ 43  Moreover, 
                                                          
38 Ibid. 
39 Talbot (n 22) 55. 
40 Stephen M Bainbridge, ‘The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights’ (2010) 53 UCLA Law 
Review 622. 
41  Simon CY Wong, ‘Why Stewardship is Proving Elusive for Institutional Investors’ (2010) 25 
Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 408. 
42 Millicent Danker, ‘Understanding Stakeholder Activism, Managing Transparency Risk’ in David 
Crowther, Güler Aras (eds) The Governance of Risk (Developments in Corporate Governance 
and Responsibility, Volume 5) (Emerald Group Publishing Limited 2013) 33. 
43 CA 2006, s172(1) 
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according to section 414 of the CA 2006, the directors of a company must prepare a 
strategic report for each financial year of the company,44 with the aim of providing 
details on how section 172 has been applied. Apart from the CA 2006, Directive 
2014/95/EU introduces more changes to non-financial reporting.45  
 
Apart from these theoretical debates, empirical research aimed at revealing the results 
of shareholder activism also shows mixed results. For the purposes of the present 
research, empirical data was collected from the period 1993–2016 (Figure 3.1) which 
focus on the effect of institutional shareholder activism. The activism behaviour taken 
by shareholder might targeted various aspects, such as improve financial performance, 
realize social and environmental appeal. Among which, the financial target is the most 
common one. One of the main aims of this thesis is to reveal the effects of institutional 
shareholder activism in improving corporate performance, therefore, researches 
targeted at social and environmental outcomes are excluded from our research and only 
those researches focuses on the financial aspects are included. 
                                                          
44 CA 2006, s414A(1) 
45 Katarzyna Chalaczkiewicz-Ladna, Irene-Marie Esser, and Iain G MacNeil, ‘Engaging stakeholders in 
the UK in corporate decision-making through strategic reporting: An empirical study’ (2017) draft 
working paper <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3049203> accessed 28 
Novermber 2017 
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Figure 3.1: Empirical research of shareholder activism, 1993–201646 
                                                          
46 Part of Figure 3.1 was adapted from Goranova and Ryan (n 2). Rest of the figure was collected and 
analysed by the present author.  
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An analysis of the empirical research (Figure 3.1) shows that the results exhibit 
significant variance. Some results are positive47, some negative48, some show that there 
is an insignificant 49  relationship between shareholder activism and certain market 
                                                          
47 See generally: Michael P Smith,  ‘Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from 
CalPERS’(1996) 51 The Journal of Finance; Hayagreeva Rao and Kumar Sivakumar ‘Institutional 
Sources of Boundary-spanning Structures: The Establishment of Investor Relations Departments in the 
Fortune 500 Industrials’ (1999) Organization Science; John M Stevens, H Kevin Steensma, David A 
Harrison and Philip L Cochran ‘Symbolic or Substantive Document? The Influence of Ethics Codes on 
Financial Executives’ Decisions’ (2005) 26 Strategic Management Journal;  Susan EK Christoffersen 
Christopher C Geczy, David K Musto and Adam V Reed ‘Vote Trading and Information 
Aggregation’ (2007) 62 The Journal of Finance; Parthiban David, Matt Bloom and Amy J Hillman 
‘Investor Activism, Managerial Responsiveness, and Corporate Social Performance’ (2007) 28 Strategic 
Management Journal; Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy and Randall Thomas ‘Hedge Fund Activism, 
Corporate Governance and Firm Performance’ (2008) The Journal of Finance;, Diane Del Guercio, Laura 
Seery and Tracie Woidtke ‘Do Boards Pay Attention When Institutional Investor Activists “Just Vote 
No”?’ (2008) Journal of Financial Economics ; James D Westphal and Michael K Bednar ‘The 
Pacification of Institutional Investors’ (2008) Administrative Science Quarterly; Shamsud D Chowdhury, 
and Eric Zengxiang Wang ‘Institutional Activism Types and CEO Compensation: A Time-Series 
Analysis of Large Canadian Corporations’ (2009) Journal of Management; April Klein and Emanuel Zur 
‘Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors’ (2009) The Journal 
of Finance; Cindy R Alexander,  Mark A Chen, Duane J Seppi and Chester S Spatt ‘Interim News And 
The Role Of Proxy Voting Advice’ (2010) 23 The Review of Financial Studies; Valentin Dimitrov and 
Prem C Jain ‘It’s Showtime: Do Managers Report Better News Before Annual Shareholder 
Meetings?’ (2011) Journal of Accounting Research; Alexander W Butler and Umit G Gurun 
‘Educational Networks, Mutual Fund Voting Patterns and CEO Compensation’ (2012) The Review of 
Financial Studies; Vicente Cuñat, Mireia Gine and Maria Guadalupe ‘The Vote Is Cast: The Effect of 
Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value’ (2012) The Journal of Finance; Ian D Gow Sa-Pyung Sean 
Shin and Suraj Srinivasan, ‘Consequences to Directors of Shareholder Activism’, Harvard Business 
School, Working paper 14-071; Andrew K Prevost, Udomsak Wongchoti and Ben R Marshell, ‘Does 
Institutional Shareholder Activism Stimulate Corproate Information Flow? Evidence form Labour Union 
Proxy Activism’ (2016) Journal of Banking and Finance. 
48 See generally, Jonathan M Karpoff, Paul H Malatesta and Ralph A Walkling ‘Corporate Governance 
and Shareholder Initiatives: Empirical Evidence’ (1996) Journal of Financial Economics; John M Bizjak 
and Christopher J Marquette ‘Are Shareholder Proposals All Bark and No Bite? Evidence from 
Shareholder Resolutions to Rescind Poison Pills’ (1998) Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis; 
Gerald F Davis and E Han Kim ‘Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds’ (2007) 2 Journal of 
Financial Economics. 
49 See generally, Lilli A Gordon and John Pound ‘Information, Ownership Structure and Shareholder 
Voting: Evidence From Shareholder-sponsored Corporate Governance Proposals’ (1993) The Journal of 
Finance; Deon Strickland, Kenneth W Wiles and Marc Zenner ‘A Requiem for the USA Is Small 
Shareholder Monitoring Effective?’ (1996) 2 Journal of Financial Economics; Sunil Wahal, ‘Pension 
fund activism and firm performance’ (1996) 31 Journal of Financial and quantitative analysis; Del 
Guercio, Diane and Jennifer Hawkins ‘The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism’ (1999) 52 
Journal of Financial Economics; Wei-Ling Song and Samuel H Szewczyk ‘Does Coordinated 
Institutional Investor Activism Reverse The Fortunes Of Underperforming Firms?’ (2003) 38 Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis; John M Stevens , H Kevin Steensma, David A Harrison and Philip 
L Cochran ‘Symbolic or Substantive Document? The Influence of Ethics Codes on Financial Executives’ 
(2005) 26 Decisions’ Strategic Management Journal; Jie Cai and Ralph A Walkling ‘Shareholders’ Say 
on Pay: Does It Create Value?’ (2011) 46 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis; Ashwini K 
Agrawal, ‘Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence From Proxy 
Voting’ (2011) 25 The Review of Financial Studies; Jayanthi Sunder and Wongsunwai, Wan, 
‘Debtholder Responses to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from Hedge Fund Interventions’ (2014) 27 
Review of Financial Studies. 
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reactions50, and some results are a mixture of positive, negative and insignificant51. In 
this research 50% of the results are positive and negative results only account for 17% 
(Figure 3.2). There are two factors that could account for the equivocal results. First, as 
observed by one researcher, many shareholder proposals are well negotiated by the 
related parties and, hence, might be withdrawn before their appearance as an actual 
proposal. 52  Proposals at general meetings may be the result of the lack of 
responsiveness to activists’ private efforts or failure to reach a consensus.53 Second, the 
majority of shareholder proposals investigated in the above research is advisory in 
nature and may, therefore, not bring changes to corporate performance.54 The type of 
shareholder activist, the type of activism demands and the degree to which managers 
are willing to negotiate with shareholder activists also contributes to differences in the 
empirical results. 
  
The research focuses on different types of shareholders, including pension funds, 
mutual funds and hedge funds; different activism targets, such as rescind pills, research 
and development input, CEO compensation, underperformance governance-related 
topics; and on different jurisdictions (mainly US). There are thus many variables that 
have an influence on the research results apart from shareholder activism, and it is 
impossible to exclude their influence and only account for the consequences of 
shareholder activism. Many research papers focus on the relationship between 
shareholder proposal and company performance. However, as will be shown in the next 
                                                          
50 Market reaction means the changes in the market components, such as the share price change following 
shareholder activism events, corporate operating performance and changes in governance. 
51 See generally, Willard T Carleton, James M Nelson and Michael S Weisbach ‘The Influence of 
Institutions on Corporate Governance Through Private Negotiations: Evidence From TIA–CREF’ (1998) 
53 The Journal of Finance; Stuart L Gillan and Laura T Starks ‘Corporate Governance Proposals and 
Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors’ (2000) 57 Journal of Financial Economics; 
Marco Becht, Julian Franks, Colin Mayer and Stefano Rossi ‘Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence 
from a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund’ (2008) 22The Review of Financial Studies;, 
Fabrizio Ferri and Tatiana Sandino ‘The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Financial Reporting and 
Compensation: The Case of Employee Stock Options Expensing’ (2009) 84 The Accounting Review; 
Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri and Stephen R Stubben ‘Board of Directors’ Responsiveness to 
Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals’ (2010) 16 Journal of Corporate; Nickolay 
Gantchev, ‘The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential Decision Model’ (2013) 107 
Journal of Financial Economics.  
52 Goranova and Ryan (n 2) 1245. 
53  Shamsud D Chowdhury and Eric Zengxiang Wang ‘Institutional Activism Types and CEO 
Compensation: A Time-Series Analysis of Large Canadian Corporations’ (2009) 35 Journal of 
Management; Diane Del Guercio and Jennifer Hawkins ‘The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund 
Activism’ (1999) Journal of Financial Economics 312. 
54 Goranova and Ryan (n 2) 1245. 
107 
 
chapter, this kind of activism is most frequently used by US shareholders, whereas their 
UK and Chinese counterparts often do not use it. As these forms of activism take place 
on an informal level, there is generally a lack of publicly available information on the 
effectiveness of private dialogue, and that makes it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness 
of informal engagement.55  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Percentage of different results in empirical research56 
 
In China, institutional shareholder activism is still in its infancy. Considering the 
difficulty in collecting relevant data, there are only a few empirical research works that 
focus on the influence of institutional shareholder activism. In 2002 Luo Wei revealed 
that there is a positive correlation between the percentage of shares held by SIFs and 
corporate performance. Therefore, the author made an assumption that it is the 
engagement by SIFs that promoted corporate performance. The first research study to 
target institutional shareholder activism was by Wei’an Li and Bin Li in 2008.57 They 
analysed the relevance between institutional shareholder intervention and the China 
Corporate Governance Index.58 The results of their research show that there is a positive 
correlation between institutional shareholder engagement and the CCGINK, which 
                                                          
55 John C Coffee, ‘Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor’ (1999) 
91 Columbia Law Review. 
56 Figure 3.2 is an analysis and summary of Figure 3.1. 
57  Wei’an Li and Bin Li, ‘Empirical Research About Engagement Of Institutional Shareholders In 
Corporate Governance’ [机构投资者介入公司治理效果的实证研究] (2008) Nankai Business Review. 
58  Hereinafter ‘CCGINK’. It is the official data published by the Research Centre of Corporate 
Governance at Nankai University.  
50%
11%
22%
17%
P (positive) N (negative) I (insignificant) M (mixed)
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means that the market value of certain companies is promoted when institutional 
shareholder engagement takes place. More research, in the form of a PhD thesis written 
in 2010, looked at institutional investor’s intervention in the corporate governance of 
Chinese listed companies from the perspective of management.59 This research shows 
that although the positive coefficients indicate the relevance between institutional 
shareholder activism and corporate performance, it did not pass the significant testing, 
which means ‘Chinese institutional shareholders are no more than ‘traders’ and show 
indifference to the long-term investment value of their investee companies.’ Therefore, 
institutional shareholder activism did not improve corporate performance in this 
research.60 Other research focuses on institutional shareholder activism, but from a 
theoretical perspective and with the expectation that institutional shareholder activism 
will contribute to corporate governance and, therefore, exclude these works. 
3.3  Institutional shareholder passivity 
 
There are various deterrents to the likelihood that shareholder engagement will play a 
substantive role in corporate governance. These factors could be divided into two 
categories: (1) from shareholders themselves and (2) from outside policy and the legal 
environment. 
 
3.3.1  Internal factors  
 
When considering shareholder passivity, the primary constraint is cost. On the one hand, 
the Berle and Means paradigm (i.e., the separation of ownership and control) makes 
shareholder passivity an inevitable result due to the small fraction of shares held by 
each shareholder compared with the large scale of modern industrial enterprise.61 An 
OECD Working Paper on institutional shareholders identified five main features, or 
components, of an institutional shareholder’ business model that influence the degree 
of their engagement, one of which is the number of companies that the institution has 
                                                          
59 Peitao Gao, ‘Theoretical and Empirical Research About the Role of Institutional Shareholders in 
Corporate Governance’ 2010, PhD thesis submitted to Shandong University, 
<http://gb.oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?filename=2010102638.nh&dbcode=CDFD&dbna
me=CDFD2010> accessed 23 June 2016. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Bernard S Black and John C Coffee ‘Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited 
Regulation.’ (1994) Michigan Law Review. 
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to look after.62 The costs of exercising the same quality of engagement is obviously 
much higher in 1,000 companies compared with only a handful. This may account for 
the reason why institutions with highly diversified equity portfolios abstain from 
ownership engagement. On the other hand, as the chairperson of the National 
Association of Pension Funds said: ‘When you are dealing with a company where 
you’ve got a problem, it is unbelievably difficult and time-consuming.’63 One has to 
contribute a certain amount of time, money and effort to engage and given that this 
process is costly, shareholders with a small fraction of shareholding are unlikely to 
engage unless the potential benefits are much larger than the cost of the effort. To make 
matters worse, Black and Coffee examined the factors that hindered the formation of 
institutional coalitions and pointed out that the direct and indirect costs of coordination 
could influence shareholder activism. The classic free-rider problem and the difficulty 
in seeking agreement on cost sharing impede the formation of institutional coalitions, 
besides, even the coalition between institutional shareholders are formed, maintaining 
this coalition takes a substantial amount of time. Some of the costs are borne by clients 
while their rivals could free ride on these efforts. As the Walker Report observed, 
‘shareholders who do not exercise such governance oversight are effectively free-riding 
on the governance efforts of those that do.’64  
 
Although institutional investors are empowered to monitor management, not all 
institutions are willing to use this power. Institutions that have a close relationship with 
their investee companies, are less likely to intervene when considering conflict of 
interests. Given the fact that their activism may lead to the loss of their business – either 
of the specific firm whose management they have opposed or of the corporate 
community generally – institutional shareholders are unwilling to oppose corporate 
management. In addition, as argued by Coffee, for some ‘friendly’ securities analysts 
and institutions, the managers of certain companies may provide them with soft 
information. The unfriendly intervention might block this soft information channel. 65 
                                                          
62 Serdar Çelik and Mats Isaksson , ‘Institutional Investors as Owners: Who Are They and What Do They 
Do?’, (2013) OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers, No 11, 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k3v1dvmfk42-en> accessed 23 June 2016. 
63 Sullivan Ruth, ‘Collective Engagement Picking up Steam’ (Financial Times, 9 November 2009) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/0231ac18-cb07-11de-97e0-00144feabdc0> accessed 23 June 2016. 
64 Sir David Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry 
Entities: Final Recommendations (hereinafter ‘Walker Report’ 2009) 78 <http://www. 
hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf> accessed 23 June 2016. 
65 Coffee (n 55) 1324 
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This kind of conflict of interest between investment managers and portfolio companies 
also prevents shareholders from exercising a more active role, as pointed out by Black: 
‘they face conflicts of interest if they monitor corporate managers as many institutional 
investors depend on corporate managers for businesses.66 Brickley, Lease and Smith 
found that further evidence shows that ‘firms with greater holdings by institutions with 
potential business relations have more proxy votes in line with management’s 
recommendations, while firms with greater holdings by shareholders without such 
potential relations experience more proxy votes against management’s 
recommendations’. 67  Andres, Hartzell and Stark’s research presents a model of 
institutional monitoring and the results are consistent with Brickley et al.’s research. 
The business relations between corporations and their institutional shareholders make 
a difference to their incentive to put pressure on their investee firms.68  
 
Concerns about insufficient expertise prove to be another obstacle. Many shareholders 
are not confident about pointing out the mistakes of the board of directors and provide 
well-informed solutions using their own expertise.69 Inappropriate performance metrics 
prove to be another reason. Given the fact that the quarterly monitoring process is 
usually the norm in the investment industry, the evaluation of the asset managers’ 
performance is based on this quarterly report. Therefore, under intense pressure from 
colleagues and clients, asset managers inevitably focus on the maximization of short-
term profits, rather than engaging with their investee companies. Because their 
remuneration is usually based on their quarterly performance, unsurprisingly, the 
financial incentive will exacerbate this situation. Another constraint that influences 
shareholders’ willingness to have a greater voice in corporate governance is their 
preference for liquidity, especially for some institutions, such as mutual funds and 
insurance companies.70 Take open-ended mutual funds as an example: on the one hand, 
                                                          
66 Bernard S Black, ‘Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice’ (1992) 39 
UCLA Law Review 845. 
67 James Brickley, Ronald Lease and Clifford Smith, ‘Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover 
Amendments’ (1998) 20 Journal of Financial Economics 277. 
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they have to stand ready on a daily basis to repay or redeem the shares of customers 
who wish to sell and, therefore, most of them are active traders and prefer liquidation 
over control. On the other hand, mutual funds are compared with their competitors from 
the perspective of their ability to outperform and the result is a focus on shorter-term 
performance which makes liquidity a preferable option.71 ‘Locking in’ by engaging in 
the operation of their investee companies could make liquidity much more difficult.72 
 
3.3.2  Legal and political environment 
 
3.3.2.1 United Kingdom 
 
In the UK, there are several layers of regulation that discipline the behaviour of 
institutional shareholders. The first layer is company law which regulates the 
institutional investors’ role as shareholders in their investee companies. The second 
layer is financial regulations that regulate the role of institutional investors as a player 
in the financial markets. The third layer are the various codes.73 Before analysing them 
in detail, a brief introduction on the new regulatory regime is needed.74 
 
In the UK, a Financial Policy Committee75 has been established within the Bank of 
England with responsibility for financial stability. It oversees the activities of the two 
new regulators, the Prudential Regulation Authority 76  and the Financial Conduct 
Authority. The PRA was established as a subsidiary of the Bank of England and 
                                                          
71 Ibid. 
72 Andrew Hill, ‘Preacher Myners is Right to Raise Hell with Investors’ (Financial Times, 22 April 2009) 
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permit flexibility, so that companies or investors subject to the guidance can, in appropriate 
circumstances, choose not to comply and explain why if required. 
74  The passage of the Financial Service Act 2012 signifies the abolition of the Financial Services 
Authority and the creation of three new regulatory bodies: the Financial Conduct Authority, the 
Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Policy Committee. This new regime came into being 
on 1 April 2013. 
75 Hereinafter ‘FPC’. 
76 Hereinafter ‘PRA’. 
112 
 
supervision of deposit-taking institutions, insurers and systematic significant 
investment firms.77 The FCA conducts business regulation for all authorised firms for 
the purpose of ‘ensur[ing] that the relevant markets function well’, protecting 
consumers, enhancing integrity and promoting effective competition.78  
                               
Figure 3.3: United Kingdom regulatory structure 79 
 
In the UK the main constraint on shareholder engagement would be the market abuse 
regime under FSMA 2000,80 even though its primary aim is to ensure market integrity. 
Afraid of being regarded as an ‘insider’ when exercising intervention, shareholders are 
                                                          
77 Iain G MacNeil, An introduction to the law on financial investment (Bloomsbury Publishing 2012) 
76. 
78 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Our Strategy’ <https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/corporate/fca-our-
strategy-december-2014.pdf> accessed 28 June 2016. 
79 This figure is taken from ‘FCA Business Plan: 2013/14’, FCA 58 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/business-plans/bp-2013-14.pdf> accessed 28 June 2016. 
80 Frank Curtiss, Ida Levine and James Browning, ‘The Institutional Investor’s Role in “Responsible 
Ownership” ’ in Iain G MacNeil and Justin O’Brien (eds), The Future of Financial Regulation (Hart 
2010) 309. 
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cautious about their behaviour when dealing in shares. However, the former Financial 
Services Authority (now FCA) clarified the extent to which the market abuse regime 
has operated as a constraint in limiting institutional engagement and ways to break this 
constraint.81 On the first issue, it is noted that ‘the firms that we have met do not 
consider that the market abuse regime is an impediment to their activist strategies’. On 
the second point, the FSA made it clear that ‘a firm would not be committing market 
abuse if it carried out trading on the basis of its own intentions or knowledge of its own 
strategy’.82 Thus, it would not be interpreted as market abuse if the purpose of buying 
shares in one company is intervention or re-structuring.83  
 
In addition, the Stewardship Code also provides a hurdle to the activism by creating a 
sequence that engagement should be escalated. 84  If a shareholder would like to 
intervene, the first step is to have a confidential discussion with the company. Only 
once this step has failed, will the further four steps (1. holding additional meetings with 
management specifically to discuss concerns; 2. expressing concerns through the 
company’s advisers; 3. meeting with the chairperson, senior independent director or 
with all independent directors; and 4. intervening jointly with other institutions on 
particular issues.85) be allowed before the issue goes public.  
 
3.3.2.2  United States 
 
The regulatory framework in the US works differently compared with its UK 
counterpart. Each state in the US has its own company law and, therefore, US corporate 
law is a matter of state rather than federal regulation. From the perspective of the 
securities industry, the legislation at the federal level exerts great influence. Securities 
market is regulated at both the federal level and state level (‘Blue Sky Laws’), which 
                                                          
81 See Financial Services Authority, the letter from the FSA to the Chairperson of the Institutional 
Shareholders Committee, 2009 <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/shareholder_engagement.pdf> 
accessed 13 August 2016. 
82 Iain G MacNeil, ‘Activism Among Shareholders in UK Listed Companies’ (2010) Capital Markets 
Law Journal 425. 
83 The FSA did, however, stress that the circumstances would be different if one party dealt on the basis 
of the intentions of another party’s intentions or strategy or if several parties colluded to avoid making 
market disclosures that would be triggered were the shares to be acquired by a single entity. 
84 MacNeil (n 12) 477. 
85 Financial Reporting Council, The Stewardship Code, Principle 4 
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are aimed at protecting investors from fraudulent practices and activities.86 While the 
specific provisions of these Blue Sky Laws vary from state to state and there is little 
uniformity among them, most of them require the registration of the sold securities and 
broker-dealers and their representatives, unless it is exempt from registration. It is a 
complicated web of regulations from 50 different jurisdictions that supplement the SEC 
rules and regulations. 
 
US institutional shareholders are hobbled by a complex web of legal obstacles that 
make activism an undesirable option. The most obvious and direct restriction on 
shareholder power are the extremely limited voting rights. Pound87 and Black88 have 
separately examined the legal rules and regulatory policies governing shareholder 
voting and have reported that this body of law, which was long thought to protect the 
shareholder’s franchise, often operates to frustrate its effective exercise. According to 
the Delaware Corporation Law, the election of directors, approval of the charter, 
amendments of bylaw, mergers, sales of substantially or all the corporation’s assets and 
voluntary dissolution89 are all included in the shareholders’ voting rights. The election 
of directors and amending the bylaws are rights that do not require board approval. 
However, the proxy regulatory regime discourages large shareholders from seeking to 
replace incumbent directors with their own nominees 90  and also discourages 
shareholders from communicating with one another 91 . Therefore, the election of 
directors is predetermined by the existing board nominating the next year’s board92 and 
to exacerbate matters, shareholder resolutions are precatory in most cases and lack 
binding power 93 . Disclosure requirements pertaining to large holders also exert 
                                                          
86  See information on official website of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
<https://www.sec.gov/answers/bluesky.htm> accessed 13 August 2016. 
87 John Pound, ‘Proxy Voting and the SEC: Democratic Ideals Versus Market Efficiency’, (1990) paper 
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Harvard University. 
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Review 1075. 
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93 See generally, Lucian A Bebchuk, ‘The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot.’ (2003) The 
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influence in limiting shareholder activism. According to s 13(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act and the SEC rules, ‘any person or group acting together to acquire 
beneficial ownership of more than 5% of the outstanding shares of any class of equity 
stock in a given issuer are required to make extensive disclosure’.94 This disclosure 
requirement impinges substantially on investor privacy and may, therefore, discourage 
some investors from holding large blocks given the 5% threshold. 95 In addition, insider 
trading and short swing profit rules also prevent shareholders from exercising 
significant influence over corporate decision-making. The Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 intended to prevent unfair use of inside information and discourage speculative 
trading by insiders by requiring ‘directors and executive officers of a reporting 
company to report their beneficial ownership of, and transactions in, the company’s 
securities to the SEC and the public’96 and selective disclosure of information to large 
block shareholders will raise serious insider trading concerns.97 In addition to s 16(a), 
s 16(b) also discourages trading on inside information by requiring ‘company insiders 
to return any profits made from the purchase and sale of company stock if both 
transactions occur within a six-month period’. This legal rule discourages communication 
and coordination among shareholders. Last, minority shareholder protection rules may 
also discourage the formation of institutional shareholders. Under the Delaware 
corporate law, controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duties to minority shareholders,98 
hence, a majority shareholder ‘who uses its power to force the corporation to enter into 
contracts with the shareholder or its affiliates on unfair terms can be held liable for the 
resulting injury to the minority’.99 Therefore, the formation of large stock blocks are 
discouraged.100 
 
                                                          
94 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 <https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sea34.pdf> accessed 28 June 2016. 
95 Bernard S Black, ‘Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States’ (1998) The 
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96 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, s 16(a) 
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and Public Policy 671. The problem is illustrated by an SEC enforcement proceeding (against the 
institutional investor group run by money manager Mario Gabelli. The group owned over 25% of the 
stock of an industrial corporation of which Gabelli was the CEO. Even though there was no 
evidence of illegal insider trading, the SEC brought an enforcement proceeding alleging that the 
investment group had inadequate policies to prevent insider trading by the firm based on 
information learned by Gabelli through his relationship with the corporation. 
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3.3.2.3  China 
 
In China, there are also several layers of regulation that discipline the behaviour of 
institutional shareholders. The first layer is the company law 2005 and the securities 
law which was enacted ‘for the purpose of regulating the issuing and trading of 
securities, protecting the lawful rights and interests of investors, safeguarding the 
economic order and public interests of the society, and promoting the socialist market 
economy.’101 It basically applies to the issuance and trading of stocks, corporate bonds 
and other securities recognized by the State Council lawfully102 and, therefore, banks, 
trust and insurance are regulated separately (see second layer discussed below).103  
 
The second layer are the regulations published by ministries under the state council. 
The regulatory boundaries are divided primarily by the broad types of activity which 
the regulator oversees. Under the state council, there are ‘one bank and three 
commissions’ (see Figure 3.4) which represents the Chinese Central Bank, the People’s 
Bank of China 104 ; China Banking Regulatory Commission 105 ; China Securities 
Regulatory Commission106; China Insurance Regulatory Commission107. The PBOC is 
in charge of the monetary policy aimed at regulating systematic risks and managing 
financial stability. It also controls the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, which 
manages the exchange rate. Banks are regulated primarily by the CBRC. Securities and 
financial markets are regulated by the CSRC in order to maintain an orderly securities 
and futures market order, and ensure the legal operation of the capital market.108 Two 
of the main institutional shareholders are (1) mutual funds and (2) QFII in China which 
are regulated by CSRC. CIRC is responsible for the regulation of insurance companies 
and part of the pension funds are regulated by the Ministry of Human Resources and 
Social Security. 
 
                                                          
101 Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 1, 
<http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207337.htm> accessed 02 July, 2016. 
102 Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 2. 
103 Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 6. 
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107 Hereinafter ‘CIRC’. 
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Figure 3.4: Regulatory framework in China 109 
 
The third layer is the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies, which is 
aimed at ‘promoting the establishment and improvement of [the] modern enterprise 
system by listed companies, standardizing the operation of listed companies and 
bringing forward the healthy development of the securities market’. 110  Unlike the 
corporate governance code in the UK which is based on the ‘comply or explain’ 
approach, the Chinese code listed criteria to measure and to judge whether a listed 
company has a sound corporate governance structure, if not, the CSRC was empowered 
to order the companies to remedy their major problems according to the code. 
 
Beyond these three layers of regulation, as shown in the dual corporate governance 
framework,111 the CPC is another important body that has quasi-regulatory power. The 
considerable influence of party bodies and party members over personnel appointments, 
financial decisions and operational strategies makes the CPC decisions influential.112 
 
In China, as discussed in Chapter 2, the powers enjoyed by Chinese shareholders is 
much greater than in the UK and US. The shareholder meeting is an ‘organ of power’ 
with the absolute decision-making authority in the company. Some rights that belong 
to directors in the UK, such as deciding a company’s management policy and 
                                                          
109 This figure is taken from the official CSRC website <http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/> 
accessed 02 July 2016. 
110 CSRC, Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 
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investment plan, require the approval of the shareholders in the Chinese system.113 The 
only constraint on shareholder engagement would be to restrict the threshold that limits 
the amount of the assets that could be invested in stocks. 114  Hence, the legal 
environment is friendly to shareholders if they want to exercise power. 
 
In conclusion, there are many constraints on shareholder activism from institutional 
shareholders themselves to a wider environment and shareholder passivity is a product 
of many barriers. For the most part, no single rule is an impediment; no single cost is 
prohibitive. However, the accumulation of numerous obstacles and risks imposes a 
substantial burden on shareholder action. 
3.4  Reasons behind the growth of institutional shareholder activism 
 
The literature on the benefits and disadvantages of shareholder activism abounds, and 
the reasons behind shareholder passivity that make engagement an option need careful 
consideration. Although the call for increased shareholder activism was never a subject 
of consensus, institutional shareholder activism has become a growing trend in recent 
years. This section will point out the driving force behind growing institutional 
shareholder activism.  
 
3.4.1  Reasons from the perspective of institutional shareholders 
 
The first aspect is the ‘exit’ versus ‘voice’. Albert O. Hirschman once claimed that the 
options of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ were available for members of any organization to choose 
from.115 The ‘voice’ will be of little attraction if an easy and low-cost ‘exit’ is available 
for members to exercise. Only if the ‘exit’ is inaccessible, will the members become 
more interested in exercising a ‘voice’ in governance decisions.116 Passivity could be 
combated and shareholders are more likely to engage when they are not happy with 
corporate performance if using ‘exit’ is not favourable.117 On the one hand, there are 
various factors that may make ‘exit’ an unattractive choice: ‘where the exit may involve 
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114 See section 1.3.3.1 of this thesis.  
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a significant stake that may drive market prices lower for the company stock, or where 
the holding is significant enough such that exit at a loss is not favoured option, or where 
certain pension funds may be servicing the investee company’s pension savings and 
hence are reluctant to sell the investee companies’ shares.’118 On the other hand, the 
growth in institutional ownership of securities and the resulting increased capacity for 
collective action make ‘voice’ less costly. Institutional shareholders come in different 
forms with many different characteristics, such as different organizational structures 
and governance structure, but they share some advantages that are not possessed by 
individual or non-institutional investors. Institutional investor are known for their 
specialized knowledge and professional teams of analysts, and access to a host of 
corporate and market data which could equip them with in-depth analyses and enable 
them to take wise decisions. Besides, institutional shareholders face lower risks than 
non-institutional investors due to a broad and diversified investment portfolio. They 
could play the role of equity market stabilizer, especially in an immature equity market 
such as China. Finally, institutional shareholders have their own internal governance 
structure and are supervised by different authorities, which makes them well established 
and well behaved. All these factors drive shareholders to use ‘voice’ more often. The 
second aspect is that shareholders may also gain certain benefits from engagement 
which was necessarily in line with the cost and, therefore, makes activism an attractive 
option. Rather than looking at the existing portfolios and trying to engage when certain 
corporate governance problems arise, many of today’s activists select their investee 
companies based on identified opportunities to exert influence in order to unlock 
existing value. This type of ‘offensive’ activism generates great financial returns, and 
is becoming increasingly popular among institutional shareholders. The third factor  
relates to the legal protection of shareholders; although the law safeguards investors 
against management failure, it has limitations. On the one hand, the legal definition of 
breaches of legal duties may be limited and may not encompass certain errors of 
judgement which could be fatal to the company. On the other hand, the law provides 
private shareholder actions to redress defined wrongs but such actions may bring cold 
comfort to investors as they are ex post and prohibitively costly. 119  Therefore, 
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institutional shareholders may adopt activism as an ex ante and efficient tool to solve 
problems before taking any legal action. In the light of these three factors, institutional 
shareholders would combat their passivity to some extent and be more likely to engage. 
 
3.4.2  Reasons from a wider context 
 
3.4.2.1  Agency problems and corporate governance deficiencies call for institutional 
shareholder activism 
 
An effective governance system is one that aligns the interests of managers and 
shareholders, thereby reducing agency costs and increasing value. Chapter 1 contains a 
detailed analysis of the corporate governance framework that has been built to address 
the agency problems that exist in different jurisdictions. However, the governance 
framework, both internal and external, has not prevented a large number of corporate 
failures, especially during the most recent global financial crisis. Recent years 
witnessed a shift to reliance on institutional shareholders with a view to solving those 
agency problems that have not been successfully resolved by the internal and external 
corporate governance framework.  
 
The UK and US are usually described as a system of dispersed share ownership, with 
the lack of controlling shareholders in listed companies.120 Therefore, an outsider or 
arm’s-length system of corporate governance with both internal and external corporate 
governance mechanisms is built with the aim of reducing the expected costs and 
negative impact on the firm’s value. For a long time, this set of corporate governance 
framework was regarded as a ‘paragon’, copied and transplanted by many other 
countries. However, the bursting of the high-technology bubble in the late 1990s, the 
Enron/WorldCom failures in the 2000s and the financial crisis in 2008 reveal the severe 
shortcomings in this outsider or arm’s-length system of corporate governance. An 
OECD report observed, that the ‘financial crisis can be to an important extent attributed 
to failures and weakness in corporate governance arrangements. When they were put to 
the test, corporate governance routines did not serve the purpose to safeguard against 
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excessive risk-taking in a number of financial services companies.’121 Lang and Jagtiani 
also claim that the risk control system was a basic failure: ‘Financial firms lacked 
effective internal controls, accurate and timely financial and risk reporting to the right 
management level, and a corporate-wide view of risk or an enterprise-wide risk 
management program.’122 Therefore, the failure of risk management systems is one 
aspect of corporate governance deficiencies that calls for more shareholder activism. 
Second, the current remuneration system is frequently criticised for its appetite for 
excessive risk-taking. Kirkpatrick pointed out that executive salaries were a failure and 
weakness in corporate governance as the remuneration systems were not in line with 
companies’ risk appetite and long-term sustainability.123 Another area of concern is  
board composition and practices. Non-executive directors have been criticised for their 
lack of time, knowledge and expertise. Finally, the opaque financial reporting and lack 
of transparency in communication with shareholders are also aspects of corporate 
governance deficiencies. Sahlman once concluded that ‘many organizations suffered 
from a lethal combination of powerful, sometimes misguided incentives; inadequate 
control and risk management systems; misleading accounting; and, low quality human 
capital in terms of integrity and/or competence, all wrapped in a culture that failed to 
provide a sensible guide for managerial behaviour.’124 These corporate governance 
deficiencies act as a concrete reflection of agency problems, sending out the message 
that the role of institutional shareholders should be encouraged to mitigate these 
problems. Many scholars argue that large shareholders’ engagement could limit agency 
problems by monitoring and controlling managers’ activities.125 These scholars have 
further argued that because of the existence of free-riding problems, it was the large 
shareholders, such as institutional shareholders, that had sufficient incentives to 
monitor. 
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It is beyond argument that the way institutional shareholders approach corporate 
governance is different from individual investors. The large blocks owned by large 
institutions enable them to develop specialized expertise and obtain greater access to 
corporate information which are needed to make informed decisions and for closer 
monitoring. As Bainbridge has pointed out, institutional investors with large blocks of 
shares might reunite ownership of the residual claim to seek the ultimate control of the 
company. Therefore, ‘concentrated ownership in the hands of institutional investors 
might lead to a reduction in shirking and, hence, a reduction in agency costs’.126 
 
However, in China, the agency problems is not as simple as in the UK and US, and both 
vertical and horizontal agency problems are crucial. As discussed in Chapter 1, owing 
to the dual governance structure, political governance determines that it is the CPC who 
decides the appointment and promotion of the top executives of SOEs. In Chinese SOEs, 
the managers and the chairperson of the board are usually the same person, and the 
overlap of board of directors and management team is a common phenomenon. As a 
consequence, the managers control the company totally and monitoring mechanisms 
are basically a failure. In addition, the managers and chairperson in SOEs not only work 
as business people, they also enjoy administrative positions in the government. The 
politically orientated bureaucratic system provides few incentives for them to fulfil their 
duties, but makes them focus on the short-term profits that could result in reward for 
them in the form of promotion. Therefore, the absolute power of the managers without 
supervision and their interest in political promotion make the vertical agency problems 
in China serious. In addition, the horizontal agency cost between majority shareholders 
and minority shareholders are also severe. Even though several rounds of economic 
reforms have taken place in the past decades, the state still owns the majority of the 
shares and this may lead to some adverse consequences. First, the state not only focuses 
on the financial aspects of SOEs, but also on political, strategic and national defense 
aspects. Therefore, the misalignment of government interests with minority 
shareholders’ interest generates agency costs. Second, majority shareholding deprives 
minority shareholders indirectly of their rights. Given the fact that the engagement of 
minority shareholders exerts no influence over the operation of the companies, those 
                                                          
126 Stephen M Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (Oxford University 
Press 2008). 
123 
 
minority shareholders are more likely to act as a ‘rubber stamp’. Third, the existence of 
controlling shareholders invalidates external corporate governance mechanisms such as 
the market for corporate control and managerial market. As a consequence, the conflicts 
between majority shareholders and minority shareholders are extremely severe in China. 
Therefore, in China, institutional shareholders are the only ones who have the capability 
to engage with the state, and their activism and engagement are welcomed and 
anticipated.  
 
3.4.2.2  Deregulation and policy support 
 
The external environment could also influence the behaviour of institutional 
shareholders. Among other factors, the deregulation that breaks down the barrier used 
to limit shareholder activism and policy support for institutional shareholder 
engagement is an important factor.  
 
3.4.2.1.1 UK 
 
As argued by Chiu, institutional shareholder activism in the UK is driven not only by 
investment gains, but also by the policy emphasis on institutional shareholders being 
part of the governance landscape.127 Therefore, apart from the factors attributed to 
institutional shareholders themselves, policy support plays an important role in 
encouraging institutional shareholder activism. 
 
The thorough examination of existing methods of financial reporting by companies 
began in 1992 when the management fraud in BCCI and Polly Peck, and the harsh 
economic climate triggered the establishment of a committee headed by Sir Adrian 
Cadbury. The Cadbury Report dealt with a model of best practice for listed companies 
in the UK, including ‘the operation of the main board; the establishment, composition, 
and operation of key board committees; the importance of, and contribution that can be 
made by, non-executive directors; the reporting and control mechanisms of a business, 
                                                          
127 Chiu (note 5) 43. 
124 
 
and the role of shareholders’.128 This report adopted the ‘comply or explain’ rule, which 
meant that companies should explain their reasoning if they could not comply with 
certain aspects of the code.  
 
As regards the role of institutional shareholders, the report stated that 
 
[g]iven the weight of their votes, the way in which institutional shareholders 
use their power to influence the standards of corporate governance is of 
fundamental importance. Their readiness to do this turns on the degree to 
which they see it as their responsibility as owners, and in the interest of those 
whose money they are investing, to bring about changes in companies when 
necessary, rather than selling their shares.129  
 
Because of the importance of their collective stake, we look to the institutions 
in particular, with the backing of the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee, 
to use their influence as owners to ensure that the companies in which they 
have invested comply with the Code. The widespread adoption of our 
recommendations will turn in large measure on the support which all 
shareholders give to them. The obligation on companies to state how far they 
comply with the Code provides institutional and individual shareholders with 
a ready-made agenda for their representations to boards. It is up to them to put 
it to good use.130 
 
 
It is evident that the report encouraged shareholders, especially institutional 
shareholders, apart from actively voting at the general meeting, to engage actively in 
dialogue and communication with their investee companies.131  
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In 1995, the size of directors’ remuneration packages, and their inconsistent and 
incomplete disclosure in companies’ annual reports came into the spotlight and the 
Greenbury Committee was set up in response to this. A comprehensive set of 
recommendations – the Greenbury Report – was produced to call for more robust 
guidelines for the operation of independent remuneration committees and greater 
shareholder engagement with remuneration issues. The Greenbury Report states that 
‘shareholders have the option of speaking at the AGM to make their concern known, or 
putting down their own resolution for the AGM…or voting against remuneration 
committee members standing for re-election’.132  
 
In line with the perception of the role of the shareholders laid down in the Cadbury 
Report, the Greenbury Report specifically saw a role for shareholder engagement in the 
issue of executive remuneration which could have governance implications. In order to 
review the implementation of the Cadbury and Greenbury Committee 
recommendations, the Hampel Committee was set up. Like the Cadbury Report and the 
Greenbury Report, the Hampel report also placed great emphasis on the role of 
institutional shareholders in their investee companies. The report stated that ‘the 
directors as a board are responsible for relations with stakeholders; but they are 
accountable to the shareholders’.133 Rather than ‘box ticking’, institutional shareholders 
are highly encouraged to engage in dialogue with companies and make full use of their 
voting rights. Therefore, policy support for shareholder activism by institutions has thus 
focused on participation in general meetings and the use of voice through the exercise 
of a vote. 
 
The Myners Report on institutional investment concentrated more on the ‘trusteeship 
aspects of institutional investors and the legal requirements for trustee, with the aim of 
raising the standards and promoting greater shareholder activism’. 134  The Myners 
Report on how institutional investment was managed in the UK indicated policy 
support for shareholder activism involving the private exercise of voice, and strongly 
encouraged investors to meet privately with executive officers and to register their 
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concerns in a persistent manner with a ‘thick skin’ until their concerns were 
addressed.135  
 
The Higgs Review, which was published in 2003, focused on the role and effectiveness 
of non-executive directors136 and the board’s relations with shareholders. The Higgs 
report set out more explicit avenues of communication and dialogue between 
shareholders and executive and non-executive directors, and affirmed the rationale for 
shareholder activism as opined in the Myners Report, namely that shareholder activism 
may generate value for shareholders and prevent losses in share values.137 The Higgs 
Report also recommended that non-executive directors other than the senior 
independent director should attend a sufficient number of meetings with shareholders 
to understand shareholder views and concerns.138 Shareholders should also be given 
access to non-executive directors through the company secretary at all times.139 Hence, 
by 2003, institutional shareholder activism had been given a firm policy endorsement 
and the policy position on activism had moved from encouragement to vote, to more 
informal use of dialogue and communication with investee companies.140 
 
In 2009, the Walker Review141 on the corporate governance in banks recommended that 
shareholders should be encouraged to be more active as ‘stewards’ of the corporations 
in monitoring management and suggested that principles of engagement that had been 
formulated under the auspices of the Institutional Shareholders Committee be given 
greater status as a code in order to facilitate informal engagement. The Walker Review 
also recommended that collective engagement be permitted in order for institutional 
shareholders to join efforts in their activism, and that safe harbours be provided for such 
activism from legal restraints in concert parties and market abuse. 142  Hence, 
                                                          
135 Ibid. para 5.75–5.76. 
136  Derek Higgs, ‘Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-executive Directors’ (2003) 
<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/higgsreport.pdf> accessed 4 November 2016 
137 Ibid. par 15.22.  
138 Ibid. par 15.16.  
139 Ibid. par 15.19. 
140 Chiu (note 5) 41. 
141  David Walker, ‘Review of Corporate Governance in Banks and Financial Institutions’ 
(2009)<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/ 
walker_review_261109.pdf> accessed 4 November 2016. 
142 Ibid. par 5.46. 
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institutional shareholder activism was encouraged not only to be exercised at general 
meetings, but beyond general meetings. 
 
The UK Stewardship Code, the first of its kind for the Financial Reporting Council143, 
tried to promote greater transparency between institutional shareholders and their 
investee companies by encouraging more communication through dialogue. The code 
‘aims to enhance the quality of engagement between institutional investors and 
companies to help improve long-term returns to shareholders and the efficient exercise 
of governance responsibilities’.144 The tradition of encouraging constructive dialogue 
between institutional shareholders and companies based on the mutual understanding 
of objectives was inherited by the Stewardship Code. The FRC set out good practice on 
engagement with investee companies with the belief that institutional shareholders 
could be inspired.145 The FRC hoped that the new Stewardship Code could create a 
stronger link between governance and the investment process.146  
 
The government response to a green paper consultation published in August 2017 was 
a document setting out the government’s response to the green paper consultation and 
it identified nine proposals for reform which it now intends to take forward.147 Among 
the summary of the responses, a majority of respondents who answered the questions 
were in favour of strengthening shareholders’ power to hold companies to account on 
executive pay.148 Besides, the government are working on the question of whether more 
needs to be done to encourage institutional investors to make full use of their existing 
and any new voting powers on pay. Almost three quarters of the respondents believed 
more could be done to encourage or enable institutional investors to make greater use 
of  their voting power.149 
 
                                                          
143 Hereinafter ‘FRC’. 
144 FRC, ‘The Stewardship Code’, <https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/e2db042e-120b-4e4e-bdc7-
d540923533a6/UK-Stewardship-Code-September-2012.aspx> accessed 4 November 2016. 
145 Arad Reisberg, ‘The Notion of Stewardship from a Company Law Perspective: Re-defined and Re-
assessed in Light of the Recent Financial Crisis?’ (2011) 18 Journal of Financial Crime. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Corporate Governance Reform: The 
Government Response to the Green Paper Consultation’, < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/640631/corporate-
governance-reform-government-response.pdf> accessed 24 November 2017. 
148 Ibid, 1.4 
149 Ibid, 1.11 
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By analysing the Cadbury Report and the successive corporate governance reports, one 
can see that UK policymakers place great emphasis on the activism of institutional 
shareholders with the expectation that they could play an important role as ‘owners’ 
rather than merely ‘investors’ in corporate governance. 
 
3.4.2.1.2 United States 
 
Institutional shareholder activism in the US has a long history which could be traced 
back to the 1900s when insurance companies, mutual funds and banks were active 
participants in corporate governance. As introduced in Chapter 2, over the next several 
decades several laws were passed with the aim of limiting the power of financial 
intermediaries and, therefore, the active role of institutional shareholders in corporate 
governance was limited. In 1942, the SEC adopted a rule that was the predecessor of 
the current rule 14a-8, which stated that management must allow shareholder proposals 
that constituted a ‘proper subject for action by the security holders.’150 Shareholders 
began to submit proposals aimed at improving corporate performance and it was not 
until the mid-1980s that institutional shareholders replaced individual shareholders to 
play a more active role in corporate governance.  
 
According to Gillan and Starks, the suspension of hostile takeovers and the steady 
growth in institutional ownership are the most important factors that contributed to the 
active role of institutional investors at the end of 1980. The formation of the Council of 
Institutional Investors could be regarded as the beginning of institutional shareholder 
activism,151 and public pension funds and union funds soon became the most active 
investors. The rise of hedge funds in recent decades was changed the picture of 
institutional shareholder activism. Unlike its UK counterpart, it is difficult to find many 
rule changes at the SEC level. There have been only a number of provisions aimed at 
shareholder activists that have been proposed in the context of the larger public and 
business press discussion of shareholder activism. These provisions include the 
following:  
                                                          
150  U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals 
<https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-40018.htm> accessed 4 November 2016 
151 Stuart L Gillan and Laura T Starks, ‘The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States’ 
(2007) Journal of Applied Corporate Science <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.959670> accessed 4 
November 2016. 
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(1) Changing the 13D filing deadline to lessen the shock of an activist investor 
(some proposed down to a 1-day timeline after 5% of a company has been 
purchased); 
(2)  Altering communication practices to restrict shareholder activists from 
reaching out to institutional investors. 
 
Unlike the consistent policy encouragement for institutional shareholder activism since 
the Cadbury report in 1992 and a succession of other reports in the UK, which greatly 
promote the development of institutional shareholder activism, the US institutional 
shareholders are under limited policy influence. The lack of overwhelming evidence 
about policy support for institutional shareholder activism might due to the populist 
agenda in the 1930s. As mentioned in chapter 2, the pervasion of the distrust about large 
financial institutions lead to the promulgation of various acts aimed at limiting their 
power. Although some restrictions are removed afterwards, the government are more 
likely to follow this cautious attitude towards the development of institutional 
shareholders and the predominant policy led we saw in the UK is unlikely to happen in 
the US. 
 
 
3.4.2.1.3 China  
 
3.4.2.1.3.1 Policy support in the past 
 
Although shareholder activism is not a new phenomenon and it is a prevalent practice 
and academia in both the UK and US, it is astonishing that shareholder activism has not 
drawn much attention in China. As discussed earlier in this chapter, directors and top 
executives chosen by the government, totally control shareholder general meetings on 
behalf of the majority shareholders, whereas minority shareholders are unable or 
unwilling to exert their influence. There are some instances where minority 
shareholders such as institutional shareholders successfully safeguard their interest by 
engaging actively, but these are rare events. Basically, shareholder activism is in the 
form of blockholder control in China, which is quite different from the usual form of 
shareholder activism in the UK and US. However, things are going to change and true 
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shareholder activism could be expected in the very near future. The section that follows 
takes stock of the policies that encourage institutional shareholder activism and looks 
at the reforms taking place in China which provides a bright future for institutional 
shareholder activism. 
 
In 2001, the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China152 was 
formulated to ‘promote the establishment and improvement of a modern enterprise 
system by listed companies to standardize the operation of listed companies and to bring 
forward the healthy development of the securities market of our country’.153 One of the 
aims of this corporate governance code is to ‘establish a corporate governance structure 
sufficient for ensuring the full exercise of shareholders’ rights’.154 Hence, articles 3, 8 
and 9 encourage shareholders actively engaged with companies to protect their interests 
and rights. 
  
Article 3: A listed company shall establish efficient channels of communication with 
its shareholders. 
 
Article 8: [A] listed company shall make every effort, including fully utilizing modern 
information technology means, to increase the number of shareholders attending the 
shareholders’ meetings. 
 
Article 9: The shareholders can either be present at the shareholders meetings in 
person or they may appoint a proxy to vote on their behalf, and both means of voting 
possess the same legal effect.155 
 
Furthermore, art. 11 encourages the active engagement of institutional shareholders by 
requesting that ‘[i]nstitutional investors . . . play a role in the appointment of company 
directors, the compensation and supervision of management and major decision-
making processes.’ This is the first time in history that activism by institutional 
shareholders has been formally prescribed in Chinese company law. 
                                                          
152 China Securities Regulatory Commission State Economic and Trade Commission, ‘Code of 
Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China’ (2001) 
<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/code_en.pdf> accessed 4 November 2016. 
153 Ibid. preface. 
154 Ibid. ch 1, art. 1. 
155 Ibid ch 1, arts. 3, 8 and 9.  
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The new company law, which was adopted in 2005, laid great emphasis on the 
protection of shareholders’ right. Article 38 generously empowered shareholder 
meetings with great functions and powers, ranging from decision rights on business 
policy, the election and replacement of directors to the amendment of the articles of 
association of the company.156 The company law focused on the protection of minority 
shareholders particularly. Article 34 expanded the shareholders’ right to know. 157 
Article 75 prescribed that shareholders could request the purchase of their equity for a 
reasonable price by the company if certain circumstances occurred. 158  Article 106 
brings in accumulative voting system to protect the rights of minority shareholders in 
the event of an election.159 Article 152 made the derivative action available in China by 
stating that ‘[i]f any director or senior officer is in violation of any provision of laws, 
administrative regulations or the articles of association of the company, thus causing 
any losses to the shareholders, the shareholders may initiate legal proceedings against 
such director or senior officer in the people’s court.’160 All these articles could be seen 
as the improvement that the government made to provide a better environment for 
shareholder activism. 
 
The former chairperson of the CSRC Shuqing GUO is a supporter of the growth of 
institutional shareholders and he has talked about the importance of nurturing 
institutional shareholders in Chinese capital markets on several public occasions. Under 
his great influence and the support of the government, the restrictions on institutional 
shareholders are easing. 
 
In order to promote the sound development of securities investment funds, the newly 
amended Securities Investment Fund Law of People’s Republic of China was published 
in 2015. In order to promote innovation and competitiveness of publicly-offered mutual 
funds, this amended law has relaxed requirements for publicly-offered funds in areas 
                                                          
156 Company Law 2005, art. 38. 
157 Article 34 prescribes that the shareholders of a company shall have the right to look into, and make 
copies of, the articles of association of the company, minutes of meetings of the board of directors, 
resolutions passed at meetings of the board of directors and the board of supervisors, and financial and 
accounting reports of the company. 
158 Company Law 2005, art. 75. 
159 Ibid. art. 106. 
160 Ibid. art. 152. 
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such as market access, investment scope and business operations. The regulation on 
publicly offered funds are loosened in the following aspects:161 
 
 Removal of the need for the CSRC’s approvals in respect of (i) the qualification 
of fund managers and custodians; (ii) establishment of branches of fund 
managers; (iii) change of shareholders of fund managers with no more than 5% 
shares; and (iv) amendment of the articles of association of fund managers. 
 Fund raising is now only subject to prior registration with the CSRC and prior 
CSRC approval is no longer required.  
 Fund managers can implement share plans for professional persons and set up 
long-term incentive and restraint schemes.  
 Investment scope is expanded to cover derivatives as specified by the CSRC, 
which will provide the legal basis for investment in the futures market and in 
stock index futures. 
 Restrictions over affiliated and securities trading by the staff of fund managers 
are relaxed.  
 
The law also introduced a standalone chapter to address the nature, structure and duties 
of self-regulatory organisations, that is, fund industry association. As self-regulatory 
organisations in the UK exert great influence on the industry, their Chinese counterparts 
could be expected to take charge of part of the government’s role and exert greater 
influence on Chinese securities investment funds, given the fact that they are 
encouraged to play a more active role. 
 
From the perspective of pension funds, the governments has also made some strides. 
As described in Chapter 2,162 China set up a multi-pillar pension system and tier one is 
the basic pension which includes 8% of employees’ monthly income and 20% of 
employer’s mandatory distribution. The government also set up the NSSF as a 
complementary vehicle to support the social security system in China. These two 
aspects of pension funds are undergoing great reform. 
 
                                                          
161 Tiecheng Yang, The Amended Securities Investment Funds Law: Significant Changes but More 
Expected (Clifford Chance, 28 January 2013) 
<https://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2013/01/the_amended_securitiesinvestmentfundslaw.html> 
accessed 4 November 2016. 
162 See section 2.4.2.2.3 of this thesis.  
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The Measures for the Administration of Investment in Basic Pension Insurance 
Funds163 were promulgated in 2015 ‘for purposes of regulating the administration of 
investment in basic pension insurance funds, protecting the lawful rights and interests 
of fund trustors and the relevant parties’.164  Article 37 stipulates that the allowed 
proportion of investment in securities and various kinds of funds must be no more than 
30% of the net assets of basic pension insurance funds.165 In 2016, the Regulation on 
the National Social Security Fund came into force. 166  This regulation is aimed at 
‘regulating the management and operation of the national social security fund, 
strengthening the supervision of the national social security fund, and realizing fund 
maintenance and appreciation under the premise of ensuring safety’. 167  Article 6 
prescribes the following:  
 
The NSSF shall manage and operate the national social security fund in a prudential 
and steady manner, and invest in and operate the national social security fund on 
domestic and overseas markets at the ratio approved by the State Council.  
 
The NSSF shall invest in and operate the national social security fund under the 
principles of safety, profitability and long-term development, and rationally allocate 
assets among such assets as fixed-income assets, equity assets and unlisted equity 
assets approved by the State Council within the range of their rates.168 
 
It is evident that the Regulation on the National Social Security Fund encourages the 
development of the NSSF as long-term institutional shareholder and on March 2016, 
100 billion RMB of the NSSF’s assets was transferred to several domestic funds for the 
purpose of purchasing tradable A shares on the equities market.169 With the policy 
                                                          
163 The Measures for the Administration of Investment in Basic Pension Insurance Funds [保险公司养
老业务管理办法] promulgated by State Council   
<http://www.circ.gov.cn/web/site45/tab2727/info75546.htm> accessed 4 November 2016. 
164 Ibid. art. 1. 
165 Ibid. art. 37. 
166 Regulation on the National Social Security Fund [全国社会保障基金条例], promulgated by the State 
Council <http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=267399&lib=law> accessed 4 November 2016. 
167 Ibid. art. 1. 
168Ibid. art. 6. 
169 ‘Different Interpretation of the Billions in Pension Money That Poured into the Securities Market [百
亿社保基金入市引发不同解读] (Sina News, 19 April 2016) 
 <http://news.sina.com.cn/zhiku/zkcg/2016-04-19/doc-ifxriqqv6295840.shtml> accessed 4 November 
2016. Sina is the leading news website in China. 
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support for the development of pension funds in China, there should be sufficient 
confidence that they will be of greater importance in the capital market. 
 
In terms of insurance companies, the Interim Measures for the Administration of the 
Utilization of Insurance Funds was revised in 2014170. Article 6 stipulates as follows:  
 
The utilization of insurance funds shall be limited to the following forms: 
 
(1) Making bank deposits; 
(2) Purchasing and selling negotiable securities including bonds, stocks, shares of 
securities investment funds, etc.; 
(3) Investing in real estate; and 
(4) Other fund utilization forms as prescribed by the State Council.171 
 
Insurance companies are thus allowed to invest in stocks and in 2015, the China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission published the Notice of the China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission on Issues concerning the Increased Regulatory Ratio of 
Insurance Funds Invested in Blue Chip Stocks which expressly states that  
 
the upper limit of the regulatory ratio of its balance of investment in a single blue-
chip stock to its total assets at the end of the previous quarter may change from 5% to 
10%; and if its balance of investment in equity assets accounts for 30% or more of its 
total assets at the end of the previous quarter, it may continue to increase its holding 
of blue-chip stocks but its balance of investment in equity assets after the increased 
holding shall not be more than 40% of its total assets at the end of the previous 
quarter.172 
 
This further encourages insurance companies to invest in the stock markets.  
                                                          
170 Interim Measures for the Administration of Utilization of Insurance Funds [保险资金运用管理暂
行办法] China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
<http://www.circ.gov.cn/web/site0/tab7758/info3980761.htm> accessed 4 November 2016. 
171 Ibid. art. 6. 
172 Notice of the China Insurance Regulatory Commission on Issues Concerning the Increased 
Regulatory Ratio of Insurance Funds Invested in Blue-Chip Stocks [中国保监会关于提高保险资金投
资蓝筹股票监管比例有关事项的通知] China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
<http://www1.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=19845&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeywo
rd=> accessed 4 November 2016. 
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As for the role of QFII, the CSRC, PBOC and the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange published the Measures for the Administration of Securities Investment 
Within the Borders of China by Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors in 2006.173 In 
these ten years, the policymakers have continually published several notices on the 
management and supervision of QFII. 174  The management of QFII is becoming 
increasingly more standardized in China and the 10 billion RMB investment restriction 
was removed in 2015, which will make QFII an important institutional shareholder in 
China. 
 
3.4.2.1.3.2 Reform in progress  
 
Once again, China finds itself standing on the crossroads and struggling with bloated 
SOEs, rising debt and growth-choking overcapacity. Although it has been several 
decades since the government began to reform SOEs, their actions have only changed 
the walls and the windows, and the foundation remains untouched. China’s SOEs today 
are different from those in the 1990s. Although SOEs are fewer in numbers, their size 
                                                          
173 Measures for the Administration of Securities Investment within the Borders of China by Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investors [合格境外机构投资者境内证券投资管理办法 ] China Securities 
Regulatory Commission, People’s Bank of China and State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
<http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=5445&EncodingName=big5> accessed 4 
November 2016. 
174 For example: ‘Notice of the People’s Bank of China on Relevant Matters Concerning Investment in 
the Interbank Bond Market by Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors’ [中国人民银行关于合格境外
机构投资者投资银行间债券市场有关事项的通知] (No. 69 [2013] of the People’s Bank of China); 
‘Notice of the Shanghai Stock Exchange on Matters Concerning Strengthening the Management of the 
Securities Trading Activities of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors and RMB Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors’ [上海证券交易所关于加强合格境外机构投资者和人民币合格境外机构投
资者证券交易行为管理有关事项的通知] (No. 19 [2014] of the Shanghai Stock Exchange); ‘Notice 
of the Shanghai Stock Exchange on Issuing the Detailed Implementation Rules of the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange for the Securities Trading of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors and RMB Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investors’ [上海证券交易所关于发布《上海证券交易所合格境外机构投资者
和人民币合格境外机构投资者证券交易实施细则》的通知] (No. 12 [2014] of the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange); ‘Notice of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange on Issuing the Detailed Implementation Rules of 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange for the Securities Trading of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 
and RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors’ [深圳证券交易所关于发布《深圳证券交易所合
格境外机构投资者和人民币合格境外机构投资者证券交易实施细则》的通知] (No. 36 [2014] of 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange); ‘Notice of the General Affairs Department of the State Administration 
of Foreign Exchange on Issuing the Operating Guidelines for the Administration of Quota for Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investors’ [国家外汇管理局综合司关于发布《合格境外机构投资者额度管理
操作指引》的通知] (No. 88 [2015] of the General Affairs Department of the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange). 
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and overall competitiveness is growing rapidly, especially for those controlled by the 
central government. Rather than focusing on the competitive manufacturing industry 
only, SOEs expanded their business in fields of ‘strategic importance’, such as mining, 
energy, transportation, telecommunications, banking and public utilities. However, 
SOEs are often blamed for their inefficiency due to the severe agency problems. In 
order to keep their handsome profits and continue enjoying their monopoly privileges, 
a barrier was established to prevent private investment from entering the market. Even 
when private capital is allowed to enter, it often faces unfair competition. The global 
financial crisis unveiled the fact that the traditional growth model of SOEs in the 
decades 1997 to 2017 was not sustainable. However, the fiscal stimulus package 
announced in 2008, along with the extremely expansionary monetary policy adopted in 
2009, made things worse. This made the government bet on painful restructuring and it 
is looking to replace the foundations of SOEs. Instead of continuing to resort to the old 
ways of deploying massive stimulus, resulting in overproduction and high debt levels, 
the party has decided to undertake ‘supply-side structural reform’,175 which relies on 
SOE reform. Breaking down the SOE monopolies is the only way forward. 
 
The clamour for SOE reform grows louder from all parts of China, and the government 
has taken the first step in a new long march towards a mixed economy. Since the 
promulgation of the Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively 
Deepening Reforms176 by the Central Committee of the China Communist Party177 in 
November 2013, a new wave of marketization reform of China’s SOEs has been 
launched in which the political foundation and legitimacy for specifically mixed 
ownership reform178 of SOEs was established. As  fundamental guidance for the reform, 
it is clearly stated that ‘[d]iversified ownership integrated by State capital, collective 
capital and private capital is the prime method for materializing the basic economic 
                                                          
175 Supply-side structural reform is the newest guiding ideology put forwarded by President Xi Jinping 
in 2015. The supply-side structural reforms aim to deliver five key tasks: (1) reduce overcapacity, (2) 
reduce inventories, (3) de-leverage, (4) lower costs and (5) shore up weak growth areas. These five tasks 
are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. 
176 ‘The Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms’ [中共中央关于
全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定], adopted at the close of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC 
Central Committee on 2013,  
<http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2013-11/16/content_30620736.htm> accessed 8 
November 2016. 
177 Hereinafter ‘Central Committee’. 
178 Mixed ownership reforms aim to promote the integration of state and private capital. 
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system’179, ‘[n]on-State shares will be allowed in State capital investment projects’180 
and ‘[m]ixed-ownership enterprises will be allowed to utilize employee stock 
ownership to form a vested community of capital owners and workers’, 181  which 
implies that private capital can invest in publically owned enterprises as the 
shareholders. Moreover, the Decision also points out the abolition of unreasonable 
regulations on the non-public economy, eliminating hidden barriers and encouraging 
non-state enterprises to invest in or play a controlling role in mixed ownership 
enterprises.182 From the perspective of legal reform, the above policy has given a signal 
that specific institutional transformation will be carried out. 
 
In August 2015, the Guidance Opinions on the Deepening of Reform of State-Owned 
Enterprises183 were passed at the Central Committee and the State Council, which 
provides 30 specific guiding points for mixed ownership reform of China’s SOEs. It is 
China’s first major policy statement on SOE reform. The Opinions build on the 
principles of the previous decision, providing the blueprint for China’s government 
ministries to proceed with legislative reform, continue with existing SOE reform 
initiatives and take new steps to implement further SOE reform. According to the 
Guidance Opinions, SOEs in China are classified into ‘commercial’ and ‘public interest’ 
according to their different economic and social functions. 184  Commercial SOEs 
operate on market-based principles in order to create and generate value for their 
shareholders. In contrast, the role of public interest SOEs is to protect people’s 
livelihood, serve the community, and provide public goods and services. In the context 
of commercial SOEs that operate on a market basis, private investors are allowed to 
invest in or even control the SOEs,185 by which the economic efficiency of SOEs’ 
corporate governance can be improved. As for the ‘public interest SOEs, the ownership 
of such SOEs may still remain state-controlled, while in which the minority investors 
are allowed to invest’.186 
                                                          
179 ‘The Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms’ (n 176 ) s 6.  
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid. s8.  
183 Hereinafter ‘Guidance Opinions’. Guidance Opinions on the Deepening of Reform of State-Owned 
Enterprises [中共中央、国务院关于深化国有企业改革的指导意见] 
<http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-09/13/content_2930440.htm> accessed 8 November 2016. 
184 Ibid. s 4. 
185 Ibid. s 5. 
186 Ibid. s 6. 
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As regards the capital structure reform of China’s SOEs, the Guidance Opinions 
encourage private capital holders to apply equity subscriptions, convertible bonds and 
equity swaps to invest in SOEs for the purpose of diversifying the ownership structure 
of SOEs.187 Moreover, the preferred share as another legal instrument for diversifying 
the ownership structure of SOEs has also been accepted by China’s top decision-
makers188 and securities regulators,189 by which the state can still retain control over 
SOEs in some special fields such as the financial and media industries. In the meantime, 
private investors can guarantee their financial interests by exercising their preference 
rights in profit distribution and liquidation.  
 
Given the fact that SOEs are large in size, small companies and individuals are too 
weak to participate in the mixed ownership reform. Hence, institutional shareholders 
and some powerful companies are expected to play a major role in the reforms. One of 
the senior officers responsible for SOE reform once stated at a conference that, 
institutional investors, like national social security funds, and insurance funds are top 
priorities when looking for private investors of the mixed ownership reform.190 
 
By analysing the policy support for the development of institutional shareholders in 
China in recent years, the finding is that institutional shareholders are becoming 
increasingly more important in China and with the further reform of SOEs, they have 
the potential to become a major force in participating in the reform and, hence, have a 
further influence on the corporate governance of these companies. 
 
3.5  Conclusion 
 
                                                          
187 Ibid. s 17. 
188 According to s 7 of the Guidance Opinion, the state-owned capital may be transferred into preferred 
shares in SOEs in specific industries, in terms of which the state can remain the managerial power over 
such SOEs.  
189 As early as March 2014, the CSRC had issued the Measures for the Pilot Administration of Preferred 
Stock, in which the detailed rules pertaining to the rights of preferred shareholders, the procedure of 
issuing preferred shares and special restrictions of listed companies were provided.  
190 ‘Pension Funds and Chinese Investors Are the Top Priority in SOE Reforms [国企混改优先考虑社
保和中国投资者] (Wall Street News, 29 December 2014) <https://wallstreetcn.com/articles/212537> 
accessed 8 November 2016. 
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This chapter took a close look at institutional shareholder activism from a theoretical 
perspective in the UK, US and China. The shareholder activism considered in this 
chapter is that behaviour displayed by shareholders with the aim of promoting corporate 
financial performance. Actions with environmental, political and social objectives were 
not considered. The premise of this chapter is not that shareholder activism is something 
to be encouraged and celebrated given their beneficial function. Rather, the thesis 
leaves shareholder activism open to criticism, and illustrates both supporting and 
opposing theories and empirical evidence. Agency problems form the unified 
theoretical foundation when talking about shareholder activism and it is the worsening 
agency problems after the global financial crisis that called for more institutional 
shareholder activism. However, shareholder activism is also criticised by scholars such 
as Bainbridge and Talbot for its adverse impact on board authority, lack of information 
and expertise, and the short-term and liquid orientation of shareholders. Furthermore, 
the inertia of shareholders and some legal barriers to some extent make them reluctant 
to exercise their power. The empirical research also showed a mixed result about the 
influence of institutional shareholder activism. Therefore, shareholder activism is not 
perfect in every aspect and it cannot prove to be a panacea for the pathologies of 
corporate governance.  
 
What is interesting is that although shareholder activism is fully debated, there has 
increasingly been enthusiasm for institutional shareholder activism in recent years in 
the UK, US and China. This brings about the question of why this phenomenon 
occurred. The answer lies in institutional shareholders themselves and a wider context. 
First, their large shareholding and benefits gained from activism make ‘voice’ more 
favourable. Second, agency problems and corporate governance deficiencies fuelled the 
calls for institutional shareholder activism. Deregulation and policy support provide a 
better environment for institutional shareholders to exercise their power. An interesting 
point here is that institutional shareholder activism in the UK and China are both driven 
by the policy emphasis on institutional shareholders being part of the governance 
landscape or ‘regulatory space’ and policymakers arguably see institutional shareholder 
activism as being part of good corporate governance.191 This could be clearly seen from a 
succession of reports published in these two countries aimed at encouraging institutional 
                                                          
191 Chiu (note 5) 18. 
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shareholder activism. Whereas institutional shareholder activism in the US was under limited 
governmental policy support as only a limited number of evidence could be found in terms of 
encouraging institutional shareholder activism. Therefore, unlike the development of 
institutional shareholder activism in the UK and China is predominantly policy led, their US 
counterparts is more of a self-help, bottom-up measure with minor support from 
policy.Therefore, even though the merits of shareholder activism are debateable, the 
greater role played by institutional shareholders justified its existence. Given the 
increasing presence of institutional investors in the financial markets, it is not surprising 
that people expect institutional shareholders to become more active in their role as 
shareholders, and to exert greater influence on investee companies and capital 
markets.192  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
192 Paul A Gompers and Andrew Metrick. ‘Institutional Investors and Equity Prices’ (2001) 116 The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics  
< http://www.nber.org/papers/w6723> accessed 20 December 2016. 
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Chapter 4: Institutional Shareholder Activism in the United Kingdom and 
United States 
 
In Chapter 3 shareholder activism was discussed from a theoretical perspective. 
Although there are objections to shareholder activism and institutional shareholders 
face obstacles when engaging in their investee companies, institutional shareholder 
activism has continued to grow in recent decades and the key role played by them in 
corporate governance cannot be underestimated. Rather than the ‘giant sleeping giants’ 
they used to be, which relied heavily on the active market for corporate control to exert 
discipline on management or selling out the shares to exit, institutional shareholders 
nowadays have increasingly engaged in corporate governance activities with the goal 
of improving corporate governance. 
 
In this chapter, institutional shareholder activism in the UK and US is examined with a 
view to answering the following questions: (1) What are the factors that influence the 
behaviour of institutional shareholder?; (2) what are the forms of activism that 
institutional shareholders use and how do they engage with their investee companies? 
and (3) what can be learnt from the experience? By answering these three questions, a 
clear picture of the activist behaviour that institutional shareholder exhibit is drawn. 
Therefore, in the first part of this chapter prior academic research is examined and the 
factors that influence the behaviour of institutional shareholders pointed out by scholars 
are listed, followed by an analysis of four typologies of activism, namely (1) private 
meetings, (2) proxy voting, (3) submitting proposals and (4) bringing legal actions 
against the company. The extent to which different types of institutional shareholders 
engage in corporate governance given the diversity of the institutions is discussed. 
Detailed analysis unveils these shareholders’ behaviour and shows how their activity 
verifies the proposed factors that influence their activism. This is followed by a 
conclusion. 
4.1 Factors that influence institutional shareholder activism 
 
In Chapter 3 the various deterrents to shareholder activism were analysed. Both internal 
factors and outside factors lead to shareholder passivity.1Internal factors include cost, 
                                                          
1 See section 3.3 of this thesis. 
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preference for liquidity, concerns for insufficient expertise and conflict of interest.2 
Legal and political factors have an outside influence on shareholder activism.3 Coffee 
pointed out those institutional shareholders who owned large shareholdings were more 
likely to be active in governance.4 Black and Coffee pointed out that the ‘overweighted’ 
institutions could be expected to take a leading position in engaging in corporate 
governance, and institutional shareholders who were ‘underweighted’ were less likely 
to participate in a shareholder coalition. A larger stake gives them a larger incentive.5 
Therefore, the number of shares held by institutional shareholders is the most 
fundamental factor that influences the willingness of activism taken by institutional 
shareholders. Furthermore, Çelik and Isaksson point out other factors that influence the 
degree of institutions’ engagement in their investee companies apart from the portfolio 
factor mentioned above.6 The first factor is the purpose of the institution. Whether 
certain types of institutional shareholders have profit-maximizing obligations 
distinguishes them from those that do not. The second factor is the kind of products 
they are offering. Those institutions offering long-term products would behave 
differently from those offering short-term products. The third factor is the investment 
strategy. There is no fixed number of investment strategies and, in principle, ‘there are 
as many investment strategies as there are investors’.7 Main institutional shareholders 
basically use three strategies, according to an OECD classification. First, there is the 
‘passive index’ strategy, which means funds hold a portfolio that mimics a predefined 
index of shares so as to reproduce or replicate the behaviour of a market index.8 Second, 
a ‘passive fundamental’ strategy means those investors who make an active choice in 
selecting the individual companies in which to invest and keep these shares for an 
extended period. Third, there is the ‘active fundamental’ strategy, which means the 
continual buying and selling of company shares that are specifically chosen based on 
fundamental analysis, such as short-term growth potential. This strategy is often 
                                                          
2 See section 3.3.1 of the thesis. 
3 See section 3.3.2 of this thesis. 
4 John C Coffee, ‘Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor’ (1999) 91 
Columbia Law Review 1285; Bernard S Black and John C Coffee, ‘Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor 
Behavior Under Limited Regulation’ (1994) Michigan Law Review 2011. 
5 Ibid, Black and Coffee. 
6 Serdar Çelik and Mats Isaksson , ‘Institutional Investors as Owners: Who Are They and What Do They 
Do?’, (2013) OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers, No 11, 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k3v1dvmfk42-en> accessed 23 June 2016. 
7 Ibid, 23. 
8 E. Philip Davis and Benn Steil, Institutional Investors (MIT Press, 2001) 58. 
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associated with a high degree of ownership engagement, even though it may be 
temporary, to generate the results they pursue, such as an increase in dividends. Lastly, 
institutional investors might deploy an active strategy but based on quantity of 
information about investee companies, which means the large flow of information 
processed by sophisticated software is usually used as the basis for their high-frequency 
trading. This ‘active quantitative’ strategy has extremely short time frames for 
transactions and this benefits from stock exchanges’ colocation services.9 
 
Figure 4.1 outlines the five factors that could influence the degree of institutional 
shareholder activism, namely (1) shareholding (portfolio structure), (2) cost, 
(3) conflict of interest, (4) liability structure and (5) investment strategy: 
 
                                            Factors 
Shareholding (Portfolio)  Concentrated Diversified 
Cost of engagement High Low 
Conflict of interest  Much Less 
Liability structure  Long term Short term 
Investment strategy  Passive index 
Passive 
fundamental 
Active  
fundamental 
Active 
quantitative 
 
Figure 4.1: Internal factors that influence institutional shareholder activism 
 
With these factors in mind, insider institutional shareholder activism in the UK and US 
will be examined to see whether and how these factors play a role in institutions’ 
engagement activities. 
 
4.2  Unveiling institutional shareholder activism in the United Kingdom and 
United States 
 
                                                          
9 Çelik and Isaksson (note 6) 4. 
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4.2.1 Typology of institutional shareholder activism 
 
Shareholder activism is not a new phenomenon, as explained in Chapter 3. It is used to 
describe an approach or a set of measures taken by a shareholder or shareholder group 
to seek effective change within a company, and it encompasses a broad range of formal 
and informal activity. There are basically four types of institutional shareholder 
activism: (1) private meetings, (2) proxy voting, (3) submitting proposals and (4) 
bringing legal actions. The level of intensity is escalates from private meetings to public 
legal actions (Figure 4.1).  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Activities taken by institutional investors10 
 
In the sections that follow each type of activism will be looked at in turn, starting with 
an introduction followed by the legal requirements or prescriptions, ending in the 
empirical data. 
 
4.2.1.1 Private meetings 
 
                                                          
10 This figure was adapted from Thomas Clarke, International Corporate Governance: A Comparative 
Approach (Routledge, 2007) 120. 
Public criticism, legal actions
Public engagement, attending 
AGMs, submitting proposals, 
proxy voting
Private engagement with 
management
Mild activism, most 
prevalent 
Aggressive activism, 
least prevalent 
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Meetings between institutional investors and companies are important as it is the first 
approach that is considered by institutional investors when concerns arise over 
corporate governance. It is one of the most commonly used approaches to shareholder 
engagement. As an effective way of communication that could avoid public 
confrontation, private meetings are welcomed by both companies and institutions. 
 
On the one hand, this kind of meeting could be initiated by shareholders. Before 
institutional shareholders hold a private meeting, they will evaluate problematic matters 
internally and if these matters can be resolved by way of private meetings,11 this would 
be the first step. They will then raise their concerns with the problematic companies in 
an informal way, such as write a letter or make a telephone call to the managers or 
officers concerned in the targeted companies. When both parties have a clear idea of 
each other’s concerns, a meeting will be held that is aimed at solving specific 
governance topics. A company usually arranges these meetings on a one-to-one basis 
with its large institutional shareholders during the course of the year and the meetings 
are at the highest level with key members of the board involved.12 A telephone call is 
usually followed by meetings to ensure that everything has been discussed. On the other 
hand, the board could also initiate a dialogue with its shareholders for the purpose of 
promoting mutual understanding on a variety of issues. As one of the commonly used 
activism approaches, there are many issues that could be discussed at the private 
meetings, such as the firm’s strategy and objectives, efforts to achieve them, the quality 
of the management and so forth. 
 
Given the importance of private meetings, regulators, policymakers and trade 
organizations have to call on more frequent board–shareholder communication. The 
UK Corporate Governance Code recommends that ‘the board as a whole has a 
responsibility to conduct satisfactory dialogue with institutional shareholders to 
understand their issues and concerns’. 13  Chairpersons, non-executive directors and 
senior independent directors are charged with particular responsibility to have sufficient 
                                                          
11 Joseph W Yockey, ‘On the Role and Regulation of Private Negotiations in Governance’ (2009) 61 
South Carolina Law Review 173.  
12 Chris A Mallin (ed.), Handbook on International Corporate Governance: Country Analyses (Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2011) 87. 
13 Financial Reporting Council, ‘The UK Corporate Governance Code’ (2016) E.1 
<https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/ca7e94c4-b9a9-49e2-a824-ad76a322873c/UK-Corporate-
Governance-Code-April-2016.pdf > accessed 25 August 2017. 
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contact with major shareholders.14 The Stewardship Code also regards private meetings 
between institutional shareholders and the company as the first option of engagement 
when concerns arise.15 Guidelines from trade associations all recommend institutional 
shareholders communicate regularly with their investee companies’ board and senior 
management.16 Although communication between institutional shareholders and their 
investee companies is encouraged, there are some restrictions on the information that 
may be exchanged at the meeting. The FCA Disclosure Rules and Transparency Rule 
require17 that if insider information is involved in private meetings, companies should 
report this insider information to the Regulatory Information Service. 18  There are 
provisions that serve the same function in the US in order to respond to the concern that 
certain investors were gaining selective access to privileged firm information, The 
Regulation Fair Disclosure was passed in 2000. This regulation prohibits managers 
from privately conveying material information to investors. Although it did not 
explicitly prohibit private meetings with investors, the contents of any private 
conversation between investors and management must comply with the Regulation Fair 
Disclosure.19  
 
Although private meetings take place behind closed doors, there is some evidence from 
institutional reports, academic research and newspapers to lift the veil of private 
meetings between institutional shareholders and their investee companies. 
 
a. Meetings could take the form of a simple telephone call, letters or meeting in 
person. A US study found that there are various ways that boards meet 
                                                          
14 Ibid. 
15 Financial Reporting Council, ‘The UK Stewardship Code’ (2012) Principle 4 
<https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/d67933f9-ca38-4233-b603-3d24b2f62c5f/UK-Stewardship-
Code-(September-2012).pdf> accessed 25 August 2017. 
16 For example, see Institutional Shareholders Committee, ‘A Statement of Principle on the 
Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and Agents’ (2007) 4 
<https://www.companysecretarialpracticeonline.co.uk/events/isc-code-on-responsibilities-of-
institutional-investors/443> accessed 25 August 2017. 
17 Hereinafter ‘DTR’. 
18 Financial Conduct Authority, DTR 2.2.1. Companies subject to the DTRs and/or the Listing Rules are 
required in a range of circumstances to make announcements to investors. The FCA has currently 
approved eight providers that act as Regulated Information Service providers from which companies 
making regulatory announcements can choose 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/doing/ukla/ris/contact/index.shtml> accessed 25 August 2017. 
19  David Solomon and Eugene Soltes, ‘What Are We Meeting for? The Consequences of Private 
Meetings with Investors’ (2015) The Journal of Law and Economics. 
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shareholders. 20  Some companies held meetings with their institutional 
shareholders on an ad hoc basis and establish a formal, separate shareholder 
advisory committee to further promote communication. Some companies are 
positioned as a listening post to hear shareholders’ concern. Generally, there 
is no consistent form for private meetings and it is usually dependent on the 
aim of the discussion. A survey undertaken in the US suggested that direct 
discussion with management was the most frequent form of engagement, with 
63% of the respondents claiming that they had used it in the past five years.21 
 
b. For the participants of the meetings, a survey conducted by the Investment 
Management Association22  shows that the participants in private meetings 
from the perspective of the company are the chairperson, financial directors, 
and non-executive and senior independent director.23 According to Stapledon, 
some large companies set up specialist investor relations executives who are 
responsible for meetings with institutions. 24  From the perspective of 
institutional shareholders, a small percentage of institutions (2/33), according 
to the IMA survey, delegate the responsibility for meetings to their portfolio 
managers.25 The majority of institutional investors set up specialist teams on 
corporate governance who represent institutions at meetings.26 
 
c. The frequency of meetings depends on many factors. Offensive institutional 
shareholders, such as hedge funds, are more likely to have meetings with 
management than other institutions. 27  When there are specific issues or 
contentious concerns, the frequency of these meetings would be high. The 
frequency is reliant on certain types of institutional shareholders and specific 
                                                          
20 Bo Gong, Understanding Institutional Shareholder Activism: A Comparative Study of the UK and 
China (Routledge 2013). 
21 Joseph A McCahery, Zacharias Sautner and Laura T Starks, ‘Behind the Scenes: The Corporate 
Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors’ (2016) The Journal of Finance 1. 
22 Hereinafter ‘IMA’. This is the trade body that represents UK investment managers and it is now called 
The Investment Association. 
23 Investment Management Association, ‘Survey of Fund Managers’ Engagement with the Companies 
for the Year Ended 30 June 2006’ (hereinafter ‘IMA 2006 Survey’) 14 
<http://www.theinvestmentassociation.org/assets/files/press/2007/20070704-01.pdf> accessed 
26 August 2017. 
24 Geof Stapledon, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance (Clarendon Press 1996) 103; 
25 ‘IMA 2006 Survey’ (n 23) 14. 
26 Ibid. 
27 See section 4.2.1.1 of this thesis. 
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time horizons. The IMA survey shows that on average each institution had 
held 33 meetings with their investee companies by the middle of 2006.28 In the 
US a survey showed that on average CEOs and chief financial officers29 had 
held meetings with investors on 17 and 26 days out of the year respectively.30 
However, there are several factors that could influence the frequency of these 
meetings. First, for those hedge funds aimed at underperforming companies, 
such as Hermes, the frequency of the meetings held with their investee 
companies could be high. Second, as Martin and Nisar note, some large 
companies have established their own corporate governance engagement 
principles which require that the meetings with their investors should be held 
on a regular basis but less frequently than in the first case.31 Third, there are 
circumstances where if the contentious issue cannot be solved at once, the 
meetings and contact between the company and institutional shareholders will 
be more frequent. Apart from the routine meetings described above, 
institutional shareholders could escalate their action by meeting with 
independent directors or senior independent directors according to the ISC’s 
principles on the responsibilities of institutional shareholders and agents.32 
 
d. The topics discussed at the meetings are mainly decided by the aim of the 
meetings. Stapledon found that the meetings focus on issues of ‘the latest 
financial results, current trading operations, trends in pricing, capital 
expenditure, cash flow, gearing, etc’.33  Institutional shareholders are more 
focused on general issues such as the long-term strategy of the company 
instead of short-term topics such as current trading.34 
 
                                                          
28 ‘IMA 2006 Survey’ (n 23) 17. 
29 Hereinafter ‘CFO’. 
30 Solomon and Soltes (n 19) 331. 
31  Roderick Martin and Tahir M Nisar, ‘Activist Investment: Institutional Investor Monitoring of 
Portfolio Companies’ (2007) 45 Management Decision 832. 
32  Hereinafter ‘Statement of Principles’. Institutional Shareholders’ Committee, ‘A Statement of 
Principles on the Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and Agents’ (2007) 
<https://www.companysecretarialpracticeonline.co.uk/events/isc-code-on-responsibilities-of-
institutional-investors/443> accessed 25 August 2016. 
33 Stapledon (n 24) 104. 
34 Ibid. 104. 
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Ayres and Braithwaite stated that ‘most regulatory intervention should be modest, with 
more draconian or painful forms of regulatory intervention being reserved for cases 
where the first level of modest intervention does not achieve the desired result’.35 By 
way of analogy, private meetings could be regarded as that modest form of intervention, 
as shown in Figure 4.1. If companies fail to respond to the issues presented at private 
meeting, institutional shareholders could consider further actions which will be 
discussed below.  
 
4.2.1.2  Voting 
 
When an attempt to sort out any contentious issues with a company ‘behind the scenes’ 
fails, institutional shareholders may use their other rights to have their concerns solved. 
The findings of McCahery et al.’s research show that only if a behind-the-scenes 
negotiation as a first option has failed, will public measures, such as shareholder 
proposals and public criticism, be carried out.36 As ownership and control are separated 
in modern companies, shareholders’ residual control rights over companies rest largely 
on their voting rights. As an obvious form of engagement and an important means to 
exercise voice, shareholders place great emphasis on the exercise of voting rights to 
effect corporate governance in their investee companies. Voting is, to some extent, the 
most basic and important tool that institutional shareholders could utilize. Voting could 
be used to elect or remove directors, approve or reject directors’ proposals and authorize 
executive pay packages.37 Therefore, the form of voting is at the heart of any discussion 
about shareholder activism.38 
 
The voting process begins when institutional shareholders receive a package of 
information – notice of meeting – by mail or other electronic forms from their investee 
companies. This package not only states the time and place of the meeting, but also 
includes various documents that report on the operations of the company, the financial 
                                                          
35  Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite. Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 
(Oxford University Press on Demand, 1995). 
36 McCahery, Sautner and Starks (n 21) 24 . 
37 Gong (note 12) 168. 
38 However, voting is only one aspect of shareholder rights, there are other rights, such as the right to 
require the directors to call a general meeting of the company, the right to require a company to circulate 
a statement in advance of shareholders’ meeting and to circulate a resolution in advance of an annual 
general meeting. Given the fact that there are too few data to analyse these separately, the focus will be 
on activism in the form of voting. 
150 
 
performance and vital decisions, such as proposals for changes to the company’s share 
structure or mergers and acquisitions. It is important for institutional shareholders to 
participate in the voting and make their decisions based on their full understanding of 
this information. Shareholders are given a certain period within which to consider their 
decision regarding the issues proposed. They can then attend the meeting in person or 
else by means of proxy. In many companies, the facility to vote electronically is now 
available.39  
 
In the UK, corporate governance guidelines and government reports call for 
institutional shareholders to vote actively on a continual basis. The 1992 Cadbury 
Report stipulated that ‘[g]iven the weight of their votes, the way in which institutional 
shareholders use their power . . . is of fundamental importance’, and encouraged 
institutional shareholders to ‘make positive use of their voting rights and disclose their 
policies on voting’.40 The Hampel Report also states that ‘institutional shareholders 
have a responsibility to make considered use of their votes’. 41  Moreover, the 
Stewardship Code requires that ‘[i]nstitutional investors should seek to vote all shares 
held. They should not automatically support the board. If they have been unable to reach 
a satisfactory outcome through active dialogue then they should register an abstention 
or vote against the resolution’, and requires institutional investors to disclose voting 
policies and voting records. 42  Apart from these government reports, various 
institutional investor representative groups also publish their own guidelines to guide 
the behaviour of their members. As early as 1995, NAPF (now the Pensions and 
Lifetime Savings Associations) referred to the vote as a powerful measure and 
‘encourage – as a matter of best practice – the regular exercise of proxy votes by pension 
funds’.43 Four years later, NAPF, together with the Association of British Insurers44, 
                                                          
39 Since Myners’ call for electronic voting in ‘Myners Principles for Institutional Investment Decision-
making: Review of Progress’ in 2004, there has been a substantial increase in the number of companies 
that facilitate electronic voting and in the number of electronic votes. According to the Shareholder 
Voting Working Group, ‘Review of the Impediments to Voting UK Shares’, All FTSE 100 companies 
and 74% of FTSE 250 companies had introduced electronic voting by 2006. 
40 European Corporate Governance Institute, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance (Burgess Science Press 1992) 
<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf>  accessed 4 November 2016. 
41 Committee on Corporate Governance, Final Report (1997) 
<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/hampel.pdf> accessed 4 November 2016 
42 The UK Stewardship Code (n 15). Principle 1, 6. 
43  NAPF, Annual Survey of Occupational Pensions of 1995, cited in Christine Mallin Corporate 
Governance (5th edition, Oxford University Press 2013).  
44 Hereinafter ‘ABI’. 
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published a guideline on voting which highlighted the important role of voting and 
called for voting to be exercised in a considered fashion rather than ‘box ticking’.45 As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the CA 2006 brought in new rules to enhance investors’ 
information rights.46 Institutional investors could receive the information about the 
issues to be addressed at shareholders’ meetings directly from the company. Permission 
to use electronic means to communicate and vote greatly reduces indirect costs.47 In 
addition, the CA 2006 widened the rights of proxies that were formerly regulated by 
CA 1985 in three respects. First, the rule that proxies were not allowed to vote by a 
show of hands was removed. Second, proxy rights were enhanced by allowing a proxy 
of a shareholder to speak at the meeting.48 Third, one or more proxies were allowed to 
be appointed by shareholders to exercise all or part of the rights. 49 Therefore, by greatly 
expanding the rights of proxies, the CA 2006 made it possible for institutional 
shareholders to act as proxies so that registered owners can exercise all the shareholders 
rights that would otherwise vest in the registered owners alone. 
 
In the US, disclosure of  voting is on a mandatory basis for some institutions. Registered 
management investment companies are required to disclose their proxy voting policies 
and procedures, and their actual voting records since 2003 under the Securities and 
Exchange Commission rules.50 Under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the 
Investment Adviser Act of 1940, investment companies and their advisers are also 
under obligations with respect to proxy voting. A fund’s board normally delegates 
voting responsibility to the fund’s adviser, under the supervision of the board, in 
recognition of the fact that proxy voting is part of the investment advisory process.51 
Rule 206(4)-6 requires advisers to ‘describe their proxy voting policies and procedures 
to clients, and upon request, to provide clients with a copy of those policies and 
                                                          
45  NAPF/ABI, ‘Responsible Voting: A Joint ABI–NAPF Statement’ (ABI/NAPF, London 1999) 
<https://www.ivis.co.uk/media/5896/ABI_NAPF_Joint_Statement_14feb2008_2_v_5.pdf> accessed 22 
June 2017. 
46 See section 3.4.2 of this thesis. 
47 CA 2006 s 333. 
48 CA 2006 s 324. 
49 CA 2006 s 324. 
50 Hereinafter ‘SEC’. Securities and Exchange Commission Final Rule: Disclosure of Proxy Voting 
Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Companies’ (2003) 
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8188.htm> accessed 12 March 2016. 
51 Sean Collins, ‘Trends in Proxy Voting by Registered Investment Companies, 2007–2009’ (2010) 
Investment Company Institute Research Perspective. 
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procedures’.52 Among other things, these policies and procedures must specify how the 
interests of fund investors will be protected when a vote presents a conflict between the 
interests of fund investors and those of a funds’ advisers. Funds must disclose all the 
proxy votes they cast and they do this by filling in Form N-PX with the SEC.53 Since 
1994, private pension funds governed by the Employess Rirement Income Security 
Act 54  have also been obliged by way of Interpretative Bulletin 94-2 to disclose 
information regarding voting activities. The SEC guidance, called Staff Legal Bulletin 
No. 20 (issued in 2014) may increase pressure on more investment managers to take 
greater direct responsibility for the vote and to perform due diligence around vote 
agency services where that duty is delegated under a set of voting policies.  
 
There is empirical evidence regarding institutional shareholder voting: 
 
a. Voting level: There is increasingly more evidence on the exercise of voting 
rights by institutional shareholders given the fact that it is an important 
indicator of shareholder activism. As early as 1994, a study focusing on UK 
listed companies found that only 35% of the ordinary shares of the 
101 companies were voted at annual general meetings.55 In 2005, Manifest 
conducted research and showed that the overall voting level was 61.06%.56 In 
2007, the Pension Funds’ Engagement with Companies Survey found that all 
respondents had used their voting rights or liaised with managers about 
voting.57 In 2008, IMA conducted a survey that showed that 32 firms in the 
study appeared to be voting on around 95% of the resolutions.58 In the US the 
2014 CalPERS report showed that firms cast more than 9,000 votes altogether, 
with 928 votes being cast in 2013. Among these votes, 58% were voted for 
                                                          
52 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 17 CFR 275.206(4)-6. 
53 Investment Company Act of 1940, s 30. 
54 Hereinafter ‘ERISA’. 
55 Stapledon (n 24) 122. 
56 Manifest’s research result was cited in Paul Myners Review of the Impediments to Voting UK Shares, 
2005 (Shareholder Voting Working Group 2005). 
<https://www.theinvestmentassociation.org/assets/components/ima_filesecurity/secure.php?f=press/20
05/20051114-01.pdf > accessed 12 March 2017. 
57 NAPF, ‘Pension Funds’ Engagement with Companies Survey 2007’ 
<http://www.napf.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/DocumentLibrary.aspx> accessed 12 March 2017. 
58 IMA 2006 Survey (n 23). 
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and 42% were voted against.59 Empirical research in the form of interviews 
with large institutional shareholders in the US show that 53% of the 
respondents reported voting against management as a shareholder engagement 
measure.60 
 
b. Voting decision-makers: According to the IMA survey mentioned above, 
approximately no more than 5% of beneficial owners retained voting rights 
themselves. Otherwise, these beneficial owners directed the funds to follow 
the instruction of a particular agency or to outsource to a third party.61 The 
NAPF 2007 survey revealed that 14 of 33 respondents subscribed to one or 
more voting agencies. Some funds may not delegate their voting right to 
agencies directly; instead, they rely on the recommendation provided by the 
fund managers or specialists. 62  The most often subscribed agencies were 
Research Recommendations Electronic Voting 63 , Pension and Investment 
Research Consultants Ltd64 and Manifest and Glass Lewis.65  
 
c. In terms of voting agendas, a survey conducted by Manifest and Georgeson 
shows that directors’ (re)election, resolutions dealing with share capital or 
transactions in own shares, and auditors’ (re)appointment and remuneration 
are the most common issues.66 The Trade Union Congress67 Fund Manager 
Voting Survey found that directors’ remuneration was the issue that received 
the most opposing votes from institutional shareholders, followed by board 
balance or director independence and pre-emption rights. 68  In the US 
shareholders were asked to vote on a series of corporate issues, including the 
                                                          
59 CalPERS, ‘Towards Sustainable Investment and Operations, 2014 Report’ (2015) 
<https://www.responsible-investor.com/images/uploads/reports/CalPERS_2015.pdf> accessed 
12 March 2017. 
60 McCahery, Sautner and Starks (n 21). 
61 Survey of Fund Managers’ Engagement with the Companies for the Year Ended 30 June 2006 (n 58). 
62 Pension Funds’ Engagement with Companies Survey (n 57). 
63 Hereinafter ‘RREV’. 
64 Hereinafter ‘PIRC’. 
65 Pension Funds’ Engagement with Companies Survey (n 57). 
66 Eugenia Unanyants-Jackson, Proxy Voting 2007: A Pan-European Perspective (Manifest Information 
Service 2007) 23. 
67 Hereinafter ‘TUC’. 
68  TUC, ‘TUC Fund Manager Voting Survey 2015’ (2015) 
<https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/Fund_Manager_Survey_2015.pdf> accessed 
23 August 2017. 
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management proposals raised by the company, such as the election of directors, 
ratification of the auditor, approval of equity compensation plans, say on pay, 
anti-takeover protections, bylaw changes and shareholders proposals 
sponsored by shareholders. Unlike individual shareholders, institutional 
investors are responsible for thousands of public companies’ interests, with 
each company holding annual meetings and various other matters to be voted 
on and, therefore, the voting task is huge. Consequently, most institutional 
investors establish dedicated proxy voting departments for the purpose of 
developing voting guidelines and voting proxies, and many institutional 
investors subscribe to proxy advisory firms, such as the IVIS and PIRC in the 
UK, and the ISS and Glass Lewis in the US. A survey conducted in the US 
recently showed that 60% of the survey’s respondents used proxy advisers, 
and about half of these respondents actually used the services of more than one 
adviser.69 These third parties become an important part in the voting process. 
A question that is greatly debated is on outsourced institutional shareholder 
activism – the role played by proxy advisers. As pointed out above, a large 
percentage of institutional shareholders rely on proxy advisers, at least for 
voting platforms in which the investors provide the advisers with instructions 
on how they want shares voted and the information shared by the proxy 
advisers on which to exercise their vote.  However, the utilization of proxy 
advisers is not without issue. The current debate focuses on two: (1) their 
conflict of interest, and (2) the quality of information and advice provided.70 
From the perspective of conflict of interest, proxy firms such as ISS play a 
dual role in issuing their advice. On the one hand, they serve as a consultant, 
advising firms on how they can improve their corporate governance. On the 
other hand, ISS make recommendations on how institutional investors of these 
companies should vote. Therefore, some scholars argue that this kind of dual 
role could result in the problem of conflict of interest and, hence, influence the 
reliability of their advice.71 However, ISS argued that they have ‘structurally 
separated [their] voting advice from [their] consulting business, reducing the 
                                                          
69 McCahery, Sautner and Starks (n 21) 21. 
70 Ibid. 
71 See generally, Cindy Alexander, Mark A Chen, Duane J Seppi and Chester S Spatt, ‘Interim News and 
the Role of Proxy Voting Advice’ (2010) 23 The Review of Financial Studies; Davi Yermack, 
‘Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance’ (2010) 2 Annual Review of Finance and Economics. 
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potential of conflict of interest’.72 Besides, a Working Paper by ECGI also 
argues that the industry’s structure, which consists of two main players, also 
reduces the possibility of conflicts of interest.73 From the perspective of the 
quality of voting advice, some hold the view that given the fact that proxy 
advisers are using their expertise and experience to collect information, 
perform delegated monitoring and, hence, make informed voting 
recommendations, they are a reliable source of informed voting advice. 74 
Therefore, the services of proxy advisers reduce investors’ voting costs, 
leading to better and more informed voting decisions. Others hold the view 
that the recommendations of proxy advisers are too standardized and ignore 
firm-specific circumstances. 75  Moreover, considering the opaqueness in 
proxies’ recommendation criteria, it is difficult to assess the quality of the 
voting recommendations. However, a recent survey indicates that proxy 
advisers do not just aggregate shareholder preferences or coincide with them, 
but actually influence voting in a positive way because of the information 
provided.76 The respondents of this survey report that proxy advisers could 
help them make better voting decisions to some extent, but they remain their 
own decision makers. These results are in line with Aggarwal et al.77and Iliev 
et al.78, whose respective research shows that proxy voters do not uniformly 
follow the recommendations of proxy advisers. Therefore, the use of proxy 
advisers does not necessarily itself represent that institutional shareholders 
take a passive role in corporate governance. 
                                                          
72 McCahery, Sautner and Starks (n 21) 18. 
73 Tao Li, ‘Outsourcing Corporate Governance: Conflicts of Interest and Competition in the Proxy 
Advisery Industry  (2013) ECGI Finance Working Paper 389/2013 < 
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=576121020003020086110099027092078064032043077
03302402407512212406708407007008011000001105002601604904911200311910211712009303004
80260260760170910950030911040910950100950020800200700800310030911270710200810810920
65090079096087072069119026073117119083124&EXT=pdf> accessed 23 August 2017. 
74 Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri, and David Oesch. ‘Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence 
from Say on Pay’ (2013) 51 Journal of Accounting Research 958. 
75  Jeffrey N Gordon, ‘“Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the UK Experience and the Case for 
Shareholder Opt-in’ (2009). Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper 336/ECGI Law Working 
Paper 117/2009 <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1262867> accessed 23 August 2017. 
76 McCahery, Sautner and Starks (n 21) 23. 
77 Reena Aggarwal and Isil Erel and Laura T Starks, ‘Influence of Public Opinion on Investor Voting 
and Proxy Advisors’ (2015) Fisher College of Business Working Paper WP 2014-03-12/Georgetown 
McDonough School of Business Research Paper No. 2447012 <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2447012> 
accessed 23 August 2017. 
78  Peter Iliev and Michelle Lowry, ‘Are Mutual Funds Active Voters?’ (2014) 28 The Review of 
Financial Studies 451. 
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4.2.1.3  Submitting proposals 
 
Submitting proposed resolutions for a shareholder meeting is another option for 
institutional shareholders to engage in corporate governance. It provides an opportunity 
for institutional shareholders to communicate with both corporate management and 
other shareholders, and it allows shareholders to raise their own concerns, that is to say, 
to ‘set the agenda’. Unlike proxy voting which is merely for or against the executive 
agendas, submitting proposals enables institutional shareholders to vote on the issues 
they want. 
 
In the UK CA 2006 permits shareholders who represent ‘at least 5% of the total voting 
rights of all the members’ or ‘at least 100 members who have a right to vote on the 
resolution at the annual general meeting to which the requests relate and hold shares in 
the company on which there has been paid up an average sum, per member, of at least 
£100’ to put forward a solution to be considered at the next AGM and require the 
circulation of resolutions for AGMs. 79  In the US, the SEC regards shareholder 
proposals as a governance mechanism. Section 14 of the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1934 prescribes that 
 
to be eligible to submit a proposal under Rule 14a-8, a shareholder must, 
among other things, provide documentation evidencing that the shareholder 
has continuously held at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company’s 
securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the shareholder meeting for at 
least one year as of the date the shareholder submits the proposal. 
 
It also permits a shareholder to include a proposal and a 500-word supporting statement 
in the proxy statement distributed by a company for its annual shareholder meeting.80 
Shareholders could submit proposals outside Rule 14a-8. However, they rarely do so 
when considering the fact that the use of Rule 14a-8 could save on the expense of 
preparing their own proxy statement.  
 
                                                          
79 CA 2006, s 338. 
80 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, s 14. 
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The pattern of institutional shareholder activism in the UK is reactive in nature, that is,  
institutional shareholders react to actions taken by the company and consider how to 
use their vote, rather than call extraordinary general meetings or table proposals. 
According to Stapledon, the resolutions proposed at annual general meetings are by and 
large initiated by management, rather than by shareholders.81 PIRC also conducted a 
study on shareholder proposals among FTSE 350 companies in the early 2000s and the 
research shows that the number of resolutions proposed by shareholders only accounted 
for a small percentage of the 6,000 resolutions discussed.82 One reason for this low 
proposal rate is the uncertainty of the acceptance of shareholders’ proposals. This could 
frustrate potential institutional investors behaving as activists. On the other hand, the 
threshold for submitting proposals is high for many institutional investors. Institutions 
have to bear many costs and devote much time in order to secure co-operation from 
other shareholders. Therefore, they may use other forms of activities, such as a private 
meeting and proxy voting discussed above. Another reason is that the uncertainty about 
whether shareholders’ proposals can be adopted increases the uncertainty of potential 
institutional activists.83 In the US empirical evidence shows that member’s proposals 
for resolutions are increasingly successful as they attract fellow shareholders’ support 
and although not binding in nature, could practically change the direction that the 
company has been taking. 84  US public pension funds conducted research into 
shareholder proposal activism and  found that shareholder proposals introduced by the 
five largest pension funds had grown from 18 in 2010 to 37 in 2015.85 The subject 
matter of shareholder proposals ranged from employment rights, proxy access to 
executive compensation and other corporate governance issues.  
 
                                                          
81 Stapledon (n 24) 85. 
82 PIRC, ‘Modernising Company Law: PIRC’s Response to the White Paper’ (2002)[no longer available] 
cited in Gong (n 20) 121. 
83 The fourth study was conducted by the TUC. Its ‘Fund Manager Voting Survey 2009’ (n 68) shows 
that all five shareholder resolutions were defeated, with one achieving a vote in favour of just under 10% 
at the company’s annual general meetings. 
84 Randall S Thomas and James F Cotter, ‘Shareholder Proposals in the New Millennium: Shareholder 
Support, Board Response, and Market Reaction’ (2007) 13 Journal of Corporate Finance; Sturt Gillan 
and Laura T Starks, ‘The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States’ (2007) 19 Jounal of 
Applied Corporate Finance <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.959670> accessed 23 August 2017.  
85 Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, ‘Public Pension 
Funds’ Shareholder-Proposal Activism’ (2015) <https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/07/01/public-
pension-funds-shareholder-proposal-activism/> accessed 23 August 2017.  
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4.2.1.4 Legal action 
 
When an issue of breach of directors’ duty arises, shareholders can rely on legal action 
to place constraints on the activities of directors and to seek redress, including the 
statutory derivative action shared by the UK and US, and minority shareholders’ 
litigation – unfair prejudice in the UK.  
 
The starting point for understanding the derivative action is the case of Foss v 
Harbottle.86 Two doctrines were established in this case: (1) the courts will not interfere 
in the internal management of companies; and (2) the proper claimant is the company 
itself when wrongs have been done to the company.87 Given the fact that these rules 
could often generate injustice, for example, the majority shareholders could vote to 
divide the company’s assets among themselves with nothing left for the minority 
shareholders, exceptions are developed to optimize the application of the derivative 
action. 88  Therefore, those legal actions taken by shareholders against directors on 
behalf of the company within these exceptions could be derivative actions. 
 
Currently, the derivative claims are now on a statutory footing in CA 2006. The key 
aspects of a derivative claim are set out in section 260. Section 260(1) defines its three 
elements: ‘(a) the action is brought by a member of a company; (b) the cause of the 
action is vested in the company; and (c) relief is sought on the company’s behalf’.89 
Section 260(3) specifies the types of breach of duty under which a derivative claim may 
                                                          
86 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189. 
87 This rule is sometimes abbreviated to the ‘proper claimant’ rule. This rule is the embodiment of several 
technical ideas. First, it incorporates the rule in Percival v Wright that directors’ duties are owed to the 
company and not to the shareholders. Second, it embodies the Salmon doctrine that the company is a 
separate entity form the shareholders and thus has its own assets and its own rights to sue. The right to 
sue is thus vested and remains vested in the company, and does not flow through to the shareholders. 
88 See generally, Ben G Pettet, John P Lowry and Arad Reisberg. Pettet’s Company Law: Company Law 
and Corporate Finance (Pearson Education, 2012) 240. The four exceptions were: (1) ultra vires and 
illegal: it has long been held that where the act is ultra vires or illegal by statute, the individual cannot be 
prevented from litigating the matter merely by an ordinary resolution in a general meeting. (for ultra 
vires, see Hutton v West Cork Railway Co. Ltd; illegal: see Ooregum Gold Ming Co. v Roper); (2) special 
majorities: individual minority shareholders could litigate in the situation where the constitution of the 
company requires a special resolution to do some act, while the company tries to pass it with an ordinary 
resolution; (3) personal right: if the articles of association give the shareholders rights that they can 
enforce against the company; the right cannot be taken away by ordinary resolutions and (4) fraud on 
minority: this is a general concept, for example, the majority of the shareholders could vote to divide the 
assets of the company among themselves and leaving the minority with nothing and with no remedy. See 
Cook v Deek. 
89 CA 2006 s 260 (1). 
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be brought: ‘A derivative claim under this Chapter may be brought only in respect of a 
cause of action arising from an actual or proposed act or omission involving negligence, 
default, breach of duty or breach of trust by a director of the company’,90 Therefore, 
shareholders should first make a prima facie estimate about the entitlement to relief 
claimed. Section 261 prescribes that ‘a member of a company who brings a derivative 
claim under this Chapter must apply to the court for permission to continue it’.91 Section 
261(2) grants the court the power to determine whether an action for corporate wrong 
should proceed taking account of the matters in s 263. There are two levels of test to be 
applied before granting permission. First, permission must be refused if a prima facie 
case is not disclosed on the evidence filed with the application according to s 261(2). 
Second, s 263 requires the court to refuse where directors act in accordance with the 
duty to promote the success of the company.92 Moreover, where the matter complained 
of was authorised in advance or ratified, the court must refuse permission.  
 
In the US, under the Delaware law, shareholders also need to meet certain criteria 
before pursuing derivative litigation. First, a shareholder is eligible to bring a derivative 
action if the shareholders held the company’s stock at the time of the challenged 
wrongdoing and continues from that time to hold stock throughout the course of 
litigation. This is the ‘continuous ownership’ rule which enables a shareholder to bring 
and maintain a derivative action. Second, in the context of shareholder requests that the 
company pursue litigation, the decision whether to pursue litigation on behalf of the 
company generally resides with the board as an exercise of business judgement. A 
shareholder first has to demand that the board of directors of the company assert the 
claim. A shareholder lacks standing to bring a suit on the company’s behalf unless (1) 
the shareholder has demanded that the directors pursue the corporate claim and the 
demand is wrongfully refused or (2) purports to initiate litigation on behalf of the 
company and alleges with particularity why pre-suit demand is excused as futile.93 
 
Part 30 of the CA 2006 grants shareholders who are being treated in an unfairly 
prejudicial way powers to seek relief from the court.94 However, the unfair prejudice 
                                                          
90 CA 2006 s 260 (3). 
91 CA 2006 s 261 (1). 
92 CA 2006 s 263. 
93 Delaware General Corporation Law s 18-1002. 
94 CA 2006, ss 994–999. 
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petition for minority shareholders under s 994 of the CA 2006 is often more appropriate 
for smaller private companies where issues of grievance relate to matters outside pure 
investment, and after O’Neill v Phillips95, it would arguably be rare for investors in 
public listed companies to find redress in taking an unfair prejudice petition. 
 
Some scholars, such as Cox, Coffee and Reisberg, maintain that some level of 
deterrence against potential abuses by management could be exercised by those liability 
rules, such as the ‘social stigma’ enforced by a successful derivative action, the threats 
of financial penalties and the loss of reputational capital. This deterrent is not only 
limited to certain companies to whom liability rules have been applied, but also other 
companies. 96  To some extent, these kinds of deterrents will affect both ex ante 
expectations of wrongdoers as well as ex post liability for the total damages they 
incurred.97 
 
However, there are hurdles when applying the legal actions. The first consideration is 
the cost of bringing a derivative suit. 98  Derivative claimants will be saddled with 
significant legal costs if they lose the case. Even in the case of successful derivative 
claims, an empirical research study found that the ‘total amount of recovery may be 
significant, it is generally de minimis on a per share basis and likely to be smaller than 
the costs the claimant shareholder incurs’.99 Therefore, with derivative action potential 
costs are higher than the received benefits. Second, it is time-consuming and likely to 
take months to reach a conclusion. Therefore, this type of activism is usually regarded 
as an action of last resort and is very rare in practice. 
 
                                                          
95 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092. The case provides that the unfair prejudice petition may be 
brought only if there is a breach of express provisions in the company’s constitution, or where there is a 
breach of mutual understanding and abuse of rules in an inequitable manner in a ‘quasi-partnership’, 
hence limiting the instances where shareholders of public widely dispersed companies may take such an 
action in court. 
96 James D Cox, ‘Compensation Deterrence and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures’ 
(1983) 52 George Washington Law Review; John C Coffee Jr, ‘New Myths and Old Realities: The 
American Law Institute Faces the Derivative Action’ (1993) The Business Lawyer; Arad Reisberg, 
Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Application (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
97 Ibid. 200. 
98 Alan J Dignam and John Lowry, Company Law (9th edn, Oxford University Press 2016). 
99  Sanjai Bhagat and Roberta Romano, ‘Event Studies and the Law: Part II: Empirical Studies of 
Corporate Law’ (2002) 4 American Law and Economics Review. 
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4.2.2  Activism by different institutional shareholders 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, firms have undergone a tremendous shift in the last century, 
family-controlled companies started unwinding due to several factors, 100  and 
institutions rose to become the main owners of publicly issued equity and they were 
largely ‘sleeping giants’ relying on the market for corporate control to exert discipline 
on management. From the 1980s in the US and 1990s in the UK, ‘systematic forms’ of 
institutional shareholder activism began to emerge.101 From then on, in the discourse 
on corporate governance, the role of institutional shareholders as a market force for 
discipline was frequently put forward. However, the general term institutional 
shareholders itself does not say very much about their nature. A breakdown by types 
of institutional shareholders in the UK and US is provided here in Chapter 4. Not all 
institutional shareholders are the same and they may vary in their objectives, driving 
force, investment strategies and size. These factors influence the degree of institutional 
shareholder activism which may lead to different results in different institutions. For 
example, passive institutional investors who focus on index returns may pay less 
attention to the performance of their investee companies, while active investors might 
care about individual firms. Long-term investors may be better at tolerating volatility 
than short-term investors and the latter may prefer to focus on quarterly earnings and 
stock price. Large institutional shareholders are more likely to dedicate significant 
resources to governance matters and their small counterparts may lack these resources. 
Therefore, the answer to the question of what the role of institutional shareholders is in 
corporate governance may lie in the types of investors and what they actually do in 
terms of engaging with firms in which they invest. In this part of the chapter, 
institutional shareholder engagement activity will be looked at more closely. Not all 
possible types of institutional investors have been included102 partly because of a lack 
                                                          
100 Such as tax incentives favouring diversification, the rise of the portfolio theory and the rise of the 
managerial revolution, See John Armour, Brian R Cheffins, and David A Skeel. Corporate Ownership 
Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law in the US and UK (ESRC Centre for Business Research, 
University of Cambridge, 2002). 
101 Iris HY Chiu, The Foundations and Anatomy of Shareholder Activism (Bloomsbury Publishing 2010). 
By referring to ‘systematic forms of shareholder activism’, Chiu means the perspective taken by some 
shareholders who regard activism as an inherent part of their investment management; that engaging with 
their investee companies is part and parcel of ongoing investment, and not as an ad hoc occurrence. 
102 Foreign shareholders are, to a large extent, made up by sovereign wealth funds (hereinafter ‘SWFs’), 
are the largest significant group of shareholders in the UK. The SWF appears to make highly diversified 
and small investments in different industries worldwide and has a primary concern for investment value. 
Therefore, it is observed that sovereign wealth funds have engaged in little or no shareholder activism in 
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of reliable data and partly because they are insignificant given their engagement 
activities in corporate governance. The main types of institutional shareholders 
discussed in Chapter 4 are analysed. Besides, there are also differences within the same 
category of institutional shareholders and it is impossible to consider every individual 
institution. Therefore, a general picture about activism in one institution will be 
presented without mentioning specific differences within them. 
 
4.2.2.1  Mutual fund 
 
Mutual funds are the major category of institutional investor in the both UK and US. 
However, unlike pension funds and insurance companies which are usually regarded as 
long-term investors, which will be discussed later, mutual funds are institutions that 
require liquidity more than others.103 This can be explained from their industry nature 
and portfolio strategies. On the one hand, unlike pension funds and insurance 
companies whose pay-out is actuarially predictable, mutual funds shareholders, 
depositors or policyholders may withdraw their funds at short notice. Therefore, 
adopting a large control position or long-term investment strategies are unacceptable if 
such stakes would be illiquid. The problem is made worse when considering open-
ended mutual funds that need to stand at the ready to redeem the shares of customers 
who wish to sell on a daily basis. Therefore, mutual funds are more likely to be active 
traders. In addition, given the fact that the competition between funds to attract 
customer’s funds is stiff, their ability to report the current market value of their 
investment to outperform their competitors is important. As a result, mutual funds are 
more focused on short-term performance than others and liquidity is a high priority for 
rational mutual fund managers.104 On the other hand, the investment strategies used by 
mutual funds makes them less likely to be long-term investors. There are basically two 
portfolio approaches, active management and passive management. Active 
management is aimed at identifying undervalued securities. These shares are purchased 
with the assumption that ‘the market is inefficient and that not all relevant information 
                                                          
both the UK and US. Therefore, this thesis will not devote much discussion to SWFs as they lead no 
significant activist activity. Further, see Chiu (note 101); Richard A Epstein and Amanda M Rose, ‘The 
Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Virtues of Going Slow’ (2012) University of Chicago Law 
Review 111 .  
103 Coffee (n 4) 1277. 
104 Coffee (n 4) 1277. 
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is present in the securities market’.105 Active management thus attempts to make profit 
by trading securities. Passive management seeks to reproduce or replicate the behaviour 
of a market index by tracking a market-weighted index or portfolio.106 The two firms 
with the largest amounts of money under their management, BlackRock and State 
Street, primarily engage in passive management strategies.107  
 
The IMA conducted a survey in 2006 aimed at measuring its members’ engagement 
with the companies in which they invested. The survey revealed that the majority of the 
fund management companies being investigated routinely met with their investee 
companies or at least once a year.108 In terms of the numbers of meetings held with their 
investee companies, there is wide disparity. Among 23 institutions that reported in 
detail, one had 290 meetings, ten institutions had ten or fewer, and the remaining 11 
had between 11 and 88 meetings during 2006.109 On average, each institution had held 
33 meetings with its investee companies. Given the behind-the-scenes nature of private 
meetings, some meetings were not captured on record.110 Only a few institutions had 
annually or regularly met with non-executives. The majority of institutions contacted 
non-executives when there were issues or at the company’s request.111 
 
The TUC also published a survey regarding the voting and engagement of fund 
managers in 2015.112 The survey shows evidence that some asset managers were more 
willing to vote against management over remuneration issues that year. There was an 
overall reduction in the proportion of abstentions and an increase in opposing votes, 
suggesting a tougher approach is taken by asset managers.113 According to the survey, 
four respondents supported management in 75% or more resolutions, while at the other 
end, six investors supported management in 30% or fewer resolutions. On remuneration, 
                                                          
105  Paul Myners, Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review (2001) 36 
<http://uksif.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/MYNERS-P.-2001.-Institutional-Investment-in-the-
United-Kingdom-A-Review.pdf> accessed 5 June 2017. 
106 Philip and Steil (n 8) 58. 
107 Victor Reklaitis, ‘Passive Investing is Now the Mainstream Method, Market Watch’ (Market Watch, 
7 August 2014) <http://www.marketwatch.com/story/passive-investing-is-now-the-mainstream-
method-says-morningstar-researcher-2014-08-07> accessed 12 August 2017. 
108 IMA 2006 Survey (n 23) 1. 
109 Ibid.  
110 Ibid.  
111 Ibid. 
112 TUC (note 69) 2. 
113 Ibid. 
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two respondents supported 80% or more remuneration reports, while three respondents 
did not support any. Take Aberdeen Asset Management as an example, the firm has 
votes in 61 of its investee companies’ reports of which 24 were opposed. The 
remuneration policy is the most frequent (13 out of 24) topic being rejected. 
 
4.2.2.2  Pension funds 
 
In the UK and US, pension funds are a large category of institutional investors. There 
are unfunded and funded pension schemes, and most of the occupational pension 
operate on a funded basis. As the objective of this kind of pension fund is to ‘build up 
a fund of investment assets from the contributions of both employer and employees, so 
that the income from, and the capital value of, those assets are available to finance the 
pension obligations of the employer when employees retire’, 114  pension funds’ 
investment environment tend to be characterised in general by ‘long-term stability and 
predictable change, but occasional short-term volatility’.115 On the one hand, in terms 
of contribution inflows, the contractual nature of the contribution guarantees the 
stability of the inflows in a certain period and restrains them from the competition of 
other forms of savings. From the perspective of outflows, unlike mutual funds, pension 
funds do not face share redemptions and the normal age of retirement of individual 
employees is set at the beginning of the contract and the rate of those who need 
premature retirement because of invalidity or mortality is actuarially predictable.116 
Besides, the long period before the payment of the pension schemes makes pension 
funds more likely to go through many business cycles and across many periods of boom 
and slump, which could lead to a more stable long-term average return. Therefore, these 
factors of stability and predictability gives pension funds a wide choice and investment 
strategy, and allows them to invest with long-term focus and select portfolios with long 
maturity profiles. To some extent, the maturity structure of pension fund assets is longer 
than that of any other type of savings institution, including that of insurance companies 
which, even in their life business, have to deal with, for example, short-term endowment 
policies and also have to make allowance for surrenders and policy loans.  
                                                          
114 David Blake, Pension Schemes and Pension Funds in the United Kingdom (Oxford University Press, 
2003) 377. 
115 Ibid. 407. 
116 Ibid. 407. 
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There are several ways to manage the investment of a pension fund. For those pension 
funds that are small in size, their portfolio is usually managed by insurance companies. 
Large pension funds tend to be self-insured or self-administered, which means the fund 
trustee is the registered beneficial owner of the fund assets in their investee companies 
and they are managed by ‘in-house staff’ or outsource the management to external fund 
managers. 117  Sometimes, funds are pooled with the contributions from different 
pensions managed together and invested as a single sum.118 Pooled funds are usually 
operated as either unit trusts, which are established under a trust structure119 or managed 
pension funds which operate under insurance contracts.120 Unlike UK pension funds 
which use a mixture of inside and outside managers, US pension funds tend to allocate 
the management of their assets among several investment advisers, thereby effectively 
staging competition among them. Arguably, UK pension funds are more likely to 
reduce the pressure of short-term performance when compared with their US 
counterparts, given the use of more internal managers and the absence of fierce 
competition.  
 
With the belief that ‘pension funds as long-term investors and they have a clear interest 
in promoting the success of their investee companies’, the NAPF issued its tenth annual 
survey of pension funds’ engagement with their investee companies.121 The following 
is an analysis of the key findings of this engagement survey. 
 
a. Stewardship responsibility:122 The first aspect mentioned in this report is the 
stewardship responsibilities owed by pension funds. Respondents nearly 
                                                          
117 Gordon Clark, Pension Fund Capitalism (Oxford University Press, 2000). 
118 Gong (note 12) 142. 
119 Unit trusts are discussed separately. 
120 In a managed pension fund, the fund simply purchases units of a diversified investment from insurance 
companies. The insurance companies that manage the fund are the beneficial owners of the assets and 
therefor have the right to exercise voting rights. Pension schemes purchasing funds own only their 
investment policies. For more, see Stapledon (n 24). 
121 NAPF, Engagement Survey: Pension Funds’ Engagement with Investee Companies. NAPF 
Research Report, 2014’ (2014) 
<http://www.plsa.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/DocumentLibrary/~/media/Policy/Documents/0412_NAPF
_engagement_survey_2014.pdf> accessed 23 August 2017. 
122 The NAPF has long believed that a greater number of pension fund signatories to the Code is 
important to give a clear signal to the market and, in turn, influence behavioural changes that lead to 
better stewardship by asset managers and companies. Therefore, the number of signatories to the UK 
Code continues to increase – there are now 82 asset owner signatories, including 63 pension funds, 
according to the data provided in the NAPF survey. 
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unanimously (93%) accepted the idea that institutional shareholders had 
stewardship responsibilities which included voting shares and engaging with 
companies.123 However, only 53% of the respondents agreed that institutional 
investors had played an active enough role as stewards of investee companies 
in the past 12 months. 124  Besides, two thirds (67%) of respondents had 
formally committed themselves to the Stewardship Code125 and more funds 
review their investment managers’ application of the stewardship policy on a 
more frequent basis, with 38% of them doing so quarterly and more than 80% 
doing so annually at least. The vast majority (80%) of respondents indicated 
that they took the stewardship activities and policies of managers into account 
when selecting managers.  
 
b. Engagement with investee companies: The survey showed that the shareholder 
turnout rate at UK annual general meetings was approximately 69%. Nearly 
80% of respondents had an investment policy that included engagement and 
voting, which was set out in their Statement of Investment Principles.126 In 
practice, the main approach of respondents to engagement with their investee 
companies was via delegation. Of the pension funds 57% delegated to their 
investment managers and 19% outsourced to a third party, with only 10% 
engaging directly with investee companies themselves. 127  In terms of the 
effectiveness of the engagement activities, the majority of respondents 
reported that there was evidence of influence resulting in positive changes on 
most issues.128 In respect of voting, 93% of the respondents exercised their 
vote rights within the UK and the rate of voting in other jurisdictions was 
increasing.129 In the US, although specific data on the pension industry were 
lacking, CalPERS could be used as an example and will be analysed below. 
 
                                                          
123 NAPF (n 121) 9. 
124 Ibid. 11. 
125 Ibid. 13. 
126  A SIP is a written statement governing decisions about investments for the purposes of an 
occupational pension scheme. NAPF Engagement Survey: pension funds’ engagement with investee 
companies. NAPF, (n 121) 16. 
127 Ibid. 26. 
128 Such as board composition (66% agree), company strategy (54% agree) and executive remuneration 
(76% agree); NAPF (n 121) 28. 
129 NAPF (n 121) 30. 
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c. Long-term investment: There has been growing acceptance that compared with 
mutual funds, pension funds are long-term in nature. Therefore, NAPF are 
encouraging pension funds to be ‘more explicit about their investment 
philosophy and their understanding of their objectives and risks’130. More than 
60% of the respondents stated that it was important for investment managers 
to take the long-term sustainability of the company strategy into account when 
making investment decisions. As shown in this chapter, UK pension funds face 
surprisingly few regulatory restrictions on their investment behaviour. They 
are free to invest in virtually any type of asset, financial or real, cash or 
derivative, at home or abroad.131 Given the restrictions on both contribution 
inflows and pension outflows, it seems reasonable that the investment 
practices of pension funds themselves are largely unrestricted, which makes 
them more likely to invest in the longer term. In the US the Board of 
Administration of CalPERS adopted a set of 11 pension beliefs in 2014. These 
beliefs articulate the pension fund’s view on ‘public pension design, funding, 
and administration’. Pension Belief 4 requires that a ‘retirement plan should 
include a defined benefit component, have professionally managed funds with 
a long-term horizon, and incorporate pooled investments and pooled risks’.132 
The Sub-beliefs under this requirements are that a ‘key success measure for 
the CalPERS investment programme is delivery of the long-term target return 
for the fund’; ‘[s]taff can be measured on returns relative to an appropriate 
benchmark, but staff performance plans should include additional objectives 
or key performance indicators to align staff with funds’ long-term goals’, 
which show that CalPERS places great emphasis on the long-term horizon of 
its fund. 
 
CalPERS, who plays a leading role in institutional shareholder activism in the US, will 
be used as a classic case to see how it engaged in its investee companies. 
 
                                                          
130 Ibid. 16. 
131 Blake (n 114) 401. 
132  CalPERS, ‘Our Views Guiding Us into the Future’ <https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-
publications/calpers-beliefs.pdf> accessed 23 August 2016. 
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Established in 1932, CalPERS is the United States’ largest public pension fund, with 
US$300 billion in assets managed by it in 2014.133 Since the mid-1980s, institutional 
investors have become active in monitoring corporate management and independently 
voting the shares they controlled. CalPERS has been a leader in this movement. Since 
1987, CalPERS has formally been active with its corporate governance activities. In the 
early days there was no formal announcement of the targeted companies. CalPERS’ 
staff selected companies to target and if approved by the CalPERS board, letters were 
sent to the targeted companies’ CEO.134 Many of the early reforms were aimed at 
repealing poison pills and staggered boards. 135  In 1992, CalPERS began publicly 
announcing its ‘focus list’ in an effort to apply public pressure on the companies it had 
in its sight.136 CalPERS began selecting firms using an elaborate matrix of factors, with 
less attention paid to a particular governance issue. Instead, it focused on stock return 
performance and governance in general. The criteria for the focus list have changed 
over time and it includes companies that CalPERS has ‘concerns about stock and 
financial underperformance, and corporate governance practices’.137 CalPERS works 
with these companies to improve their corporate governance and thereby improve their 
financial performance. However, beginning in 2011, the focus list and the engagements 
became private given the fact that ‘the confidentiality facilitates the development of 
constructive relationships’. 138  Its engagement with underperforming public stock 
companies is mainly in the form of private contacts and proxy actions. In its 2014 
‘Towards Sustainable Investment and Operations Report’,139 CalPERS states that the 
focus list still played a vital role in its engagement on corporate governance and it 
selects targeted companies from the top 1,000 domestic public equity holdings that are 
underperforming on both stock returns and governance factors. Governance factors 
include ‘board quality, staggered boards, lack of director independence, shareowner 
                                                          
133 CalPERS, ‘Facts at a Glance’ (2015) <https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/facts-at-
a-glance.pdf> accessed 23 August 2016. 
134 Stephen Nesbitt, ‘Long-term Rewards from Shareholder Activism: A Study of the “CalPERS Effect”’ 
(1992) 6 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 75. 
135 Claire E Crutchley, Carl D Hudson and Marlin RH Jensen, ‘Shareholder Wealth Effects of CalPERS’ 
Activism’ (1998) Financial Services Review 1. 
136 Brad M Barber, ‘Monitoring the Monitor: Evaluating CalPERS Activism’ (2007) 16 The Journal of 
Investing 66. 
137 Author unknown, ‘CalPERS Targets Five Companies on 2008 Focus List of Underperformers’ (San 
Francisco Business Time, 23 March 2008) 
<https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/2008/03/24/daily14.html> accessed 28 August 2016. 
138 Towards Sustainable Investment and Operations (n 59) 12. 
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rights, poison pills, executive compensation, and risk management of environmental 
and social issues’.140  
 
Apart from the focus list strategy, CalPERS also sees proxy voting as the primary way 
to influence a company’s operation and corporate governance.141 In 2016, CalPERS 
launched four proxy voting campaigns142 and supported shareholder proposals by other 
organizations on topics such as board diversity, climate reporting and proxy access.143 
 
Empirical research on the results of CalPERS’ activism is mixed. Smith found that 
companies that had adopted the changes proposed by CalPERS or that made changes 
resulting in settlements being reached with CalPERS, shareholders’ wealth increased 
and those companies who did not, shareholders’ wealth decreased. 144 Wahal examined 
all firms targeted by nine major pension funds from 1987 to 1993 and found that only 
firms targeted by CalPERS experienced a positive stock price reaction.145 Crutchley, 
Hudson Jensen’s research found that very visible and aggressive activism increased 
shareholder wealth, but ‘a quieter activism practiced by CalPERS after 1994 does not’. 
For the total sample period, 1992–97, the returns for targeted firms were no different.146 
Two studies published by CalPERS staff in 2003–2004 found that stocks on the 
CalPERS Focus List experienced ‘positive excess stock returns of about 12% over the 
three months following release of the list’.147 English et al. concluded that CalPERS’ 
targeting produced a statistically significant improvement in short-term returns but not 
necessarily in long-term returns.148 Nelson’s research in 2006 found ‘no evidence to 
support the persistence of a “CalPERS”’ effect after 1993. 149  Barber found that 
                                                          
140 Ibid 15. 
141 CalPERS official website, ‘Proxy voting’ 
<https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/investments/governance/proxy-voting> accessed 28 August 2016. 
142 Ibid. The four proxy voting campaigns are Anglo American, Glencore Plc, Old Republic International 
Corp and Rio Tinto Plc. 
143 ‘Proxy voting’ (note 141). 
144  Michael P Smith ‘Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS’ 
(1996) 51 The Journal of Finance 227. 
145  Sunil Wahal, ‘Pension Fund Activism and Firm Performance’ (1996) Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 12. 
146 Crutchley, Hudson, and Jensen (n 135) 8. 
147 Mark Anson, Ted White and Ho Ho, ‘The Shareholder Wealth Effects of CalPERS’ Focus List’ (2003) 
15 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 102 
148 Philip C English, Thomas I Smythe, and Chris R McNeil, ‘The “CalPERS Effect” Revisited’ (2004) 
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Finance 187. 
170 
 
‘CalPERS activism yields small, but reliably positive, market reactions in the short term’ 
and the long-term returns are not guaranteed.150  
 
4.2.2.3  Insurance companies 
 
 In the UK and US, insurance companies have long been the important types of 
institutional investors in terms of their equity holdings and have been central to the 
development of capital markets. 151  Insurance is a contract based on money for a 
promise. The policy holder’s premium is consideration for the insurer’s agreement to 
pay a covered claim that may occur months, years or even decades in the future and 
where the amount of the claim is likely to be.152 The UK insurance industry mainly 
consists of life business and other long-term insurance contracts, with 93% of the total 
assets controlled by them, as opposed to other insurance contracts, such as household, 
casualty and health.153 In the US, according to the data provided by the Insurance 
Information Institute, the US insurance industry’s net premiums amounted to US$1.2 
trillion dollar in 2015, with life and health sector contributing 55%.154 Given the fact 
that life insurance accounts for a large percentage of the insurance industry, there is 
plenty of time before a sum needs to be paid out at either death or a specified time in 
the future. Therefore, in the life insurance business, contracts are mainly long-term in 
nature and, to some extent, similar to pension funds.155  
 
In 2013, ABI issued a report on corporate governance and shareholder engagement, 
with the aim of promoting good corporate governance and investee company’s long-
                                                          
150 Barber (n 136). 
151 Black and Coffee (n 4) 1997. 
152 Peter Kochenburger and Patrick Slave ‘An Introduction to Insurance Regulation’ in Julian M Burling 
and Kevin Lazarus (eds) Research Handbook on International Insurance Law and Regulation (Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2012) 221. 
153 ABI, UK Insurance: Key Facts (2010) 3 
<https://www.abi.org.uk/globalassets/sitecore/files/documents/publications/public/2015/statistics/key-
facts-2015.pdf > accessed 05 September 2017.  
154 Insurance Information Institute, ‘Facts and Statistics: Industry overview’ <http://www.iii.org/fact-
statistic/industry-overview> accessed 05 September 2016. 
155  Insurance Companies and Pension Funds as Institutional Investors: Global Investment Patterns, 
Trusted Sources Research and Networks, Report prepared for the City of London Corporation by Trusted 
Sources, November (2011) 7 <http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/business/support-promotion-and-
advice/promoting-the-city-internationally/china/Documents/ 
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term sustainable performance.156 This report covers several aspects157 and section five 
reviews current approaches to shareholder engagement. What follows is an analysis of 
the key findings of the report in terms of engagement: 
 
a. Attitude towards institutional shareholder activism: There is a long tradition 
for ABI members to regard engagement as an important responsibility that 
should be exercised on behalf of their clients. ABI members see ‘effective 
shareholder engagement as an integral part of the investment process and 
therefore as a means to generate outperformance over the long term’. 158 
Although some members acknowledge that their corporate governance 
practice may be compliance in nature, rather than part of the investment 
process at the beginning, the culture of responsible ownership is currently 
increasingly being integrated into the investment process and a virtuous circle 
of engagement is being created.159 
 
b. Private meeting with companies: There is no set formula for engagement. 
Given the diversity of approaches in evaluating and understanding companies, 
different shareholders will have different engagement approaches, and likely 
adopt different voice and exit strategies, depending on the circumstances. All 
members acknowledge that their approach may vary extensively from case to 
case when considering the specific circumstances of the company in question. 
They place great emphasis on the importance of confidentiality in order to 
ensure an appropriate relationship of trust and, in turn, enhanced dialogue.160 
Therefore, a private meeting is the first recourse of engagement. During the 
course of 2013, members of the ABI Investment Committee each held, on 
average, 150 meetings with UK listed companies.161 The meetings covered a 
wide range of issues, such as board composition, remuneration, strategy, 
accounting, audit and poor performance. If insufficient or no progress was 
                                                          
156 ABI, ‘Improving Corporate Governance and Shareholder Engagement’ (2013) 3 
<https://www.ivis.co.uk/media/5929/ABI-Report-Improving-Corporate-Governance-and-Shareholder-
Engagement.pdf> accessed 05 September 2016. 
157  Such as corporate governance overviews, non-executive directors, shareholder engagement, 
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made after the meetings with the company, collective engagement may be 
contemplated. Many members believed that most successful collective 
engagements would tend to involve three to four shareholders and include at 
least one or two of the largest ten shareholders. Sometimes, they may carry out 
collective engagement through the ABI executive.162 
 
c. Voting: ABI members consider it important ‘to demonstrate to the market that 
institutional investors undertake rigorous voting analysis and decision-making’ 
as the voting rate is usually regarded as a critical aspect of responsible 
ownership.163 The report shows that all members vote all their UK equity 
holdings. In order to identify potential issues in their investee companies and, 
hence, inform their in-house analysis, all members of ABIS have a policy of 
using proxy adviser research. However, the final voting decision is not solely 
dependent on their recommendations. Those members with a small 
shareholding sometimes vote in accordance with proxy adviser 
recommendations. In addition, as all ABI members are Stewardship Code 
signatories, they disclose their voting policies, their formal voting process and 
actual voting decisions.164 In terms of the proxy voting, only 20% of members 
assigned proxy voting responsibilities exclusively to portfolio managers165 and 
90% of members’ proxy voting decision-making processes include active 
participation from portfolio managers and investment analysts. Of members’ 
proxy voting decision-making processes 50% require formal approval from 
the Chief Investment Officer for negative voting decisions or for large equity 
positions.  
 
                                                          
162 ABI collective meetings are initiated by members who are seeking to resolve issues with shareholders 
or by investors who feel that their concerns have not been addressed. The executive normally arranges a 
pre-meeting to share concerns and decide on areas of focus for the meeting and any objectives. The 
meeting are chaired by a senior figure among the ABI members and individual members will raise their 
own specific concerns. The Director of Investment Affairs will then write a letter to the company 
following the meeting. This letter will typically outline commitments made by the company, highlight 
any areas of outstanding concern and convey whether a further meeting would be required.  
163 ABI, Best Practice Principles on Corporate Governance Research  
http://bppgrp.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/ABI-BPP-GRP-Consultation-Response-2013.pdf 
164 ABI (n 156) 23. 
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4.2.2.4  Hedge funds 
 
Hedge funds, as discussed in Chapter 2, are private pools of capital that engage in a 
variety of trading strategies with the aim of generating excess returns. Hedge funds 
operate on ‘an agenda of absolute returns’,166 which means they have to maximise 
upsides and minimise downsides by using various strategies, such as hedging, 
leveraging and short selling,167 in order to generate returns for their investment no 
matter the market condition. Their investment strategies are ‘designed to squeeze 
agency costs and other inefficiencies out of underperforming companies’.168 Hedge 
funds are known for their high fee structure (2/20), with 20% of the portfolio upside 
and 2% management fee.169  In order to justify these fees, hedge funds face great 
pressure from their clients to generate superior performance. Therefore, unlike the 
defensive institutional shareholders activism discussed above, hedge funds generally 
carry out different kinds of activities, that is, offensive activism170, which means their 
activism has frequently been exercised out to persuade companies to take certain 
actions that could result in the generation of cash for hedge funds.171 McCahery et al. 
showed that many hedge funds (48% of their sample) were very active in seeking 
communication with management.172  
 
According to empirical research, the hedge fund investment horizon is relatively short-
term.173 The relatively short-term horizon also feeds into hedge funds’ aggression and 
impatience in extracting the value of their investments and, hence, a similar style in 
                                                          
166 Chiu (n 101) 73. 
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their activism.174 Given the fact that hedge funds target companies and engage in their 
investee companies with a view to generating abnormal returns, the process of activist 
engagement is quite different from other institutional shareholders. Activism taken by 
hedge funds generally begins with an informal contact with their target companies for 
the purpose of generating dialogue with investor relations and executive officers. This 
initial contact is non-confrontational. 175  In order to put pressure on the targeted 
company, hedge funds may use various strategies; the most common one being to write 
letters to management that list deficiencies observed by hedge fund activists, and 
various changes and concessions sought to be made.176 The Conference Board reports 
that this first step is almost universally taken in all cases in the US where some public 
attention is given to the activism.177 In nearly a fifth of cases, concessions may be made 
by the targeted company without any public attention drawn to the activism.178 If this 
action does not get the expected results, the hedge fund may take the next action, 
namely to publicise the contents of the letter in order to draw attention to the activism. 
Such open letters are frequently published in major newspapers in the jurisdiction of 
the target company. 179  This public or semi-public communication generally exerts 
pressure on the board of the targeted company to meet with and try to resolve the activist 
demands, although such meetings need not necessarily result in concessions being made 
by the target. In the US failure to obtain concessions from the targeted company after 
publicising the activism may result in a threat to, or actual carrying out of, a proxy 
contest by the hedge fund activist. The indication of a hedge fund activists’ ‘intent to 
solicit’ proxies or actual commencement of the campaign of solicitation of proxies 
generally results in the targeted company’s climb-down from resistance against the 
hedge fund activist. Settlements could occur based on major concessions or minor 
concessions agreeable to the activist.180 However, such steps are rarely taken in the UK. 
On the whole, compared with other institutional shareholders, hedge funds are more 
                                                          
174  William W Bratton, ‘Hedge Funds and Governance Targets’ (2006) 95 Georgetown Law 
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<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1107027> access 12 September 2016. 
176 Chiu (n 101) 78. 
177 Tonello (n 175). 
178 Brav et al. (n 173).  
179 Chiu (n 101) 79. 
180 Ibid. 
175 
 
likely to use confrontational and aggressive tactics against the targeted companies in 
their escalation of activism if their initial efforts do not generate expected results. 
 
As pointed out by Armour and Cheffins, hedge fund activism remains largely a US 
phenomenon given the fact that most hedge funds are based in the US.181 However, 
Hermes, the fund manager owned by the British Telecoms Pension Scheme, operates a 
UK Focus Fund that pursues shareholder engagement. Its investment strategy is an 
appropriate case here to take a close look at the hedge fund activism. 
  
The Hermes approach can be discussed in two stages: (1) investment stage and 
(2) engagement stage. At the investment stage, Hermes usually focuses on those 
companies that have been underperforming for a certain period in the market due to 
structural or strategic governance problems but have the ability to fix these problems 
through shareholder engagement. It applies three criteria when evaluating which 
portfolio company to target, asking ‘(1) whether the target is underperforming; 
(2) whether the fund believes it can engage the company successfully; and (3) whether 
the fund expects to achieve at least a 20% increase in current share price. If all three 
criteria are satisfied, the fund will decide to include the company in its portfolio’.182 In 
terms of the engagement process, a meeting with the targeted companies is usually the 
first step taken, if it receives positive feedback from the board, Hermes will assist the 
board with implementing the consensus they have reached. If a negative response is 
received, Hermes will meet with independent board members and the major 
shareholders to persuade the board to make changes. If the board makes no changes, 
the fund will escalate its action into public action, such as calling a general meeting.183 
Once the changes have been made, Hermes will hold the shares and wait for the changes 
to be released to the market so that the market can re-evaluate the shares. Typically, it 
will take two to three years for an engagement process to be successfully completed. 
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Research undertaken by the London Business School focused on the ways in which 
Hermes caries out activism and its effectiveness on those targeted underperforming 
companies.184 From 1998 to 2004, Hermes had targeted 30 of its 41 investee companies 
by means of private meetings, telephone calls, letters between fund representatives and 
executive directors, investment relation officers and other board members. Hermes had 
been successful in using private communication to bring about governance change. 
More than half of its targeted companies, in some cases as many as 75%, had adopted 
its proposed changes.185 Moreover, once the companies had followed up on Hermes’s 
suggestions to make changes, the study found that their share price increased 
substantially; by as much as 6% immediately after the changes had been disclosed to 
the public.186  
 
4.2.2.5  Industry trade associations 
 
There is another important pillar of institutional shareholder activism, which is of in the 
UK style, namely industry trade associations. British institutional shareholders tend to 
act and voice through various institutional investor representative groups when dealing 
with corporate management. The main types of institutional shareholders all have their 
own industry association: the PLSA (the former NAPF), the ABI, the Investment 
Association187 (the former IMA), and the Association of Investment Companies188. The 
PLSA, the history of which is more than 90 years old, consists of more than 1,300 
pension schemes with 20 million members and ￡1 trillion in assets and over 400 
supporting businesses.189 The ABI was established in 1985 to represent the collective 
interests of the UK’s insurance companies. It has around 400 members, which between 
them account for about 94% of domestic insurance services sold in the UK.190 The IA 
is the representative body for the UK investment management industry. Its members 
collectively manage over ￡3 trillion of assets in the UK.191 The AIC was formed in 
1932 to represent the closed-ended investment company industry. It has some 300 
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members, which between them account for approximately 77% of the sector by 
assets.192 Apart from these individual trade organizations, an umbrella organization, the 
Institutional Shareholders Committee193, which collectively represents major financial 
institutions except commercial banks, was created in 1973 under the agreement of these 
trade associations. 194  Its role is to allow ‘the UK’s institutional shareholding 
community to exchange views and, on occasion, coordinate their activities in support 
of the interests of UK investors.’195  
 
These associations are, though in various degrees, active in encouraging institutional 
shareholders engaging in corporate governance. Firstly, these industry trade 
organizations play a traditional lobbying role with the government on behalf of their 
members.196 They not only lobby or liaise with governmental institutions197 on matters 
such as large transaction and management buy-outs, but are also represented in some 
of them.198 Moreover, they have the chance to contribute their opinions and advice to 
the UK corporate governance framework. For example, they have issued many 
responses to government-related bodies, such as the FRC, who collects comments on 
various aspects of corporate governance.199 Secondly, UK industry associations have 
produced several statements of, or guidance on, best practice in corporate governance 
issues, such as the ISC’s A Statement of Principle on the Responsibilities of 
Institutional Shareholders and Agents200, the ISC’s Code on the Responsibilities of 
Institutional Investors, NAPF’s 2009 Corporate Governance and Voting Guidelines 
Responsible Voting (a Joint ABI–NAPF Statement), and the ABI’s Report on 
Improving Corporate Governance and Shareholder Engagement. All the above 
guidance is voluntary in nature but those associations call on institutions to state 
publicly how they apply the principles. Thirdly, industry associations bridge the 
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connection between their institutional members and their investee companies in 
circumstances where concerns or problems may rise.201 For example, when corporate 
governance problems or strategic concerns rise in certain investee companies, a ‘case 
committee’ will be established. With the help of associations, members holding large 
numbers of shares form this ‘case committee’ to meet with the board and management 
with the aim of resolving these problems. It was the most important means of forming 
negotiations between institutional shareholders and corporate managers in the late 
1980s and 1990s. 202 As reported by Stapledon, the ABI formed about 200 case 
committees annually.203 However, thereafter they were less visible204 until 2003 when 
NAPF was reported as reviving its case committee. 
  
Furthermore, industry associations could provide some background research and advice 
to their members. Associations, such as the NAPF and ABI, help their members to 
monitor their investee companies through their voting information services. They make 
voting recommendations on behalf of their members if required to do so by monitoring 
listed companies’ compliance with relevant corporate governance guidance, such as the 
UK Corporate Governance Code. In addition, industry associations also conduct 
surveys to examine the extent to which members are complying with good practice and 
engage with investee companies to act as responsible investors. These surveys are 
important sources of evidence in the present thesis to investigate the level of 
shareholder engagement.205  
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institutions might not want to join a case committee as this would restrict their ability to sell. Finally, a 
committee of only insurance companies or pension funds cannot speak for all institutional investors, yet 
a pan-institutional committee would be even more unwieldy. 
205 See above surveys conducted by the NAPF, ABI and IMA. 
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Therefore, it is beyond argument that UK industry trade associations play a vital role in 
providing better corporate governance standards, and promoting good communication 
between institutional shareholders and their investee companies. The increase in 
institutional shareholder activism in recent years in the UK is, to some extent, driven 
by these associations. The ABI will be used as an example to see how the associations 
play a role in making their members more active. 
 
The ABI has a long history of taking its shareholder engagement responsibilities 
seriously, which could be traced back to 1991, when the ABI published a discussion 
paper on the responsibilities of institutional shareholders.206 The document outlined 
nine principles of good practice for institutional investors; one of which described the 
impotence of engagement. The first principle is that ‘[i]nstitutional investors should 
encourage regular, systematic contact at senior executive level for the purposes of an 
exchange of views and information on strategy, performance, board membership and 
quality of management.’207 Over time, the ABI’s role in facilitating dialogue between 
investors and companies has led to a strong understanding of different approaches to 
engagement.208 
 
As discussed above, UK industry associations have produced and promoted statements 
of, and guidance on, best practice in corporate governance in various areas and the ABI 
is no exception in this respect. As early as 1999 the ABI, together with NAPF, issued a 
statement regarding responsible voting. In 2008, the ‘Joint Statement on Executive 
Contracts and Severance by the ABI and NAPF’ was published for the purpose of 
‘assisting Boards and their Remuneration Committees with the design and application 
of contractual obligations for senior executives.’209 Following on from this, the ‘Board 
Effectiveness: Highlighting Best Practice: Encouraging Progress’ 210 , ‘Comply or 
                                                          
206 ABI, ‘The Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders’ (1991) 
<http://www.ivis.co.uk/PDF/3.3_The_Responsibilities_of_Institutional_Shareholders.pdf> accessed 12 
September 2016. 
207 ABI (n 156) 17. 
208 Ibid.. 
209 ABI and NAPF, Joint Statement on Executive Contracts and Severance by the Association of British 
Insurer (ABI) and the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) (2009) 2 
https://www.ivis.co.uk/media/5896/ABI_NAPF_Joint_Statement_14feb2008_2_v_5.pdf accessed 
12 September 2016. 
210  ABI, “Report on Board Effectiveness’ (2011) <https://www.ivis.co.uk/media/5917/ABI-Board-
Effectiveness-Report-2011-Final.pdf> accessed 13 September 2016. 
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Explain: Investor expectations and current practices’, ‘Board Effectiveness: Updating 
Progress, Promoting Best Practice’ 211 , ‘Improving Corporate Governance and 
Shareholder Engagement’212 were published regularly. 
 
Apart from these reports and guidelines, the ABI is focusing on facilitating proactive 
engagement by its members. ABI members are increasingly developing more proactive 
mechanisms for identifying engagement targets that ‘focused on specific thematic 
topics and identifying companies that are considered to be underperforming and/or 
which are considered to have poor management and/or governance’.213 This proactive, 
but non-confrontational, approach has been developed into a service called the 
Institutional Voting Information Service214, which is now one of the UK’s leading 
providers of corporate governance research. 
 
In addition, the ABI plays an important role in facilitating dialogue between 
investors and companies. The collective engagement through the ABI is a good 
example. The ABI collective meetings are usually initiated by members whose 
concerns have not been properly solved in their first attempt. In the beginning a pre-
meeting will be arranged by the ABI executive with the aim of deciding areas of focus 
for the meeting. Then, specific company matters will be discussed formally at the 
Investment Committee of the ABI which is chaired by a senior figure among the ABI 
members. Such meetings are usually constructive and collaborative in nature, with the 
intention of increasing understanding on both sides. Followed by that, the Director of 
Investment Affairs will write a letter to the company following the meeting, which 
outlines commitments made by the company, highlight any areas of outstanding 
concern and conveys whether a further meeting would be required. Given the 
constructive nature of such meetings, the ABI develops a sustainable relationship with 
a wide range of companies, and companies increasingly contact the ABI executive with 
a view to facilitating collective engagement with members. 
 
                                                          
211  ABI, ‘Comply or Explain: Investor Expectations and Current Practices’ (2012) 
<https://www.ivis.co.uk/media/5923/ABI-Report-on-Comply-or-Explain-Investor-Expectations-Dec-
2012.pdf> accessed 13 September 2016. 
212 ABI (note 207). 
213 Ibid. 21. 
214 Hereinafter ‘IVIS’. 
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4.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter took a closer look at institutional shareholder activism in the UK and US 
from a practical perspective. At the start of this chapter, five factors that could influence 
the degree of institutional shareholder activism were discussed: (1) shareholding 
(portfolio structure); (2) cost; (3) conflict of interest; (4) liability structure and (5) 
investment strategy. After examining the engagement activities taken by different 
institutional shareholders, it became evident that these factors do influence the 
preference and degree of institutional shareholder activism. Some institutions require 
liquidity more than others, such as mutual funds. They tend to hold large portfolios, 
which lead to their passivity in activism compared with pension funds and insurance 
companies, whose long-term obligation and predictable redemptions or outflows allow 
them to have the patience to go through many business cycles, and across many periods 
of boom and slump. With the help of proxy adviser firms and industry associations, the 
cost of engagement and forming coalitions is greatly decreased and the willingness to 
engage is much higher. As for conflicts of interest, although the analysis does not show 
much about this factor due to the secrecy of business relationships, research shows that 
their interviewees would keep a relatively low profile on corporate governance issues 
if there were actual or potential business relationships. However, as it is difficult to 
measure and there is not enough data and evidence to show how it influences the 
behaviour of institutional shareholders, this factor was not included in the analysis in 
figure 4.1 .The nature of the products institutional investors offer to the public also have 
an influence on their activism. As discussed above, pension funds and insurance 
companies are more likely to be long-term investors given their long-term obligation 
and predictable redemptions or outflows allowed, whereas mutual funds have to be at 
the ready to redeem on a much shorter basis. Long-term obligations are associated with 
more willingness to engage. First, longer-term investment offers a good opportunity for 
institutions to develop long-term relationships with investee companies to increase 
those institutions’ influence over the company and to secure more accountability from 
the board. 215  Moreover, a close relationship between institutional investors and 
corporate management is found to be helpful to reduce the possibility of managerial 
                                                          
215 Arnold W Sametz and James L Bicksler (eds), The Battle for Corporate Control: Shareholder Rights, 
Stakeholder Interests and Managerial Responsibilities (McGraw-Hill Inc 1990) 67–76. 
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short-termism by facilitating boards to adopt a longer-term investment strategy in their 
companies.216 Finally, in terms of the investment strategies, different strategies do 
produce different ways of acting, which leads to different degrees of engagement. No 
one type of institution only focuses on one type of investment strategy. Many mutual 
funds and pension funds use a passive index strategy217 and hedge funds are usually 
associated with ‘active fundamental’ strategy 218 . Therefore, Figure 4.1 could be 
expanded into Figure 4.2: 
 
 
                                                          
216 Research on managerial incentives frequently found that managers tended to focus on the short term 
and ignore the long-term impact of their investment. For example, see J Robert, The Modern Firm: 
Organizational Design for Performance and Growth (Oxford University Press, 2004) 271. 
217 Çelik and Isaksson (note 6) 1. 
218 Ibid. 1. 
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Figure 4.2: Factors that influence institutional shareholder activism 
 
Four forms of institutional shareholder activism were discussed in this chapter. Private 
meetings with management and boards of directors are considered as the first option by 
many institutions when concerns arise over corporate issues. When private meetings 
fail, other forms of activism are followed. Among multiple channels for institutional 
shareholders to engage, the behind-the scene private meeting and proxy voting are the 
most frequent weapons used by majority institutional shareholders. According to Talner, 
shareholder activism in the 1930s was usually triggered by specific events, and was 
thus ad hoc, event-led and ex post in nature.219 From the discussion above one can see 
that although some activism exercised by institutional shareholders may still be event-
led, ‘relational investing’220 has become a significant development and more persistent 
engagement with companies could be seen on a more frequent basis.221 Moreover, 
activism could be divided into ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ according to its motive. As 
seen in the Hermes case, the engagement approaches deployed by offensive activism 
are basically the same as that adopted in defensive activism. 222  In addition, the 
emergence of proxy advisory firms has led to an increase in the number of shareholders 
willing to take an active role in the governance of their investee companies. In addition, 
industry trade associations in the UK play an important role in encouraging institutional 
shareholder activism. They encourage their members to engage in governance of their 
investee companies in various ways. 
 
                                                          
219 Lauren Talner, ‘Investor Responsibility’ The Origins of Shareholder Activism (1983), now out of print, 
quoted in R Franklin Balotti, Jesse A Finkelstein, and Gregory P Williams. Meetings of Stockholders 
(Aspen Publishers, 1996) at para 5.4. 
220 Relational investing is frequently characterised by significant stakes held over a long period, with the 
shareholder committed to exerting internal discipline on managers; see Ian Ayres and Peter Cramton. 
‘Relational Investing and Agency Theory’ (1993) Cardozo Law Review; Chiu (note 101).  
221 Such engagement may be carried out in order to safeguard investment value when issues arise that 
may threaten investment value. Some engagement may even be carried out with a view to influencing 
management on an ex ante basis. The latter may include regular and not merely ad hoc participation in 
general meetings, but also includes informal types of engagement outside the general meeting.  
222 For a detailed discussion and cases of hedge funds activism, see Jonathan R Macey, Corporate 
Governance: Promises Kept, Promises Broken (Princeton University Press, 2008). 
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In conclusion, the findings of this chapter are captured in Figure 4.3. The grey circle 
represents the internal environment in which institutional shareholder activism operates. 
The horizontal axis represents the factors mentioned in Figure 4.2 from X to Y. The 
vertical axis represents the level of activism. One could conclude from Figure 4.2 that 
there is a strong correlation between high activism levels and factors in the extent of 
XY. Therefore, this relationship is simplified on this axis. Analysis shows that some 
external factors, such as the friendly legal environment for institutional shareholders, 
the effects of proxy advisory firms and industry associations, all promote institutional 
shareholders to better engage in their investee companies. Therefore, these outsider 
factors (orange arrow) lift the overall level of activism (from black line 1 to square dot 
line 2). The circle on the left of the axis illustrates that the different routes of activity 
taken by institutional shareholders depend on different levels of activism. Those traders 
who have no interest in shareholder activism usually pick stocks and use technical 
assessments to judge the movements of the stock prices to find a perfect time to sell 
their shareholdings only for the profits of the price gap. However, those institutional 
shareholders who actively engage in their investee companies, used to hold a private 
meeting with the boards or managements as their first option. If this fails, other activism 
forms were followed. Rather than only focusing on the profit, these institutional 
shareholders are more concerned about the performance and governance of certain 
companies. 
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Figure 4.3: Relationship between factors in Figure 4.1 and activism level and 
different routines taken by institutional shareholders at different activism 
levels 
 
The following Chapter 5 also takes an empirical perspective to investigate the level of 
institutional shareholder engagement in Chinese listed Companies. 
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Chapter 5: Institutional Shareholder Activism in China 
 
In Chapter 4 institutional shareholder activism was analysed from a practical 
perspective in the UK and US. In this chapter the same pattern is followed when looking 
at how institutional shareholder activism is exercised in China.  
 
5.1  Factors that influence institutional shareholder activism 
 
In Chapter 4 five factors were presented that influenced the degree of institutional 
shareholder activism in the UK and US: (1) shareholding (portfolio structure); (2) cost; 
(3) conflict of interest; (4) liability structure and (5) investment strategy. Chapter 5 will 
also start with a review of the literature on factors that influence the way that 
institutional shareholders engage in the corporate governance of their investee 
companies in China.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, according to the latest data, the tradable shares held by 
institutional shareholders have been increasing since 2001, with insurance companies 
(0% to 3.87%), pension funds (1.07% to 1.31%) and QFIIs (0.64% to 1.38%). The rise 
in these figures may be related to two factors: on the one hand, the government’s policy 
which is friendly to the development of investment funds and, on the other hand, the 
gradual transfer of non-tradable shares to tradable shares during this period. Given the 
relatively short history of development compared with China’s UK and US counterparts 
and limited information and data, the academic literature shows an astonishing 
indifference to the institutional shareholder activism phenomenon. There are only a few 
papers that look into the factors that influence the engagement activities undertaken by 
institutional shareholders.  
 
The first is the research report published by the research centre of the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange which focuses on the development of institutional shareholders.1 In this 
report, the author pointed out the three factors that prevented institutional shareholders 
                                                          
1 Jibao He and Xia Wang, ‘Investigation the Development Strategies of Institutional Investors’ [机构投
资者发展战略研究] (Shenzhen Stock Exchange Research Centre, 2006) 
<http://www.szse.cn/UpFiles/Attach/1088/2006/08/01/1703111178.pdf> accessed 05 October 2016. 
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from engaging actively in corporate governance. The first is that the existing legal 
system is inflexible and out-dated compared with the burgeoning institutional 
shareholders. The second factor is the imbalance in the development between different 
types of institutional shareholders. The weak position of some institutions hindered 
their willingness to engage. The third factor is lack of expertise within institutions and 
lack of experience in engaging. 
 
Feng and Li pointed out two factors that contributed to institutional shareholder 
passivity: 2  (1) investment restrictions faced by institutional shareholders greatly 
restricted their power and (2) the ownership structure and the presence of blockholders 
made institutional shareholders too weak to counterbalance them.  
 
Gong pointed out that the cost and limited benefits may discourage institutional 
shareholders from engaging actively.3 On the one hand, the cost of activism, such as 
bringing legal action, is huge.4 Even if the suit is successful, the recoveries accrue to 
the company as a whole and institutional shareholders who proposed this litigation 
would only receive a pro rata benefit. On the other hand, the notion of institutional 
shareholder activism is relatively new to Chinese investors and beneficiaries might 
ignore institutional shareholders’ efforts in engaging their investee companies. 
Therefore, Chinese institutional shareholders are likely to receive lower reputational 
gains than their UK and US counterparts. The burden of disclosure rule further 
exacerbates the passivity by creating legal impediments to shareholder collaboration 
action. According to the Chinese legal requirement, investors should disclose their 
shareholdings if certain thresholds have been met. Section 86 of the Securities Law 
2005 prescribes that investors who hold more than 5% of a listed company’ stock must 
notify the company and submit a report to the CSRC and the stock exchanges within 
                                                          
2 Guo Feng and Anan Li, ‘Investor Revolution, Shareholder Activism and the Structural Reform of 
Company Law’ [投资者革命, 股东积极主义与公司法的结构性变革] (2012) Science of Law 112. 
3 Bo Gong, Understanding Institutional Shareholder Activism: A Comparative Study of the UK and 
China (Routledge, 2013) 185. 
4 The cost consists of at least two parts: (1) the court’s fees and (2) the attorneys’ fees. The court’s fees 
includes the filing fees (anjian shouli fei) paid to the court before the suit and other expenses incurred 
during the hearing of the case, such as fees for investigation and for preservation of assets. In addition, 
shareholders had to pay attorneys’ fees. According to s 19 of the Supreme People Court’s (hereinafter 
‘SPC’) ‘Measures on the People’s Courts’ Acceptance of Litigation Fees 1989’, the losing party should 
bear the cost of the filing fees and other litigation fees allocated by the court, excluding attorneys’ fees. 
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three days from the date on which such shareholding occurred.5 Moreover, each 5% 
increase or decrease in the shareholding of this listed company’ stock must be reported. 
During the reporting period, and for two days after the report and announcement have 
been made, the investor may not continue to purchase or sell shares of the listed 
company.6 The information that the investors need to complete the report includes facts 
about their identity, the number of shares held,7 their trading activities within the six 
months prior to the disclosure (including the number of shares he or she traded monthly 
and the price range of the trading),8 the intention to increase or decrease shareholding, 
and their plans for the following 12 months.9 Moreover, there are cultural factors that 
influence the behaviour of Chinese institutional shareholders. The traditional Confucian 
culture does not encourage people to resolve a dispute publicly and, therefore, puts 
pressure on institutional shareholders who could like to take action. 
 
In addition to the works cited above, three PhD theses contain research on institutional 
shareholder activism in China. Only one analysed the factors that influence institutional 
shareholder activism. Besides the factors pointed out above, the aforementioned thesis 
shows that Chinese institutional shareholders focus on speculation and short-term 
benefits. The prevalence of this kind of trading makes shareholder activism a useless 
weapon for them. Besides, the shareholding of institutional shareholders in certain 
companies determines their attitude towards activism.10 
 
The conclusion reached from the above analysis is that institutional shareholder 
activism is influenced by factors such as the shareholding, cost, investment strategy, 
development stage of institutions, and some external factors that exert an influence on 
shareholder activism, such as legal barriers and culture. These factors are listed in table 
format (Figure 5.1) as in Chapter 4. 
                                                          
5 Securities Law 2005 s 86. 
6 Securities Law 2005 s 86(1.) 
7 Securities Law 2005 s 87. 
8 CSRC, ‘Guideline on Contents and Format for Information Disclosure of Companies with Publicly 
Issued Securities No. 15: Report on Shareholding Changes of Shareholders in Listed Companies’, s 36. 
9 Ibid. s 20. 
10 Peitao Gao, ‘Research on Institutional Investors’ Intervention in Corporate Governance of Listed 
Companies in China [机构投资者参与我国上市公司治理的理论与实践研究] PhD thesis submitted 
to Shandong University 
<http://gb.oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?filename=2010102638.nh&dbcode=CDFD&dbna
me=CDFD2010> accessed 07 October 2016. 
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Figure 5.1: Internal factors that influence institutional shareholder activism 
 
5.2  Unveiling institutional shareholder activism in China 
 
As already indicated, Chinese institutional shareholdings have been experiencing rapid 
development during recent years. However, this growth does not necessarily mean that 
institutional shareholders will take more responsibilities in corporate governance. As 
was seen in Chapter 4, academic scholars and institutional industry associations have 
conducted much research and written many articles to lift the veil of institutional 
shareholder activism in their investee companies in the UK and US. In China, however, 
empirical evidence aimed at investigating institutional shareholders in corporate 
governance is much less compared with the UK and US, despite the fact that 
institutional investment has gained increased popularity in the past years. Seven 
empirical studies related to institutional shareholder activism have been listed below 
which could help one gain a better understanding of Chinese institutional shareholder 
activism: 
 
a. Yang’s work on shareholders’ voting rights and shareholder meetings.11 
                                                          
11 Jinzhu Yang, ‘Shareholder Meetings and Voting Rights in China: Some Empirical Evidence’ (2007) 
18 International Company and Commercial Law Review 4. 
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b. Peng’s study on the exercise of shareholders’ voting rights at annual general 
meetings in 2005.12  
c. A special chapter of the ISS’ survey on corporate governance, which focuses 
on the view of ten Chinese institutional investors on Chinese corporate 
governance in 2006.13 
d. Yuan et al.’s study on the role of financial institutions in the corporate 
governance of Chinese listed companies in 2006.14 
e. Clarke’s study on derivative actions in Chinese companies in 2011.15 
f. Gong’s empirical research on institutional shareholder activism in China in 
2013.16 
g. Cai and Yu’s research on the promotion of institutional shareholder activism 
in Chinese listed companies in 2015.17 
 
These research works contributed much to the present investigation into the activism of 
Chinese institutional shareholders. However, none of this research provides a full and 
comprehensive overview of Chinese institutional shareholder participation. Some of 
these studies focus on only one or several perspectives of institutional shareholder 
activism, such as on shareholders voting or derivative actions. Several research works 
on theoretical aspects without the support of empirical findings. Therefore, it was 
necessary to collect case studies (see section 6.3.1 of this thesis) for these years 
regarding institutional shareholder activism to find evidence to make the study feasible. 
                                                          
12 Wan Peng, ‘Call for More Exercising of Voting Rights by Investors’ [专家呼吁投资者行使投票权] 
(Sina Finance, 3 March 2005) <http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/t/20050303/11031399998.shtml>  
13 Institutional Shareholder Services, ‘2006 Global Institutional Investor Study: Corporate Governance; 
From Compliance Obligation to Business Imperative’ 
<http://maga.econ.msu.ru/Work/%D0%A1%D0%A8%D0%90%20-%20Presentations/ 
2006_ISS_Global_Institutional_Investor_Study_FINAL.PDF> accessed 07 October 2016. 
14 Rongli Yuan, Jason Zezhong Xiao, Nikolaos Milonas and Joe Hong Zou, ‘The Role of Financial 
Institutions in the Corporate Governance of Listed Chinese Companies’ (2009) 20 British Journal of 
Management 562. 
15 Donald C Clarke and Nicholas C Howson, ‘Pathway to Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative 
Actions in the People’s Republic of China’ in Dan W Puchniak, Harald Baum, and Michael Ewing-
Chow (eds), International Corporate Law and Financial Market Regulation (Cambridge University 
Press 2012) 
<http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1066&context=book_chapters> accessed 
07 May 2017. 
16 Gong (n 3) 122. 
17 Yi Cai and Zhongbo Yu, ‘Several Legal Opinions About Promoting Institutional Shareholders’ 
Engagement’ [关于推进机构投资者参与上市公司治理的若干法制建议] (2015) 1 Financial Law 
Forum < http://www.cqvip.com/qk/71483x/2015001/74827089504849534849484855.html> accessed 
07 October 2016. 
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This part of the chapter reveals what institutional shareholder activism is really like in 
China. First, types of institutional shareholder activism will be discussed, followed by 
how different institutional shareholders utilise these forms of activism. Finally, a 
conclusion is drawn. 
 
5.2.1  Typology of institutional shareholder activism 
 
What follows are case studies of institutional shareholder activism until 2014. These 
cases were selected from two main sources: first, was the previous research on 
institutional shareholders. 18 These articles mainly focused on different aspects of 
institutional shareholder activism and may include some cases on that perspective. 
Articles from 2000 to 2016 yielded some relevant cases. Second, cases were traced in 
the Annual reports of the companies and news published on the Internet and in 
newspapers. However, owing to  insufficient data, the latest case that was found was 
for 2014.  
 
Year Case Institutional shareholder Type of activism Result 
1994 Regrouping the board 
of directors of China 
Vanke Co. Ltd 
Guotai Junan Securities 
firm 
Press conference F 
2000 Regrouping the 
board of directors of 
Hubei Xingfu Ltd 
Mingliu Investment 
company 
Call for shareholder 
meeting and 
shareholder 
proposal 
S 
2002 Voting against the 
issuance of H shares 
of ZTE Corporation 
Dacheng Fund 
Management Co. Ltd 
Proxy voting (joint 
effort with other 
institutional 
shareholders) 
S 
2003 Voting against the 
issuance of 
securities in China 
Merchant Bank 
China Asset Management 
Co. Ltd, NSSF, Shiji 
securities firm 
Private meeting and 
proxy voting (joint 
effect with other 
institutional 
shareholders) 
S 
2004 Amending articles of 
the China Vanke Co. 
Ltd 
China Asset Management 
Co. Ltd, Bosera Asset 
Management Co. Ltd, 
Call for shareholder 
meeting and 
shareholder 
proposal 
F 
                                                          
18 See empirical research above. 
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Year Case Institutional shareholder Type of activism Result 
China Southern Asset 
Management Co. Ltd 
(institutional 
shareholders) 
2004 Voting against the 
issueance of new 
shares in Chongqing 
Baihuo 
Huabao Xingye Asset 
Management Co. Ltd 
Proxy voting (joint 
effort with other 
institutional 
shareholders) 
S 
2007 Suing Yinchuan 
Guangxia Ltd for 
misrepresentation 
Dacheng Fund 
Management Co. Ltd 
Bring legal action S 
2008 Voting against the 
proposal to 
refinance Pingan 
China 
Dacheng Fund 
Management Co. Ltd, Lion 
Fund Management Co. Ltd 
Proxy voting F 
2008 Voting against a 
merger between 
Eastern Airline and 
Singapore Airlines 
Rongtong Asset 
Management Co. Ltd 
Proxy voting S 
2008 Advising ways to 
effect better 
corporate 
governance of 
Saima Ltd and 
proposal to elect 
new directors 
Shanghai Baoyin 
Investment and 
Consultation Company 
Private meeting and 
shareholder 
proposal 
F 
2010 Rejecting the 
proposal of 
Shuanghui Company 
Havest Asset 
Management Co. Ltd, 
Bosera Asset 
Management Co. Ltd 
Proxy voting S 
2011 Suing Xiaxin 
Electrical for 
misrepresentation 
Shenzhen Hongshan 
Investment Company 
Bring legal action S 
2011 Promoting the 
enactment of 
certain promises 
Aegon Industrial Fund 
Management Co. Ltd, 
Orient Securities Co. Ltd 
(investment service 
company) 
Press conference 
(joint effort with 
other institutional 
shareholders) 
S 
2011 Proposing to 
incentivise the 
management of 
Dashang Ltd 
Shenzhen Heying Asset 
Management Co. Ltd, 
Penghua Asset 
Management Co. Ltd 
Shareholder 
proposal (joint 
effort with other 
institutional 
shareholders) 
Part 
succeed
, part 
failed 
2012 Proposing the 
removal of a 
Dacheng Fund 
Management Co. Ltd 
Shareholder 
proposal  
F 
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Year Case Institutional shareholder Type of activism Result 
director of the 
Chongqing Beer 
company 
2012 Voting against the 
proposal for 
appointing new 
directors and 
proposing new 
directors in Gree 
Electrical Appliance 
Inc. of Zhuhai  
Penghua Asset 
Management Co., Yale 
Endowment Fund 
Proxy voting and 
shareholder 
proposal (joint 
effort with other 
institutional 
shareholders) 
S 
 
2012 Proposal corporate 
operational 
strategies for 
Beiyinmei Ltd 
JVR International Shareholder 
proposal 
N 
2012 Voting against the 
proposal to remove 
managers in 
Zhejiang Huahai 
Pharmaceutical Co. 
Ltd  
Fullgoal Fund 
Management Co. Ltd, Lion 
Fund Management Co. Ltd 
Proxy voting S 
2013 Proposing 
amendments to 
articles of 
association and 
electing a board of 
directors in 
Shanghai Jahwa Co. 
Ltd 
Fullgoal Fund 
Management Co. Ltd, 
Huitianfu Fund 
Management Co. Ltd, 
Huashang Fund 
Management Co. Ltd 
Shareholder 
proposal (joint 
effort with other 
institutional 
shareholders) 
S 
2013 Voting against a 
merger proposal of 
Dashang Ltd 
Fuguo Fund Management 
Co. Ltd 
Proxy voting S 
2013 Proposing new 
directors for China 
Merchant Bank 
Anbang Insurance Group Shareholder 
proposal 
F 
2014 Voting against the 
proposal in 
Chongqing Taiji 
Industry Co. Ltd 
Baoying Fund 
Management Co. Ltd 
Proxy voting S 
2014 Proposing new 
directors for 
Minsheng Bank 
Anbang Insurance Group Shareholder 
proposal 
S 
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Year Case Institutional shareholder Type of activism Result 
2014 Proposing company 
operational 
strategies 
Zexi Investment Fund 
Company 
Shareholder 
proposal 
S 
2014 Proposing company 
operational 
strategies 
Zexi Investment Fund 
Company 
Shareholder 
proposal 
N 
2014 Proposing the 
restructure of the 
board of directors in 
Gongda Shouchuang 
Zexi Investment Fund 
Company 
Shareholder 
proposal 
N 
 
      F = Failure;        N = Not known;        S = Success   
 
Figure 5.2: Cases of institutional shareholder activism, 1994-2014 
 
After analysing the above cases, three pie charts can be produced to show the 
percentage of different types of activism, the types of institutional shareholders, the 
results and a line chart about the number of cases each year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Types of institutional shareholders engaged in activism in Figure 5.2 cases 
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Figure 5.4: Results of institutional shareholder activism in Figure 5.2 cases 
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Figure 5.5: Types of activism by institutional shareholders in Figure 5.2 cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Number of institutional shareholder activism cases each year, 1994–2014 
 
5.2.1.1 Private meeting 
 
As described in Chapter 4, the first form of activism a shareholder may consider is to 
seek private communication with the board or executives of portfolio companies. When 
an issue arises, an institution usually begins its engagement process with a private 
discussion or negotiation with this company. If the company responds actively, they 
could reach agreement on this specific issue and perhaps no further action will be 
needed. If the response is negative, the institutional shareholder will determine what to 
do next, either making a proposal or voting against certain issues at the shareholders’ 
meetings. Private meetings, whether in China or in UK and US, are often used as the 
first resort for shareholder activism.  
 
Yuan, Milonas and Xiao’s research found that there was a strong preference for private 
negotiation over other types of activism among Chinese institutional shareholders. It is 
often the first option considered by them.19 Among 20 financial institutions and ten 
directors from listed companies, most institutions would communicate with the 
management of portfolio companies about their dissatisfaction and ways to solve it. 
                                                          
19 Yuan et al. (n 14) 571. 
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They express their desire emphatically in some cases. In the event of voting against a 
board proposal, they inform the company in question in advance and offer an 
explanation for their behaviour. 
 
Institutional Shareholder Services’ global survey on corporate governance shows that 
some institutions regard private meetings as an investment necessity that could enable 
them to obtain some information that is not publicly disclosed.20 The majority (12) of 
the institutions in Yuan et al.’s study also demonstrate that a private meeting could be 
relied on for the purpose of obtaining information about the company and the quality 
of the management team.21 Therefore, a significant push factor for Chinese institutional 
shareholders to arrange private meeting with their investee companies actively is the 
information collected through this negotiation process. 
 
As for the concerns about private meetings, according to Gong, it usually depends on 
the different aims of the meetings and the topics often focused on corporate financial 
performance, corporate strategy, and corporate growth opportunities.22 The persons 
they get in touch with are often the secretary of the board, company chairperson, general 
managers or managers from functional departments. 23  In her research, Gong also 
collected a self-assessment report24 of the targeted listed companies, in which they were 
required to disclose the ways in which they communicated with their shareholders. The 
respondents contacted investors in the following forms: ‘(1) phone call, emails; (2) 
investors’ visiting; (3) corporate annual results investors’ and analysts’ briefing, press 
conference, and institutional investor meetings organized by companies; (4) conference 
or forum organized by institutional investors; and (5) road shows’.25Among these forms 
of contact investors’ visiting, telephone calls and emails were the most commonly used 
methods for investors to get in touch with companies.26 As for the frequency of the 
                                                          
20 Institutional Shareholder Service, ‘2006 Global Institutional Investor Study: Corporate Governance; 
From Compliance Obligation to Business Imperative’(n 13) 61. 
21 Yuan et al. (n 14) 573. 
22 Gong (n 3) 143. 
23 Ibid.  
24 Chinese listed companies are required to conduct self-examinations on their corporate governance 
system by answering a list of questions provided by the CSRC. However, the self-examination report is 
not taken seriously by the listed companies and by looking at some reports, it could be said that almost 
all the reports use a one-size-fits-all model which could be downloaded online. Therefore, the usefulness 
and quality of the information have been reduced. 
25 Gong (n 3) 144. 
26 Ibid. 
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meetings, most companies in the sample reported that they met with fund managers and 
financial analysts each year. However, none of the targeted companies provided 
information with regard to the frequency of their contact with investors. 
 
In the present empirical research into cases of intuitional shareholder activism, 2 out of 
26 used private meetings as a way of communicating with their investee companies. 
The first institutional shareholder did so in 2003, when the board of directors of China 
Merchant Bank proposed a scheme aimed at the issuance of new shares; the institutional 
shareholders were strongly opposed to this. Therefore, a private meeting was held 
between China Asset Management Ltd and China Merchant Bank. Owing to the 
breakdown of the meeting, China Asset Management Ltd put forward a shareholder 
proposal on how the issuance scheme should work. The second case occurred in 2008 
involving the rapidly developing Ningxia Saima Industry Co. Shanghai Baoyin 
Investment and Consulting Company had a positive attitude towards the future of this 
company, therefore, it communicated with the Ningxia Saima Industry Co. and 
proposed better ways to operate the company. However, there was no response from 
the company. Therefore, Shanghai Baoyin Investment and Consulting Company put 
forward a shareholder proposal to express its opinion. 
 
What is interesting here is that both of the cases started out with a private meeting 
between both parties, and the failure of the meeting led to further actions; in this case, 
shareholder proposals put forward by institutional shareholders. Yuan et al.’s research 
revealed that there was an overwhelming preference for private negotiation over other 
forms of activism as the first action among Chinese institutional shareholders. 27 
However, the data in the present study show that private meetings only accounted for 
7% of the total cases. The assumption is that the results are not conflicting, given the 
fact that private meetings are always held behind closed doors. These two cases are 
public because further actions were taken. Shareholder proposals is a matter on which 
the media would like to report. There is no way of knowing which private meeting cases 
end in a satisfactory result for both parties.  
 
                                                          
27 Yuan et al. (n 14) 574. 
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In conclusion, as the above research showed, Chinese institutions regard private 
meetings as a first option when concerns arise and it is an important means to improve 
shareholders–board communication. 
 
5.2.1.2  Voting 
 
According to the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, a notice of a general 
meeting should be given to shareholders 20 days in advance of an annual general 
meeting, and 15 days in advance of an extraordinary general meeting28. A shareholder 
can be either present at the meeting or appoint a proxy voting on his or her behalf.29 
The default voting system is one share, one vote. A general resolution must be passed 
with the approval of more than half of those with voting rights.30 A special resolution 
with fundamental changes, such as modification of the articles of association, mergers 
and dissolutions, needs to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the voting rights.31 
 
In particular, a cumulative voting mechanism is allowed in Chinese listed companies 
for shareholders to elect directors or supervisors.32 According to article 106 of CL 2005, 
the term ‘cumulative voting system’ refers to ‘when a general meeting elects a director 
or supervisor, the number of voting rights attached to each share is the same as the 
number of directors or supervisors to be elected, and that the voting rights held by a 
shareholder may be exercised collectively’. 33  Under the circumstances where 
cumulative voting is applied, votes held by each shareholder could be multiplied by the 
number of directors and supervisors to be elected. Shareholders can cast all their votes 
for a single nominee for the board of directors when the company has multiple 
candidates on its board.34 For example, under straight voting, if shareholder A has 
30 voting shares and there are three nominee directors, shareholder A has a maximum 
of 30 shares for any one nominee. In cumulative voting and other unchanged conditions 
shareholder A has three times 30, namely 90 votes in total. He or she can choose to vote 
                                                          
28 Hereinafter ‘EGM’. 
29 CL 2005 s 103. 
30 CL 2005 s 104. 
31 CL 2005 s 104. 
32 CL 2005 s 106. 
33 CL 2005 s 106. 
34 CL 2005 s 106. 
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all 90 to one nominee, or 30 for each one, or any percentage he or she would like to 
divide the 90 votes into.  
 
In addition, electronic voting is allowed in the Chinese context. Although it is not 
stipulated explicitly in the company law, the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed 
Companies35  admits that it ‘make[s] every effort, including fully utilizing modern 
information technology means, to increase the number of shareholders attending the 
shareholders’ meeting.’36 
 
As for empirical findings on shareholder voting rates, Gong’s study finds that the voting 
level at shareholders’ meetings was around 60.49%,37 which is higher than found in the 
prior work concluded by Yang (56.79%).38 There are a number of likely contributory 
reasons for this difference. First, Yang’s research was carried out in 2007, which 
electronic voting system was not introduced into Chinese shareholders’ meetings. The 
use of electronic voting could be regarded as a booster to the increased level of voting 
as it provided shareholders with a cheap and convenient way to cast their shares, and 
thus promoted a higher level of shareholder participation in voting. Second, the 
companies selected in the Gong’s sample are companies evaluated as having good 
corporate governance practice or large institutional holdings, suggesting that they may 
have a greater chance to encourage more shareholder participation. The last reason 
might be the government’s efforts to promote good corporate governance practice and, 
therefore, raise the level of shareholder engagement. However, subject to insufficient 
data, one cannot get a clear picture about the exact voting level cast by institutional 
shareholders. 
 
Among the cases selected for the present study, in 10 out of 25 cases institutional 
shareholders used their voting rights actively to exert influence on their investee 
companies. Most of the cases were the joint efforts of several institutional shareholders. 
Of the ten cases, the success rate was 90% with only one failure. The only failed case 
was for a ‘vote against the proposal of refinancing Pingan China’ which occurred in 
                                                          
35 Hereinafter ‘Chinese Code’. 
36 CSRC, Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China, s 1(2) 
<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/code_en.pdf> accessed 10 May 2017. 
37 Gong (n 3) 155. 
38 Yang et al. (n 14) 575. 
201 
 
2008. A shareholder proposal about refinance was strongly opposed by individual and 
institutional shareholders. An online survey about the attitude towards this shareholder 
proposal showed that only 10% of the respondents had a supportive attitude.39 However, 
this shareholder proposal was passed with 92.8%. The main reason behind this dramatic 
result is the large portion of non-tradable shares held by the state. Therefore, it is 
obvious that in most of the circumstances where institutional shareholders joined efforts 
with other shareholders to use voting to exert some influence on their investee 
companies, they were quite confident that their shares in total could play a decisive role 
without the interference of the majority shareholders. This could explain the high 
success rate in this research. 
 
Apart from the ZTE Corporation case in 2002,40 China Merchant Bank case in 2003,41 
Pingan China case in 2008 42  and Shuanghui Company case in 2010 43  where 
institutional shareholders rejected the shareholder proposal, from the news it is obvious 
that all these cases shared a similar background: rejected proposals were troubling 
controlling shareholder tunnelling and apparently the rest of the shareholders were all 
strongly opposed. Therefore, institutional shareholders take advantage of public 
opinion and their success is a guarantee to some extent. 
 
5.2.1.3  Submitting a shareholder proposal 
 
Submitting a shareholder proposal is another effective mechanism for institutional 
shareholders to voice their demands and ask for changes in their investee companies. 
Chinese Company Law 2005 stipulates that shareholders who hold 3% or more of the 
voting rights of a company may propose a resolution for a shareholders meeting by 
                                                          
39 Author unknown, ‘Great Debate Arising About Ping’an Refinancing’ [中国平安巨额融资惹争议] 
(Sohu News, 6 March 2008) <http://business.sohu.com/s2008/zgpa/> accessed 10 May 2017.  
40 ZTE official website, ‘Relationships with Investors’ [投资者关系] 
<http://www.zte.com.cn/china/about/investorrelations/announcement/200311/348996> accessed 10 
May 2017. 
41 Hongze Ouyang, ‘Suspense arises in the Results of the Merchant Bank’s Convertible Shares, As The 
Legitimacy Has Been Questioned [合法性遭质疑，招行可转债陡生悬念] (Sohu News, 20 October 
2003) <http://business.sohu.com/04/37/article214653704.shtml> accessed 10 May 2017. 
42 Dong Lv, ‘Shareholder Proposal About Issuing More H Shares in Ping’an China’ [中国平安 H股增
发议案] (Sohu News, 14 May 2008) < http://business.sohu.com/20080514/n256835555.shtml> 
accessed 10 October 2016. 
43 Author unknown, ‘When Shuanghui Met Voters’ [双汇遭遇投票门], Sina News 
<http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/blank/shfz/> (Sina News, 05 March 2010) accessed 10 October 2016. 
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written submission to the board ten days before a meeting.44 The board must circulate 
this resolution to other shareholders within two days after receiving it and must present 
it for consideration at the meeting. 
 
Yang’s research does not report any cases of a proposal raised by institutional 
shareholders among the 267 companies researched in 2007.45 In Gong’s research, there 
were only 2 out of 30 targeted companies in which shareholders submitted 
six resolutions at the shareholders’ meetings from 2007 to 2008. To reveal the 
characteristics of shareholder resolutions in Chinese listed companies, she expands the 
time span (2002–2009) which entailed 25 proposals in total. It shows that 19 out of 25 
(76%) were proposed by the largest shareholders, and the remaining six were proposed 
by the non-largest shareholders or individual shareholders.46 Given the fact that most 
of the resolutions are posed by largest shareholders, the resolutions were passed with a 
94%–99% support.47 Therefore, although the exact number of the resolutions submitted 
by institutional shareholders is not available, it is safe to say that the number will be 
less than 24% (6 out of 25). As for the subjects to be considered in these proposals, 
Gong’s research shows that the most popular was ‘the directors and supervisors election, 
followed by the category of corporate financial performance and planning. The third 
most popular targets of shareholder resolutions are issues of executive remuneration 
and amendment of articles of association, followed closely by concerns about cash and 
bond offers’. 48  In Gong’s opinion, submitting shareholder proposals is typically a 
mechanism largely used by large shareholders to seek changes of management. 
Considering their large shareholdings, proposals raised by these large shareholders are 
more likely to be passed with a high percentage of support.  
 
                                                          
44 CL 2005 s 103. 
45 Yang (n 11) 10. 
46  Another notable fact revealed in her research is that the shareholdings controlled by the largest 
shareholders are all significantly higher than the 3% legal threshold. This could explain the difference 
that shareholder resolutions are more frequently seen in Chinese listed companies than in their UK and 
US counterparts; 3% might be a high threshold in companies with a diversified ownership structure, 
while in China, in the light of the concentrated ownership of Chinese listed companies, it is much easier 
for large shareholders to meet this requirement to exert their control over management. 
47 Gong (n 3) 156. 
48 Ibid. 
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However, according to the empirical research conducted for the present research, there 
are 12 cases regarding proposals submitted by institutional shareholders, which is the 
most frequent form of activism (see Figure 5.5) and since 2012, it became the dominant 
form of institutional shareholder activism. The case of regrouping the board of directors 
of Hubei Xingfu Ltd in 2000, the shareholder proposal in Ningxia Saima Industry Co., 
Ltd in 2008, the shareholder proposal in Gree Electrical in 2012, the shareholder 
proposal in Shanghai Jiahua Co. Ltd in 2013, the shareholder proposal in China 
Merchant Bank in 2013 and of the shareholder proposal in Minsheng Bank in 2014 
were all aimed at electing the person they selected as new directors to exert some 
influence on the board. There are a few other topics, such as corporate strategies and 
financial statutes. The present research shows great consistency with that of Gong. The 
result of shareholder proposals put forward by the investment fund company Zexi was 
not known due to the fact that all related news were blocked since the manager of Zexi 
had been arrested and charged with insider trading. 
 
5.2.1.4  Legal actions  
 
The shareholder derivative suit was first introduced to China in 2005, in chapter 6 of 
the Company Law 2005. It greatly improved the situation of minority shareholders, 
given the fact that it provides minority shareholders with a weapon against the abuse of 
power by majority shareholders. According to s 152, shareholders holding 1% singly 
or collectively may, depending on the circumstances, make a demand on the board of 
directors or the board of supervisors to sue under s 150 of the Company Law 2005, 
which imposes liability for compensation on any ‘director, supervisor, or senior 
manager who causes losses to the company by violating laws, administrative 
regulations, or the articles of association during the course of performing his duties’.49 
If the request to bring a suit to remedy the alleged harm is ignored within 30 days, 
shareholders may bring suit in their own name.50 
 
                                                          
49 CL 2005 ss 150, 152. 
50 CL 2005 s 152. 
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The survey conducted by Clarke51 found that there were virtually no derivative suits 
involving listed companies by the end of 2009.52 Lin found that there were 77 derivative 
action cases from 2006 to 2013, which all happened in limited liability companies.53 
They suggested that this absence of listed company-related cases is largely associated 
with potentially high litigation and transaction costs incurred.54 Another reason that 
could account for this phenomenon is that courts may refuse to accept derivative suits 
involving listed companies because of the ‘political sensitivity or technical complexity 
involved’.55 Clarke and Howson pointed out that the court was under great influence 
from the local party as state officials have the power of appointment and of budgets. 
Courts might refuse to permit the litigation to proceed when they are with confronted 
interference from local governments or related institutions. 
 
In the present empirical research, no case related to derivative action taken by 
institutional shareholders was revealed except two lawsuits about misrepresentation. 
Therefore, institutional shareholders regard legal action as a kind of mechanism of last 
resort.  
 
5.2.2  Activism by different institutional shareholders 
 
                                                          
51 Clarke (n 15) 1064.  
52 From 2006 to the date on which this article was completed, the author found only a few cases involving 
an unlisted CLS or large numbers of shareholders in an LLC; see, for example, Li Xiaozhong and 28 
other shareholders v Xiao Wuyong & Zhang Dingzhong re: Nanchuan Municipal Hardware 
Infrastructure Electric Chemical Industry Company Limited, Chongqing Nanchuan City Basic-Level 
People’s Court (2006), Nanchuan Fa Min Chuzi no. 538 http://vip.chinalawinfo.corn!Case/ 
displaycontent.asp ?Gid= 1 17 484117 and www.siaaacom/falvanliku/gongsixiangguan/ 
200910/386516_2.html) [Nanchuan Chemical Industry 2006] (28 shareholders); Dong Fengchang v 
Fang Yishu re: Shanghai Zhongjian Enterprise Company Limited, Shanghai Hongkou District Basic-
level People’s Court, no. 2 Civil Division, case filed 26 September 2008, case opinion not reviewed, but 
report by Judge Luo Jianhao of the Hongkou District Basic-level People’s Court, 26 February 2009 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zmbrn!content/2009-02/26/content_1043325. htrn) [Shanghai Zhongjian 
Enterprise 2008] (40 shareholders); Zhu Yongjun and 20 other shareholder plaintiffs v Liu Huanren, Zhu 
Yongjun and Ma Zhonghua re: Shizuishan Municipal HengJ!Uan Metals Collection Company Limited, 
Shizuishan Municipal Wukou District Basic-level People’s Court (2008), Shi Da Min Zhu Zi 1008; on 
appeal Ningxia Hui Minority Autonomous Region Shizuishan Municipal Intermediate People’s Court 
(2009), Shi Min Zhong Zi 25  
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/case/displaycontent.asp?Gid=ll7633588) [Shizuishan Hengyuan 2009] (21 
shareholders).  
53  Shaowei Lin, ‘Derivative Actions in China’ (2011) (PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh 2014) 
<https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/9749/Lin2014.pdf?sequence=2> accessed 10 
October 2016. 
54 Clarke (n 15) 1064.  
55 Ibid. 
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5.2.2.1  Securities investment funds 
 
Compared with the UK and US mutual funds, China’s fund industry has a short history, 
which is less than 30 years. Despite the late start, the industry keeps growing at an 
impressive pace and has emerged as a significant investment tool. At present, as the 
key institutional shareholders in China, securities investment funds accounted for 85% 
of the total institutional shares. However, what seems disproportionate is the shares 
held by securities investment funds and their desire to engage in corporate governance. 
Some of the funds clearly state in their prospectuses that they ‘will not pursue 
controlling power in listed companies and not engage in corporate governance of the 
investee companies’.56 In addition, they are notorious for their short-termism. Dated 
back to 2000, Caijing, which is a leading financial magazine in China, published an 
article that revealed the inside story of the fund management industry. It disclosed that 
in order to gain unlawful shorter-term profits, many fund managers had manipulated 
the price of their holdings. 57  This news immediately drew public and regulatory 
attention, and this was the turning point for the funds industry. After that, regulators 
quickly stepped in and responded to this malpractice behaviour. The Chinese 
Government has set strict investment threshold and limits with a view to tightening the 
control of the SIF’ investment in the securities market. Under Fund Law, a SIF is not 
allowed to hold more than 10% of its net assets in the shares of a single issuer.58 It is 
also not allowed to hold more than a total of 10% of one company’s shares in the fund 
managed by the same fund manager.59 It has been 17 years after that notorious news. 
However, securities investment funds are still struggling with this short-term 
investment strategy.60 Although securities investment funds have greatly increased in 
numbers, they are basically almost hybrid funds and their portfolios are made up of a 
mix of stocks and bonds. Given this similarity, the competition between SIFs is fierce, 
                                                          
56 Hua Yang, Reforms in Need: Exploring the Roads to Marketization Reform of the Chinese Capital 
Market [变革与突破：中国资本市场发展研究] (China Financial and Economic Publishing House, 
2014).  
57 Jing Li, Dark Realities of Securities Investment Funds, [基金黑幕] (Cajing News, 05 October 2000) 
<http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/2000-10-05/110059644.html> accessed 15 October 2016. 
58 Fund Law, s 31(1). 
59 Fund Law, s 31(2). 
60 Jia Ronglei, ‘Ways to Respond to the Herd Behaviour in Chinese Securities Investment Funds’ [我国
证券投资基金的羊群效应问题及对策] (2015) Contemporary Economics 34. 
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which induces them to focus more on short-term benefits.61 A research paper on the 
behaviour of securities investment funds in the field of management62 pointed out that 
securities investment funds relied heavily on the social network63 of managerial teams 
or boards of directors. Therefore, whenever there was conflict between the management 
and the board of directors, the Chinese securities investment funds would evaluate the 
strengths of both sides and support the one who could offer more social networks and 
profits for them. Therefore, it could be said that the behaviour of securities investment 
funds is mainly benefit-lead, even in issues of corporate governance. 
 
However, in recent years, especially from 2011 onwards, securities investment funds 
have caught people’s eyes with their active engagement in some corporate governance 
cases. They are the dominant players in institutional shareholder activism according to 
the present research. Among the 26 cases, there are 17 in which SIFs have a role to play. 
The reason behind this activism may be that they contribute to the raise in awareness 
that their engagement could influence their investee companies. However, the 
underlying reasons may lie in the problems experienced with SOEs. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, the stock exchange was established for the purpose of helping SOEs out of 
trouble. Therefore, the main players in the stock exchange were the SOEs. Given the 
fact that some of them are suffering from severe agency problems and bad performance, 
the companies that have shown good and steady performance would be the target of 
securities investment funds when they are investing. In companies such as the Shanghai 
Amarsoft Information & Technology Co. Ltd, according to Xinhua Net, securities 
investment funds occupied nine seats in the top ten shareholders of Amarsoft in 2015.64 
Therefore, this led to, on the one hand, the failure of the ‘Wall Street rule’ and, on the 
other, the power to counterbalance majority shareholders is growing.  
 
                                                          
61 Qingbin Meng, Weixing Wu and Shangyao Yu, ‘Career Anxiety and Investing Style Oof Securities 
Investment Funds’, [基金经理职业忧虑与其投资风格] (2015) 50 Economic Research Journal 115. 
62 Jue Wang and Jigao Zhu, ‘Securities Investment Funds Engaging in Corporate Governance: Behaviour 
Logic and Pattern Choosing’ [基金参与公司治理: 行为逻辑与路径选择] (2015) 5 China Industrial 
Economics 135. 
63 According to Laumann et al, a social network can be defined as ‘a set of nodes (e.g., persons, 
organizations) linked by a set of social relationship (e.g. friendship, transfer of funds, overlapping 
memberships) of a specified type. See Edward O Laumann, Joseph Galaskiewicz, and Peter V Marden, 
‘Community Structure as Interoranizational Linkages’ (1978) Annual Review of Sociology. 
64 Author Unknown, ‘Nearly Forty Percentage of the Tradable Shares Are Controlled by Securities 
Investment Funds’ [近四成流通股被基金掌控] (Xinhua News, 18 May 2015) 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2015-05/18/c_127811552.htm> accessed 15 October 2016. 
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As a new phenomenon, securities investment fund activism in investee companies is 
rarely studied and most of the studies on SIFs focus on their influence on market 
stability and their performance. Two studies were conducted on securities investment 
fund activism 65  but none of them revealed the engagement behaviour of SIFs. 
Eissenhardt points out that a case study is extremely useful when almost nothing is 
known about the research object or when the aim is to approach it from a new 
perspective. 66 Therefore, the case study method was used here to assist with a better 
understanding of SIF activism.  
 
Gree Electrical Appliance case in 2012 was chosen for two reasons: first, this company 
is the leading company in its industry, the media continues to focus on this case and the 
massive amount of information provided in the news makes the case study available. 
In contrast, other cases are reported in limited information and the detailed procedures 
are unknown to the public. Second, this the most typical case in terms of the typology 
of activism. Shareholder proposals are used to exert influence on the composition of 
the board, which is a typical form of activism. 
 
Gree Electrical Appliance Inc. of Zhuhai is a state-owned enterprise whose largest 
shareholders are the Zhuhai stated-owned assets supervision and administration 
commission (see Figure 5.5). The Gree Group Co. Ltd collectively held 19.37% of the 
shares of Gree Electrical in 2012. The second largest shareholder is its retailer, Heibei 
Jinghai Co. Ltd. The other large shareholders are institutional shareholders, such as 
Penghua Asset Management Co., the Yale Endowment Fund and Yifangda Asset 
Management Company. Jianghong Zhu is the founder of Gree Electrical and he retired 
in 2012, therefore, shareholder meeting was held to re-elect the board of directors.  
                                                          
65 Two studies focus on securities investment fund activism: (1) Michael Firth, Chen Lin and Hong Zou, 
‘Friend or Foe? The Role of State and Mutual Fund Ownership in the Split Share Structure Reform in 
China’ (2010) 45 The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis; 2) Shujun Ding, Chunxin Jia and 
Zhenyu Wu. ‘Mutual Fund Activism and Market Regulation During the Pre-IFRS Period: The Case of 
Earnings Information in China from an Ethical Perspective’ (2016) 138 Journal of Business Ethics. There 
are also some Masters and PhD dissertations on their activism, but no related information  
66  Kathleen M Eisenhardt, ‘Building Theories from Case Study Research’ (1989) 14 Academy of 
Management Review 532. 
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Figure 5.7 State-owned shares in Gree Electrical Appliance Inc. of Zhuhai, 201267 
 
Before the shareholder meeting, the Penghua Asset Management Company and the 
Yale Endowment Fund held a private meeting to decide to recommend and elect Jiyong 
Feng as the director candidate. At the same time, Zhuhai SASAC decided to 
recommend and elect one of its officers, Shaoqiang Zhou, as director candidate. 
However, institutional shareholders strongly questioned this decision and thought 
Shaoqiang Zhou had no experience in governing an electrical company and the future 
was unpredictable.  
 
In May 2012, Gree Electrical held its shareholder meeting. During the meeting the 
largest shareholders, Gree Group Co. Ltd, proposed four director candidates: Mingzhu 
Dong, Shaoqiang Zhou, Junsi Lu and Hui Huang. The second largest shareholders, 
                                                          
67 China Management Case-sharing Center, <http://wenku.baidu.com/link?url=OUsZwY1LHrQ-
7AmT6ejlHDW5ajFKhKAW_oOsH31m8WripA4mkgNufR75jwZuqKGFdGhac4RTxgvHvOXcYwsK
FJZe1_Gj4htJ2AqKbZb-om3> accessed 15 October 2016. 
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Hebei Jinghai, proposed one director candidate, Jundu Zhang. The Penghua Asset 
Management Company and Yale Endowment Fund proposed Jiyong Feng as their 
director candidate. 
  
Shareholder Number of shares 
Proportion of voting rights 
(%) 
Gree Group Co. Ltd 548,127,812 27.47 
Hebei Jinghai 282,099,476 14.14 
Gree Real Estate Co. Ltd and Gree 
Residential Property Co. Ltd 
34,452,437 1.73 
Yale Endowment Fund 52,808,544 2.65 
Penghua Asset Management 
Company 
50,365,800 2.52 
Jianghong Zhu 21,507,416 1.08 
Mingzhu Dong 21,148,846 1.06 
Others 7,722,989 0.38 
 
Figure 5.8: Main shareholders and their portion of shares on the day of the 
shareholder meeting68 
 
The voting results are shown in Table 5.3. As accumulative voting system was adopted, 
the director appointed by Zhuhai SASAC only received 36.6% of the support and failed 
to be elected as director, whereas directors proposed by Penghua Asset Management 
Company and the Yale Endowment Fund received 113.66% of the support and 
successfully gained a director’s seat on the board of directors 
 
Director candidate 
Total vote of the shareholders 
attending the meeting 
Number of votes 
gained 
Percentage 
(%) 
Mingzhu Dong  1,995,391,682 2,515,105,800 126.05 
Shaoqiang Zhou 1,995,391,682 730,345,048 36.6 
Junsi Lu 1,995,391,682 1,951,141,658 97.78 
Hui Huang 1,995,391,682 1,953,467,335 97.7 
Jundu Zhang 1,995,391,682 1,951,351,409 97.79 
Jiyong Feng 1,995,391,682 2,268,056,760 113.66 
 
Figure 5.9: Votes gained by each director candidate69 
                                                          
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
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In this case, the success of Penghua Asset Management Company and the Yale 
Endowment Fund is attributable to a number of factors. First, the ownership of Gree 
Electrical is quite diffused compared with other SOEs. The largest shareholder, Gree 
Group Co. Ltd holds 19.37% of the total shares and institutional shareholders hold 
30.82% collectively, 70  which makes it possible for them to confront the largest 
shareholders and their alliances. Second, the use of the cumulative voting system played 
a role. Although the Gree Group Co. Ltd held 27.47% of the voting rights compared 
with the no more than 5.17% of Penghua Asset Management Company and the Yale 
Endowment Fund, the Gree Group Co. Ltd proposed four directors and that the voting 
be diffuse. The institutional shareholders only proposed one director. Therefore, they 
could vote all of their shares to him if they wished to do so. Therefore, as mentioned 
above, the cumulative voting system can really make a difference in certain 
circumstances. Third, the willingness of institutional shareholders to engage in 
corporate governance and working together was another factor. Before the shareholder 
meeting, institutional shareholders already expressed their objection to the decision of 
Zhuhai SASAC which shows that they cared about the operation of their investee 
companies. Penghua Asset Management Company and the Yale Endowment Fund had 
meeting privately to reach a consensus on the election of directors. The high support 
rate shows that other institutional shareholders might also have voted for them during 
the shareholder meeting. All three these factors working together make the Gree 
Electrical case a notable milestone in the process of promoting institutional shareholder 
activism.  
  
In addition, one research study pointed out that securities investment funds would 
evaluate the strength of both sides and support the one who could offer them more 
social networks and profit when there were conflicts between the management and the 
board of directors.71 This case complied with this research result. On the one hand, as 
Figure 5.7 shows, the Zhuhai Stated-owned Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission was the largest shareholder. However, it held shares in Gree Electrical 
indirectly through its parent company, Gree Group Co. Ltd, rather than holding shares 
directly. Besides, the influence of the Zhuhai SASAC is limited inside the company. In 
                                                          
70 Wang and Zhu (n 62) 142. 
71 Ibid 143. 
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contrast, Mingzhu Dong, the CEO and the chairperson of the board of directors, has 
been in this position for 11 years and the company was under her de facto control. In 
addition, she was the representative of the National People’s Congress, and enjoyed a 
good reputation which could offer institutional shareholders the social network they 
needed. Therefore, institutional shareholders voted against the proposal to elect the 
director appointed by the SASAC and support whoever could bring them more benefits. 
 
In the 2013 case of Shanghai Jahwa Co. Ltd, a shareholder proposal to amend the 
articles of association by several securities investment funds also succeeded. The shares 
held by the largest shareholders amounted to 29.15%, while the shares held by 
institutional shareholders amounted to 43.27% collectively, according to research 
conducted by Chinese scholars.72 Therefore,  it is evident that SIFs willingly engage in 
corporate governance if their power is big enough to make a difference and joint efforts 
are common among them.  
 
5.2.2.2  Insurance companies 
 
In terms of insurance companies, they were prohibited from investing in equities until 
2004. Although their investment channel has been enlarged in the past decades, they 
remain subject to strict regulations. The upper limit for directly investing in stock is 20% 
of total investment value.73 In addition, insurance companies are permitted to access 
the securities market through investing in SIFs, but the aggregate investment in SIFs 
should not exceed 15%.74 Therefore, although insurance companies are an important 
part of the Chinese capital market, they are invisible to some extent. 
 
Among the cases selected for the present research, insurance companies were engaged 
in 2 cases out of 26. These two cases were taken by the same insurance company, 
Anbang Insurance Group. From the limited information of the China Merchant Bank 
case, Anbang Insurance Group held 2.76% of the total shares at the shareholder meeting 
                                                          
72 Ibid. 
73 CIRC, Provisional Measures on Administration of Operation of Insurance Capital, s 16(4).  
74 CIRC, ‘Second Quarterly Press Conference in 2009’ (China News, 31 July 2009) 
<http://www.chinanews.com.cn/cj/cj-gncj/news/2009/07-31/1798879.shtml> accessed 
15 October 2016. 
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in 2013.75 The ownership percentage in 2013 is not known. However, according to the 
ownership percentage in 2016,76 it is evident that there were some large shareholders, 
namely the Hong Kong Securities Clearing Company Nominees Limited 77  (18%); 
China Merchants Group Steamship Company (13.04%); China Ocean Shipping (Group) 
Company (6.24%) and other shareholders are some institutional shareholders who held 
3–4% of shares. Therefore, the Anbang Insurance Group’s portion of shares was 
insufficient to influence the result of the shareholder proposal. In the case of Minsheng 
Bank in 2014, Anbang Insurance Group held 9.06% of the total shares, before the 
shareholder meeting, Anbang increased its shares to 15% from direct or indirect control. 
This high percentage of shares may contribute to the success of its activism in this case. 
The aim of both actions was to propose their own directors.  
 
The year 2016 witnessed the biggest boardroom wars. Baoneng, a little-known 
conglomerate owned by the Shenzhen tycoon, Yao Zhenhua, used its insurance arm, 
Qianhai Life Insurance, to raise funds to bid for Vanke, a leading home developer. 
Because insurance companies are attracting people’s attention, 78  many takeover 
attempts followed. Baoneng’s move was just one of dozens of hostile takeover attempts 
by insurance companies. As they caused great gyrations in the stock market, Liu Shiyu, 
the chairperson of the CSRC called them ‘barbarians’, ‘bandits’, ‘evil monsters’ and 
‘poisonous demons,79 and the CSRC decided to tighten the regulation of insurance 
companies.  
 
5.2.2.3  Pension funds 
 
                                                          
75 Author unknown, Anbang Increase Its Shareholding in Merchant Bank [安邦财险增持招行] (China 
Economic News, 24 December 2013) 
<http://finance.ce.cn/rolling/201312/24/t20131224_1982060.shtml> accessed 15 October 2016. 
76 “Major Shareholders of Merchant Bank’ Sina Finance 
<http://vip.stock.finance.sina.com.cn/corp/go.php/vCI_StockHolder/stockid/600036/displaytype/30.pht
ml> accessed 15 October 2016. 
77 Hereinafter ‘HKSCC Nominees Limited’.  
78 Frank Tang, ‘China’s Muddled Regulatory Battlefront against Stock Market ‘Monster” (South China 
Morning Post, 11 December 2016 ) 
<http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2053563/battling-beasts-black-stock-market-
lagoon> accessed 15 October 2017. 
79Author Unknown, ‘CSRC and CIRC Criticised ‘Barbarians’’ [保监会证监会齐喊话, 剑指’野蛮人’] 
(Xinhua News, 05 December 2016) < http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2016-
12/05/c_1120050125.htm> accessed 15 October 2016. 
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The pension fund industry in China still faces tight restrictions on stock ownership 
given its importance to national stability. For CPFs, it may not be no more than 30% of 
the fund's net assets when managed by an investment management company, 
investments in equities, investment-type insurance products and equity funds, with 
investments in equities alone not being more than 20% of net assets.80 When a CPF 
managed by ‘a single investment manager invests in a stock issued by a single company 
or in a mutual fund, the amount of that investment shall not exceed a total share of 5% 
of said stock or said mutual fund, nor shall exceed 10% of total pension fund assets 
managed by the investment manager’.81  
 
For the NSSF, investment in safe channels, which are bank deposits and government 
bonds, should be no less than 50%. For the remaining assets, no more than 40% of them 
may be invested in equities.82 Therefore, securities investment must be a minority 
portion of total assets and it is perhaps not surprising that among 26 cases selected for 
this research, none of them were initiated by pension funds.  
 
5.2.2.4  Qualified foreign institutional investors 
  
Just like other institutional shareholders, QFIIs are subject to both investment scope 
and ownership shareholdings. On the one hand, the investment scope of QFIIs is limited. 
QFIIs are allowed to invest in ‘shares (excluding B shares), treasuries, convertible 
bonds and enterprise bonds listed on China's stock exchanges’.83 Non-tradable shares 
and legal person shares of listed companies and derivative securities products are off-
limits to QFIIs. On the other hand, the total percentage of shares held by all QFIIs in a 
single listed company must not exceed 20% of the total shares of that listed company.84 
Moreover, investment by a single foreign investor through a QFII scheme in a single 
                                                          
80  Measures for the Management of Enterprise Annuities Fund [企业年金管理法办法] (2011) s 47 
<http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2011-02/23/content_1808854.htm> accessed 4 November 2016. 
81 Ibid. s 47. 
82 Interim Provisions on Administration of NSSF Investment’ [全国社会保障基金投资管理暂行办
法] s 28 < http://www.ssf.gov.cn/xxgk/flfg_1139/200904/t20090427_6891.html> accessed 4 
November 2016. 
83 ‘Measures on Administration of Domestic Securities Investments by Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investors’ [合格境外机构投资者境内证券投资管理办法] 
<http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfg/bmgz/jjl/201012/t20101231_189872.html> s 9. 
84 Ibid. s 10. 
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listed company must not exceed 10% of the total shares of that listed company.85 
Although faced with tight control, in the Gree case discussed above, the Yale 
Endowment Fund, a QFII, in joint efforts with Chinese domestic securities investment 
companies, successfully expressed their voice in a shareholder meeting.  
 
5.3  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, institutional shareholder activism in China was approached from the 
primary perspective of case studies, with the reflection on the limited range of 
secondary sources. In terms of the types of activism, as in the UK and US, a private 
meeting is also the first option for most Chinese institutional shareholders. The case 
study used as illustration does not involve many cases of private meetings, given the 
fact that private meetings are always held behind closed doors. However, the main 
purpose of private negotiation, according to Yuan et al.’s study, is to obtain information 
about the company and the quality of the management team86 rather than improve 
corporate performance. Shareholder proposals are also a popular form of activism 
among Chinese institutional shareholders, followed by voting and legal action. In terms 
of Chinese institutional shareholders, SIFs are the key institutional shareholders in the 
Chinese equity market and the key activists in engaging in corporate governance. 
However, the case study reveals that their power to counterbalance blockholders is the 
major factor they consider before taking any action. Investment funds evaluate the 
strength of both sides and supports the one that can offer them more social networks. 
Therefore, the activism taken by securities investment funds is carefully weighed 
behaviour aimed at gaining certain benefits. Long-term institutions, insurance 
companies and pension funds face strict restrictions and low levels of development. 
They, therefore, almost disappear in shareholder activism except for one insurance 
company. The influence and power of QFIIs is also limited to some extent. 
 
At the start of this chapter some factors that could influence institutional shareholder 
activism were discussed. Analysis showed that a factor that highly influenced 
institutional shareholders activism was their power to counterbalance the largest 
                                                          
85 Ibid. s 10. 
86 Yuan et al. (n 14) 575. 
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shareholders, that is, the percentage of shareholding in the hands of both sides. The 
success of the Gree and Jahwa cases is attributed to the large shareholding of 
institutional shareholders. The cost of engagement and coalition all matter. Third, the 
development level of institutional shareholders plays an important role in deciding their 
engagement activities. Securities investment funds, who are well developed compared 
with other institutions, are more willing to engage in corporate issues. However, 
compared with the UK and US, they are still at an embryonic stage and it is evident 
from the case study above that the activism is still event-led and profit-driven, without 
the intention to improve the performance of investee companies. Therefore, their 
investment strategy is basically speculative in nature. Figure 5.1 on internal factors that 
influence institutional shareholder activism could be developed into Figure 5.10. 
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Mutual 
funds  
Pension 
funds  
Insurance 
companies  
QFIIs 
        
Figure 5.10: Internal factors that influence institutional shareholder activism 
In addition, legal restrictions and political influence on institutional shareholder 
activism cannot be underestimated. The restriction on the percentage of shares that can 
be invested in the equities limits the shares that one institution could hold in its investee 
companies. Besides, the complicated disclosure rule further frustrates their activism. In 
addition, political factors, to some extent, determine the role that institutions could play. 
The CSRC’s criticism of the takeover attempts by insurance companies meant that this 
kind of behaviour has been banned ever since and insurance companies’ activism was 
‘nipped in the bud’. Therefore, these external factors exert reverse influence on 
institutional shareholder activism compared with external factors in the UK and US. As 
can be seen in Figure 5.11, the overall activism level is much lower (black line 1) and 
these external factors further lower the activism to the dotted line. 
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Figure 5.11: Relationship between factors in Figure 5.1 and activism level and different 
routines taken by institutional shareholders on different activism levels  
 
In the next chapter, we will move on to the conclusions. The findings in chapter 4 and 
5 will be summarized and the question raised in the beginning of the thesis will be 
answered.
218 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
In Chapters 4 and 5 the extent of institutional shareholder activism in the UK, US and 
China was explored from an empirical perspective respectively. In general, as the figure 
at the end of each chapter presented, institutional shareholders in the UK and US are 
more willing to engage in corporate governance, compared with their Chinese 
counterparts. This chapter delves more deeply into this phenomenon and an attempt is 
made to answer the core questions of this thesis: whether institutional shareholders are 
able to fulfil the responsibilities that are placed on them under the recent SOE reforms 
and whether more institutional shareholder activism can be expected. The first part of 
this chapter provides a summary of the findings in the previous two chapters and a 
conclusion is drawn about the effects of institutional shareholder activism in the UK, 
US and China. The second part is an analysis of the reasons for the differences in the 
effects of institutional shareholder activism. The thesis concludes with an analysis of 
the possibilities for more institutional shareholder activism and the possible way 
forward. 
 
6.1  Summary of the effects of institutional shareholder activism  
 
In Chapter 4 institutional shareholder activism was analysed from an empirical 
perspective in the UK and US. In terms of the typologies of institutional activism, the 
meeting between institutional investors and companies is the first approach that most 
institutional investors consider and it is one of the most commonly used approaches to 
shareholder engagement. The evidence found in institutional reports, academic research 
and newspapers shows that private meetings are an effective way of communication 
which could avoid public confrontation, and are welcomed by both company and 
institutions. Certain types of institutional shareholders rely on frequent meetings. These 
meetings usually focus on general issues, such as the long-term strategy of the company, 
instead of short-term topics, such as current trading. Voting is another frequently used 
option and the voting rate is quite high, due, in some instances, to the help of voting 
agencies. In terms of voting agendas, board composition, say on pay, bylaw changes 
and shareholder proposals are topics that are most common. Submitting proposed 
resolutions for a shareholder meeting and bringing legal actions are further options for 
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institutional shareholders to engage in corporate governance. Although these two 
options are not used as frequently as private meetings and voting, they assist 
institutional shareholder activism in their own way and could be helpful in certain 
circumstances. In terms of institutions that do engage actively in corporate governance, 
long-term institutional shareholders are more willing to engage in corporate governance. 
Hedge funds act as offensive shareholders and are also active players in corporate 
governance. Therefore, although institutional shareholder activism is a topic of debate 
both theoretically and empirically, in some instances, institutional shareholder activism 
really does improve the governance of targeted companies. Apart from contributing 
towards managerial accountability, achieving the benefit of reducing the majority–
minority agency costs, institutional shareholder activism can also promote the 
performance of targeted companies to some extent. The absence of unified positive 
empirical results supporting institutional shareholder activism should not in itself be 
viewed as establishing some kind of presumption against institutional shareholder 
activism and it seems clear that the potential benefit could be expected in appropriate 
cases with specific objectives, proper techniques for intervention and responsible 
institutional shareholders. Therefore, one could say that in the UK and US institutional 
shareholders activism could play a certain monitoring role that relieve agency problems 
and promote corporate governance to some extent. 
 
In Chapter 5 institutional shareholder activism in China was examined. As reports by 
institutional shareholders and academic research are limited, cases on institutional 
shareholder activism were collected to assist with the study. It is evident from these 
case studies that private meetings, whether in China or in the UK and US, are often 
used as the first resort for institutional shareholder activism. However, the purpose of 
these meetings is not only to focus on the performance of targeted companies, a 
significant push factor for Chinese institutional shareholders is to arrange private 
meetings with their investee companies in order to gain access to the unpublicized 
information collected through this negotiation process. As for voting, the voting rate is 
increasing and Chinese institutional shareholders usually make concerted efforts with 
other institutions to achieve expected results. Submitting shareholder proposals is 
another effective mechanism for institutional shareholders to voice their demands and 
ask for changes in their investee companies. Of the cases selected for the present study, 
12 relate to proposals submitted by institutional shareholders, which is the most 
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frequent form of activism (see Figure 5.1) and since 2012 it has become the dominant 
form of institutional shareholder activism. However, after careful analysis, it was found 
that in most of these cases the proposal put forward by institutional shareholders is 
focused on the nomination of directors, which means that in order to counterbalance 
blockholders and obtain more information and benefits, they usually dispatch one of 
their own as nominee director, and through a shareholder proposal and joint voting 
efforts attempt to achieve their goal. Legal action is the last resort and Chinese 
institutional shareholders usually avoid taking legal action, given the influence of 
Confucianism. The situation is quite different in China from that in the UK and US 
respectively in terms of the institutions that engage in corporate governance. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the government encourages the development of securities 
investment funds, and several policies and regulations are issued with the aim of 
promoting SIFs. Therefore, SIFs are the key institutional shareholders in the Chinese 
equity market and major players in engaging in corporate governance. The case studies 
reveal that when they intervene, they do not focus on improvements in corporate 
governance, but the private benefits that they stand to gain. An example of this is when 
the blockholder and the management team are in different camps. Investment funds 
usually evaluate the strength of both sides and supports the one who could offer them 
a greater social network. Apart from SIFs, other institutional shareholders play a minor 
and supplemental role. Therefore, one could say that the positive and beneficial role 
exercised by Chinese institutional shareholders in corporate governance is quite limited 
compared with their UK and US counterparts. The management monitoring role, and 
the checks and balances of blockholders that are expected of Chinese institutional 
shareholders are not properly exercised.  
 
Therefore, although it appears that there is institutional shareholder activism with 
similar features in the UK, US and China, the role that institutional shareholder activism 
plays in corporate governance is different.  
 
6.2  Reasons for the differences in institutional shareholder activism 
 
The growth in institutional shareholders in the UK, US and China is impressive, and 
calls for more institutional shareholder engagement in their investee companies is 
increasing as well. However, despite similar features in institutional shareholder 
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activism in China, Chinese institutional shareholder activism is different from that in 
the UK and US. The analysis therefore moves to the question of what those reasons for 
the differences in shareholder activism might be. This question could be answered from 
nine perspectives:  
 
a. As discussed in chapter 2, the emergence and development of institutional 
investors were propelled by different forces. In the UK and US the demand for 
market and financial innovation was the main diving force and the development 
of institutional investors was the results of both self-motivation and  policy 
encouragement. However, in China the emergence and growth of institutional 
investors has been driven mainly by the governmental need for economic reform 
and it is policy that influences the development of institutional shareholders. 
Therefore, institutional shareholders cultivated by policy lack inner incentives to 
intervene to improve the corporate performance of targeted companies  
 
b. Chinese institutional investors are much younger than their UK and US 
counterparts and they are, to some extent, immature in their investment and 
engagement strategies. Under the restriction of limited investment instrument, 
speculation of short-term profits is a popular way of investing among institutional 
shareholders. The imbalanced development of different institutions has led to the 
powerlessness of institutions (especially long-term institutions, such as pension 
funds) who are more likely to engage in corporate governance. 
 
c. The inconsistent objectives between companies and institutional shareholders 
may lead to the low level of institutional shareholder activism. In the UK and US 
most of the companies are for-profit and the goal of achieving better financial 
performance was admitted and shared among companies and institutional 
shareholders. However, most listed companies are SOEs with political and social 
objectives, and the financial performance was not the only factors that were 
considered by the board and management team. Therefore, the interests of 
institutional shareholders and the companies may not be aligned and this reduces 
the possibility of institutional shareholder activism. 
 
d. Another reason would be the difference in the aims of corporate governance. In 
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the UK and US the main objective of corporate governance is to reduce the 
agency costs generated in the process of dispersing shares, and provide 
management teams with a certain degree of incentive and monitoring. In China, 
as discussed in Chapter 1, the aim of establishing ‘modern corporations’ with a 
proper corporate governance mechanism is to lift SOEs out of trouble. The 
ultimate aim of corporate governance is to maintain the predominant power of 
public ownership (i.e., SOEs). The differences in corporate governance aims lead 
to the differences in the policies and regulations that are published.  
 
e. Ownership structure also influences the way that institutional shareholders 
engage. Under the dispersed ownership structure, the problems faced by 
institutional shareholders are the agency costs generated from the inconsistency 
in interests between managers and shareholders. Therefore, institutional 
shareholders have a clear and unitary objective when engaging. However, in 
China the presence of concentrated ownership and blockholders makes the 
situation complex. On the one hand, the decision and voting power of 
blockholders make institutional shareholder rights useless to some extent. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, whether their shares are large enough to counterbalance 
the blockholders is the main concern when Chinese institutional shareholders 
contemplate activism. On the other hand, the existence of vertical and horizontal 
agency problems poses a dilemma for institutional shareholders. When there is a 
conflict between blockholders and management, institutional shareholders have 
to make a choice and as we see from the case in Chapter 5, institutional 
shareholders evaluate the strength of both sides and support the ones who could 
offer a more extensive social network for them. 
 
f. The legal and regulatory framework also plays a distinct role in institutional 
shareholder activism. As is evident from the evolution of US institutional 
shareholders, the legislation in 1929–1970 laid the foundation for the 
development of institutional shareholders. The well-regulated capital market and 
securities market, sophisticated disclosure requirements, and good protection for 
minority shareholders all guaranteed a favourable institutional environment for 
shareholder activism. In China the promulgation of related legislation lags far 
behind the development of institutional shareholders. Although some specific 
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rules are transplanted into Chinese company law and securities law from the UK 
and US, many of them are no more than ‘empty words’. The protection for 
minority shareholders, the quality of information disclosure and the regulation of 
market players are all inefficient. Much of the governance of UK listed companies 
is left to governance codes with a ‘comply or explain’ enforcement approach that 
is flexible and friendly to shareholder activism. Whereas the regulations and rules 
related to Chinese corporate governance are largely compulsory in nature. In 
addition, legal barriers and investing thresholds also discourage Chinese 
institutional shareholder activism. 
 
g. The role of the state also influences the way that institutional shareholders engage. 
In the UK and US, the state plays a neutral role in the capital and securities market. 
Although the policy may vary in different periods, the main goal of the state is to 
protect the proper operation of the market and to ensure the welfare of the market 
players. The unbiased attitude leaves room for the development of any market 
participants who fits in the market. In China, the state plays a dual role both as 
‘athlete’ and ‘referee’. On the one hand, the state plays the role of regulator as in 
the UK and US; and on the other, it is the shareholder or even the blockholder of 
the SOEs. Therefore, the welfare of SOEs is the main focus when making 
decisions and the state can make use of its regulatory position to firm its control 
over listed companies. As seen in Chapter 5, many regulations and rules are 
enacted with the aim of preserving the state’s control over the economy and this 
leads to a situation where it is the government who decides what kind of 
institutional shareholders are encouraged to develop and to what extent 
institutional shareholders could engage in corporate governance depending on the 
influence on SOEs. 
 
h. From a wider context, well-functioning capital and securities markets are  
prerequisites for institutional shareholder activism. In the UK and US the 
securities market is sophisticated and operates well when institutional 
shareholders actively engage in corporate governance. However, the Chines 
securities market is still suffering from unstable fluctuation called the ‘policy 
market’ because the policy published by the government deeply influences stock 
trends. It is no wonder that institutional shareholders pay more attention to short-
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term gains rather than long-term investment. Furthermore, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, a large number of the listed companies on the Chinese stock exchange 
are SOEs. As the most important players in the securities market, these SOEs are 
struggling with non-viability.1 Without the ability to earn acceptable profits in a 
free, open and competitive market, they cannot distribute dividends to 
shareholders. Considering that institutional shareholders cannot benefit by 
holding stocks for a long time due to the non-viability and unprofitability of those 
listed companies, they therefore make profits only by speculating on stock prices. 
 
i. As shown in the present research, the presence of proxy advisory firms and 
industry associations greatly facilitates the way that institutional shareholders 
engage in corporate governance. The leading companies in shareholder activism 
which serve as a kind of role model could lead the way towards more activism. 
 
In conclusion, the different levels of institutional shareholder activism are the result of 
various factors, both from institutional investor themselves and the environment in 
which institutional shareholder activism operates. One could therefore say that although 
Chinese policymakers borrowed experiences from the UK and US and some rules and 
regulations on shareholder activism seems largely identical, great discrepancies exist. 
All these factors and differences deeply influence the level at which Chinese 
institutional shareholders can engage. The question that remains is what does the future 
hold for institutional shareholder activism in China. 
 
6.3  Possibility for more institutional shareholder activism  
 
After analysing the different roles of institutional shareholders in corporate governance 
and the reasons behind such differences, the natural step is to see whether more 
institutional shareholder activism can be expected in China. First, the question needs to 
be asked: is institutional shareholder activism rational? If it is, does China need it? If 
the answer is still positive, then what is the possibility of Chinese institutional 
shareholders becoming more actively involved in corporate governance? 
                                                          
1 Justin Yifu Lin, ‘Demystifying the Chinese Economy’ (2013) Australian Economic Review 46(3)  259, 
268. 
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As shown in Chapter 3 and the empirical research above, although institutional 
shareholder activism is a topic of debate and the research results are not 
overwhelmingly positive, there is no solid basis for the theory that institutional 
shareholder activism is detrimental to corporate governance. The empirical analyses in 
Chapters 4 and 5 reveal that institutional shareholder activism is collectively valuable 
as an efficient tool to reduce agency costs and ensure managerial accountability in 
circumstances where proper activists are engaged and proper activism was exercised. 
Shareholders have inborn advantages in supervising, monitoring and engaging 
compared with other corporate governance devices. Therefore, institutional shareholder 
activism is rational and, if not encouraged vigorously, this approach should at least be 
tried to improve corporate governance. 
 
The fact that institutional shareholder activism is rational and beneficial to corporate 
performance under certain circumstances does not mean that it is needed in China. 
Whether more institutional shareholder activism can be expected depends on the extent 
to which it fits within a broad tapestry of economic reform. As shown in Chapter 4, 
SOEs are now standing at the crossroads of mixed ownership reform, which means 
certain percentages of state-owned shares will become tradable and the ownership 
structure will become more diversified. On the one hand, given the fact that SOEs are 
large in size, small companies and individuals are too weak to participate in mixed 
ownership reform and, therefore, institutional shareholders and some powerful 
companies are expected to play a major role in this reform. On the other hand, 
horizontal agency costs between blockholders and minority shareholders would be less 
of a problem when the ownership structure is further diversified. Therefore, as in the 
UK and US, the vertical agency problems between managers and shareholders will 
create demand for institutional shareholder engagement. In addition, with the 
development of the securities market and financial innovation, Chinese institutional 
shareholders are expected to be more sophisticated in both investment strategies and 
governance strategies. Therefore, institutional shareholder activism, together with other 
corporate governance mechanisms, would become increasingly more important and 
replace direct regulatory control from the state in certain areas in the near future. 
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Now that the first two questions have been answered positively, could more Chinese 
institutional shareholder activism be expected, that is, will institutional shareholders 
overcome their passivity and engage in corporate governance actively? It is evident 
from Chapters 4 and 5 that big institutional shareholders with large shareholdings and 
long-term investment horizons are more likely to intervene in targeted companies 
because (1) it is easier to change corporate affairs given their sufficiently large 
shareholding; (2) they have more sophisticated investment strategies: and (3) they will 
receive more benefits as a result of activism, which could outweigh the cost generated 
in the process of engagement. First, the possibility of institutional shareholders 
counterbalancing majority shareholders will be addressed. With the implementation of 
mixed ownership reform, blockholders will gradually exit and it could be expected that 
the shareholdings of institutional shareholders will increase. However, considering the 
socialist ideology and the role of the CPC in China, one cannot be too optimistic about 
the extent to which shares will be dispersed. Furthermore, cumulative voting also 
enhances the likelihood of counterbalancing majority shareholders. However, the legal 
barriers to investment thresholds remain a problem. Although deregulation is taking 
place and higher thresholds are introduced, this process seems slow and hysteretic. 
These legal barriers are set for two reasons. One is to curb market abuse and maintain 
market stability, and the other is to strengthen state control of the economy. These two 
aims are fundamental, therefore the state has adopted a cautious attitude. The 
deregulation has a long way to go. Second, it is unrealistic to expect institutional 
shareholders who are in the embryonic stage to deploy sophisticated long-term 
investment strategies and actively engage in corporate governance. It is a process of 
gradual learning and growing. Third, when institutional shareholders actively engage 
in corporate governance, they have an expectation that their intervention could improve 
corporate performance and, in turn, the rise in share prices could benefit them. However, 
as already discussed, the Chinese securities market is heavily influenced by government 
policy and it cannot reflect the true value of a company. Therefore, Chinese institutional 
shareholders are more short term in nature. From the perspective of institutional 
shareholders, it is not easy for them to overcome passivity to actively engage in 
corporate governance. 
 
6.4   The way forward 
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Institutional shareholder activism appears to have come of age in the UK, US and China. 
It has long been considered vital to good corporate governance, and policymakers in 
the UK and US have issued a variety of regulations and guidelines to promote 
institutional shareholder engagement. China is following this trend. Recent decades 
have witnessed the rapid rise of institutional investors and their initiatives in engaging 
in corporate governance. This massive development in the scale of institutional 
investors, together with the increases in their level of activism, suggests the possibility 
of the beginning of a new era in corporate governance. Policymakers also place great 
emphasis on the role that institutional shareholders could play in the ongoing SOE 
reform. However, after exploring and comparing the effects and the extent of 
institutional shareholder activism in the UK, US and China, it was found that 
institutional shareholder activism is influenced by ownership structure, corporate 
governance framework, the role of the state, the level of maturity in institutional 
shareholders, the role of the securities market and ideology. All these factors and the 
existence of path dependency force Chinese institutional shareholders to face a tougher 
reality compared with their UK and US counterparts. Therefore, the advantages and 
potential of institutional shareholder activism do not in themselves mean that there will 
be more activism in future. The focus should not only be on the positive effects of 
institutional shareholder activism without looking at the preconditions that make 
institutional shareholder activism positive. Before exploring the preconditions and 
possible reform, it is necessary first to deal with the possibility of experiential learning 
and legal transplantation. 
 
Legal transplantation, which is a way to transfer legal experiences or rules from one 
jurisdiction to another, is commonly observed as ‘most changes in most systems are the 
result of borrowing’.2 Given the sharp contrast in ideology and legal systems between 
the UK and US and China, the borrowing experience from the West may not fit in well 
with special national conditions. However, it would be less of a problem in the area of 
corporate governance. The development of corporate legislation and the corporate 
governance system in China are in themselves borrowing processes from the West, and 
convergence relating to institutional shareholder activism is under way.3 The borrowing 
                                                          
2 A Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (Scottish Academic Press, 1974) 94. 
3 For example: first, the core functional features are limited liability, shared ownership by investors, and 
the division of power and responsibilities between directors, managers and shareholders. The corporate 
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and transplantation must be carried out with caution, and should not be a ‘pick-and-mix’ 
approach. The consideration should be whether the imported rules could work well with 
the fundamental principles in the accepting country. Cognisance must also be taken of 
the preventative role played by ‘path dependency’, which influences the expected 
results achieved by the imported rules. The suggested reforms are divided into two 
categories. In the first category are the suggestions and reforms that are practicable, 
easily transplanted and that may be able to work in conjunction with current legal 
systems. Another category contains those reforms that may be prevented by the current 
legal and political framework but that could be expected in the long term. 
  
First, reform should begin with the cultivation of institutional shareholders. The 
greatest obstacle to the development of institutional shareholders is the dominance of 
state-owned shares in listed companies. The reduction in state ownership is the foremost 
reform that should be proposed. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the dominant 
position of SOEs in the national economy is the distinct feature of a socialist system 
and the extent to which shares become dispersed is totally dependent on decisions of 
the government and there is almost nothing to be done to change the situation. A 
practicable reform would be tax relief. The beneficial tax treatment in the UK and US 
at different periods promoted the growth of institutional shareholders. In the light of 
their experience, certain degrees of tax relief could be granted to long-term institutional 
shareholders, such as pension funds and insurance companies. Furthermore, the 
government also needed to promote market integrity and stability, and increase 
financial innovation.  
 
Second, in terms of promoting institutional shareholder activism, relaxing institutional 
investment restrictions would be a good, but unrealistic, approach. Given the 
immaturity of Chinese securities market and institutional shareholders, the restrictions 
on investment would serve as an efficient barrier for shareholders to avoid unbearable 
financial losses. In the UK, although the larger pension schemes control its own 
                                                          
governance framework is similar except for the presence of political governance in China. Second, the 
way tin which shareholders engage in corporate affairs is basically the same. Third, there are similarities 
at the less formal regulatory level, such as the corporate governance code; for more, see Bo Gong, 
Understanding Institutional Shareholder Activism: A Comparative Study of the UK and China 
(Routledge, 2013); Iain G MacNeil, ‘Adaptation and Convergence in Corporate Governance: The Case 
of Chinese Listed Companies’ (2002) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 289(2), 306. 
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investments, the Pension Act requires trustees or fund managers to have regard to the 
need for diversification and the suitability of investment.4 Besides, they also operate 
under a ‘prudent person’ model, in which the investment of pension assets was 
undertaken with care, the skill of an expert, prudence and due diligence. Whereas in 
China the quantitative portfolio regulation was the only approach adopted to regulate 
the investment industry. As suggested by Davis, it could be rational to impose 
regulatory restrictions on institutions in a country where the institutions are not 
sufficiently experienced and the market is more volatile.5 The experience of the UK 
and US also shows that adopting a strict regulatory regime is helpful in the initial stage 
of institutional investment if the institutions are not sophisticated enough. With the 
development of institutional investors and the securities market, the regime could be 
relaxed accordingly. Furthermore, the implementation of the ‘prudent person’ approach 
may face legal difficulties given the fact that both regulators and asset managers in 
China are unfamiliar with the concept of fiduciary responsibilities in a civil law 
jurisdiction. Therefore, a gradualist approach to relax the regulatory regime of 
institutional investors is currently more feasible. In addition, the reluctance to engage 
in corporate governance is due to the fact that the Chinese securities market is heavily 
influenced by government policy and cannot reflect the true value of a company. 
Therefore, the government should also focus on promoting the optimal operation of the 
securities market. Some practicable reform could be carried out to promote a more 
active involvement in corporate governance. 
 
Industry trade associations have facilitated the roles played by their members in 
organizing collective action among institutions as well as promoting good corporate 
governance practice in UK. Therefore, Chinese industry trade associations are expected 
that they could learn from the UK experiences in ways to co-ordinate institutional 
shareholder engagement. Besides, the establishment of self-regulatory organizations 
will generate other benefits apart from promoting shareholder engagement in the 
Chinese context.  On one hand, trade associations could speed up the process of 
reducing political and administrative control over companies by relying more on 
indirect regulatory methods. On the other hand, it can enhance the government’s 
                                                          
4 Iain G MacNeil, An introduction to the law on financial investment (2nd, Hart Publishing 2012) 180. 
5  PE Davis, Private Pensions in OECD Countries (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 1997). 
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regulatory efficiency and capacity by co-operating with self-regulatory bodies. 
Moreover, the UK case show that provisions in the Codes or guidelines could pave way 
for the further legal changes in company law and securities law. As discussed in chapter 
two, China has established several industry trade associations as a sub-branch of the 
governmental supervision regulator. Given the fact that it is still at the initial stage, we 
could providing special support, such as training professional staffs, promoting 
industrial exchange to learn experience from other countries. In the meantime, the 
independence of the trade associations should be strengthened. The regulatory body 
could grant more power to those associations for the purpose of exercising its flexibility. 
Besides, internal regulation and governance of the trade associations is an important 
aspect to maintain its independence.   
 
Furthermore, the role of proxy voting services cannot be ignored. Foreign proxy voting 
services could be invited to develop their business in China as well as develop Chinese 
proxy voting services. The question of how to develop Chinese proxy voting services 
offers fertile ground for future research.  
 
Apart from establishing a more effective legislative framework and a more 
sophisticated institutional investor base, the cultivation of a culture of good corporate 
governance is also important. In the past Chinese history, the influence of political 
intervention and the worship for authority seems overgrowth. In the UK. many matters 
concerning the corporate governance are left to private ordering, whereas Chinese 
corporate legislation relies heavily on a mandatory approach, such as much of the 
governance in the UK goes beyond the legislative framework, using instead other less 
formal bodies of rules, such as governance codes with a ‘comply or explain’ 
enforcement approach, by contrast, it Chinese counterparts are largely compulsory in 
nature, issued by organs of the state, and backed by formal sanctions. Given the fact 
that neither the legal system in the UK nor the legislative framework in the US is 
equipped with optimal level of flexibility, we could say that the legal framework is 
evolved with the development of the society. With the increase in the complexity of the 
economic behaviour, the possibility of the foreseeing and prescribing everything by law 
is decreasing. Under this circumstances, the purpose of law is shifting from prescribing 
everything to allocating power to those institutions that could fix the problem caused 
by future contingency. Therefore, the soft law norm published by trade associations 
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could be regarded as a sign of legal improvement and cultural progress. As the culture 
cannot be nurtured overnight and it is not a matter simply regarding laws and theory, it 
demands long-term efforts and the assistance of government’s advocacy. 
 
6.5   Issues for further research 
 
The initially stated overarching aim of this research was to analyse the role of 
institutional shareholder activism and explore whether Chinese institutional 
shareholders are able to fulfil the responsibilities that are placed on them under the 
recent SOE reforms. Although the thesis has largely achieved this aim, there are 
limitations and weaknesses. Therefore, future researches could focus on following 
aspects.  
 
First, the typologies of institutional investors focused on as part of this research was 
limited. Only institutional shareholders who accounted for a relatively large percentage 
were analysed due to the limited available data and space constraints. Other types of 
institutional investors, such as foundations and endowments could form part of future 
studies.   
 
Second, in terms of the effects of institutional shareholder activism, only the financial 
results of shareholder activism were analysed. As sustainability is an issue growing in 
popularity, empirical research dealing with the relationship between activism and social 
and environmental outcomes could be collected and analysed. 
 
Third, the conclusion figures drawn at the end of chapter 4 and 5 are based on the 
investigation and analysation in these two chapters. Therefore, they are evidence-based 
interpretation of findings, rather than figures concluded from precise data analyse.  It 
constitutes an interesting topic for the future research to design a mathematical model 
to investigate the exact extent of correlation between factors.  
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